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1 MUTATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: THE EMERGENCE 
OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES 
1.1 Environmental Impacts of the Transport Industry 
The 21st Conference of Parties on Climate Change was held in Paris, from 30 November to 12 
December 2015, and ended with the signature of a historical agreement by the 196 parties 
represented. They agreed on a common goal to “hold the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C” (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2015). 
 
Figure 1.1 Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Source: (IPCC, 2014a) 
 
Figure 1.2 Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
There is now a clear evidence of the human contribution to climate change: Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated in its 2014 Synthesis Report: “Human influence on the 
climate system is clear and warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions […] are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century” (IPCC, 2014a). Figure 1.1 shows the level of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1850 and 2011, Figure 1.2 the concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere and Figure 1.3 the human contribution to global warming. 
Global warming could have major impacts on both natural and human systems. In (Thomas et al., 
2004), it is shown that between 15 and 37% of species could be “committed to extinction” in 2050 
on a sample of selected regions and species. According to a report released for the UK Government 
by Nicholas Stern, if no action is taken, the costs of climate change would be equivalent to the loss 
INTRODUCTION: ELECTRIC VEHICLES AT THE CONVERGENCE OF TWO INDUSTRIES IN MUTATION 
3 
 
of 5% of global GDP every year (Stern, 2007). This loss would be due to increase of extreme events 
such as floods, drought, cyclones or wildfire, impact on food production, increased sea level etc. 
 
Figure 1.3 Human Contribution to Change in Surface Temperature between 1951 and 2010. Source: (IPCC, 
2014a) 
To reach global warming target set by the Paris Agreement, global emissions of CO2 should 
drastically decrease in the coming decades. The International Energy Agency (IEA) published in 
the Energy Technology Perspectives 2017 the CO2 emissions in three different scenarios. The 
Reference Technology Scenario (RTS) takes into account today’s commitment by countries to limit 
emissions. The emissions of this scenario would result in a global increase of the temperature of 
2.7°C. The Two Degree Scenario (2DS) represent a pathway to limit global increase to 2°C, while 
the Below Two Degree Scenario (B2DS) represent the maximum practicable pathway of reduction 
of emissions. 
 
Figure 1.4 CO2 Emissions in the next decade to reach Paris Agreement Target Source: (International Energy 
Agency, 2017) 
Emissions of greenhouse gases mainly come from the burning of fossil fuels (oil, gas or coal). 
Figure 1.5 shows emissions by economic sector and distinguishes between direct emissions and 
indirect emissions (emissions for electricity and heat production). Transport sector represents 14 % 
of global emissions. Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of transport sector emissions between 1970 
and 2010 and the breakdown of emission by mean of transport. Road represents 72% of the total 
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transport emission with a sharp increase over the four last decades (1.73 GtCO2eq/year in 1970 
and 5.11 tCO2eq/year in 2010). Road transport is during this period almost only composed of 
Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles. Reduction of global CO2 emissions will inevitably mean 
first stabilization and then a reduction from emissions from road transport.  
Moreover, concerns are rising on the impact of road transport on local pollutant emission. The 
combustion of the fuel creates side products such as Carbon Monoxide, Nitrogen Oxides, Ozone 
and Particulate Matters. These pollutants can have effect on health and induce lung cancer and 
other respiratory illnesses. 
 
Figure 1.5 Global Greenhouse gas emissions by economic sector1. Source: (IPCC, 2014b) 
 
Figure 1.6 Evolution of CO2 emissions of transport industry between 1970 and 2010. Source: (IPCC, 2014b) 
                                                     
1 AFOLU stands for Agricultural Forestry and Other Land Use 
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1.2 Involvement of Policy Makers in the Development and Diffusion 
of Electric Vehicles 
1.2.1 The Necessity for Public Intervention 
CO2 emissions from road transportation is the product of three factors: 1) Demand for road transport 
in km, 2) Energy intensity of the vehicles in MJ/km and 3) Fuel Carbon Intensity of the vehicles in 
tCO2/MJ (IPCC, 2014b). Policy makers should target these three factors to achieve reduction of 
CO2 emissions of road transport. 
It is possible to decrease energy intensity of the vehicles by either improving efficiency (increase 
the efficiency of the engine, reduce air resistance by changing the shape) or by reducing the weight 
of the vehicles. However, it will not be possible to completely decarbonized ICE vehicles. Direct 
Carbon Emissions for average vehicle on the road and new ICE vehicles sold in France are given 
in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Direct Emission of Fuels. Source: (Ademe, 2017) 
  Emission factor 
(gCO2/L)2 
Consumption 
(L/ 100 km) 
Direct emission 
(gCO2/km) 
Average 
vehicle 
Gasoline 2280 7.84 179 
Diesel 2510 6.64 167 
Average 
new 
vehicle 
Gasoline 2280 5.1 117 
Diesel 2510 4.2 110 
It is thus necessary to change the fuel of the vehicle to obtain lower Fuel Carbon Intensity. This is 
the aim of Electric Vehicles, where fossil fuel is partly or totally replaced by electricity. It requires 
the addition of electricity storage in the vehicle (an electrochemical battery) and the replacement of 
the Internal Combustion Engine by an Electric Engine. 
If the vehicle only uses electricity as fuel, we will talk of Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV). If the vehicle 
uses both fossil fuel and electricity, we talk about Hybrid Electric Vehicle (HEV). If the battery of a 
HEV can be charged through an external plug, we talk of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle (PHEV).3  
Electric Vehicles (BEV or HEV) have no direct (or Tank-to-Wheel) emission of CO2 when the electric 
engine is running. However, in order to compare EVs and ICE vehicles, it is necessary to take into 
account CO2 emissions of the electricity used to charge the vehicle (Well-to-Wheel emissions). 
Before taking any action to develop electric cars, policy makers should therefore make a thorough 
assessment of the carbon footprint of electric cars taking into consideration the carbon footprint of 
the electricity generation. If indirect emissions for EVs were higher than direct emissions for ICE 
vehicles, the impact of a public policy to develop and diffuse electric cars would be negative on 
global warming4. 
Figure 1.7 shows the CO2 intensity of electricity generation in 2014 for European Union countries. 
With efficiency from the plug to the wheel around 80% and a consumption of the vehicle of 
0.2kWh/km, it appears than in most of EU countries, it would be beneficial to replace ICE cars by 
EVs. However, in some countries such as Poland, Estonia or Greece, where electricity generation 
is largely based on coal, the benefits from EVs are not clear. 
                                                     
2 Emission factor is intrinsic to the nature of the fuel. It represents the emission of CO2 for one liter of fuel 
3 In the following of the thesis, EV will stand for Battery Electric Vehicle 
4 As we have seen in Paragraph 1.1, impact of other pollutants of the ICE vehicles might be taken into account 
in a cost/benefit analysis of the Electric Vehicle 
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To complete this analysis, full life cycle of the vehicle should be taken into account to assess the 
impact of electric vehicles on greenhouse gas emissions, including production of the vehicle and 
the battery storage. Figure 1.8 shows the results of a study commissioned by the European 
Parliament. EV emits less greenhouse gas on its full life cycle with the European Union mix. 
However, when electricity mix is mainly based on coal generation, EV emits almost 15 tons of 
CO2eq more than ICE vehicle on its life cycle. 
 
Figure 1.7 Carbon Intensity of Electricity Generation in 2014 in European Union Source:(European 
Environment Agency, 2016)  
 
Figure 1.8 Lifecycle GHG emissions of 24 kWh BEV and ICE vehicle. Source: (European Parliament, 2018) 
Based on these results, it appears that switching from ICE vehicle to EVs would be beneficial for 
policy makers to reach their target on CO2 emissions if electricity is produced with low carbon 
intensive technologies. However, back in the beginning of 2010’ decade, EVs were suffering 
multiple drawbacks for consumers compared to ICE vehicles. 
First, the entire road mobility system was built during the last century around ICE cars. It is a mature 
system, with an already existing complete infrastructure. There is a dense network of gas stations 
to fill-in the cars when necessary. On the contrary, there are very few public charging points (no 
more than 3,000 in Europe). 
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Moreover, electrochemical storage was still an immature technology, with low energy density and 
high costs. First EVs commercialized at this period had low autonomy and were more expensive 
than similar ICE vehicles. 
As a result, consumers were reluctant to buy an electric vehicle, first because of “range anxiety” 
(fear of having an empty battery without being able to charge the car) and because of high price of 
EVs. There were only 11,000 EVs sold back in 2011 in Europe, which represented a market share 
of only 0.01%. Because of this limited market, car manufacturers were reluctant to deeply invest in 
Research and Development in electric vehicles and to install new assembly lines. 
In (Greene et al., 2014), the authors list six economic barriers that “lock in” ICE vehicles and “lock 
out” electric vehicles: 
 Technological limitations of electric power-drives 
 High costs that can be reduced by experience 
 High costs that can be reduced by volume 
 Consumer’s aversion to novel products 
 Lack of diversity of choice 
 Limited infrastructure for EVs 
There are some positive externalities to the adoption of electric vehicles (global warming reductions, 
air quality), which are not reflected in the price of EVs and require the intervention of policy makers. 
The public intervention can take multiple forms and we will give some examples. 
1.2.2 Some examples of public intervention 
Public intervention can target supply, infrastructures provision or demand side public policies. On 
the supply side, policy makers can decide to impose stringent regulation on emission of pollutants, 
in order to stimulate private R&D efforts in both Energy efficiency for ICE cars and Battery 
technologies and electric engines for EV cars. It will also incentivize manufacturer to diversify their 
offer of EVs and to make the appropriate marketing efforts to sell these vehicles. This type of 
regulation was first put in place in 1975 in the US (“Corporate Average Fuel Economy” - CAFE 
standard). The production-weighted average consumption of vehicles produced by each 
manufacturer is calculated. If this score is higher than the standard, the manufacturer should pay a 
civil penalty or buy credits to other manufacturer below the standard. A similar regulation was put 
in place in 2010 in the European Union, with a 2015 target set at 130 gCO2/km5 and a 2021 target 
set at 95 gCO2/km.  
Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show the average CO2 emissions by manufacturer in 2010 and in 2016. 
Manufacturers have lowered their emissions during this period in order to meet up this target, 
showing the efficacy of the regulation. With the 2021 target, manufacturers have to find other ways 
to reduce this average emission, which mean selling more EVs.  
Public intervention can also target the development of the charging infrastructure. It is done at the 
local level, at the national level or at the supra-national (European) level. For example, in France 
the Advenir program gives a subsidy corresponding to 40 % to 50 % of the costs for installation of 
public or private charging point. More than 4000 installations have benefited from this program. 
It is also possible to intervene on pushing demand, through direct financial support in cash and/or 
non-financial incentives like bus-lane access or free parking fees. Many countries in Europe decided 
to put in place public subsidies for buyer of electric cars: France introduced a fixed subsidy of 
6,000 € for electric vehicles, Norway an exemption of VAT and registration taxes and the possibility 
to use bus-lanes for EVs (Haugneland and Kvisle, 2015). 
                                                     
5 Target for an average weight of the fleet corresponding to the average weight of Passenger cars in Europe. 
The target is lower is the average weight of the fleet is lower and higher in the other case, as can be seen on 
Figure 1.9 
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Figure 1.9 Average CO2 emissions per km by Manufacturer in European Union in 2010. Source: (European 
Environment Agency, 2017) 
 
Figure 1.10 Average CO2 emissions per km by Manufacturer in European Union in 2016. Source: (European 
Environment Agency, 2017) 
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These different schemes resulted in a lowering of the different aforementioned barriers. On the 
supply-side, stringent standards have incentivized manufacturers to invest in R&D to develop new 
electric vehicles and in marketing to sell them, which allowed them to gain experience and to 
increase volume production. In particular, battery prices have decreased drastically during the last 
decade, as can be seen in Figure 1.11. It also led to a diversification of EV models proposed by 
manufacturers. Energy density of the battery increased, which allowed increasing the capacity of 
the installed battery and the density of the charging infrastructure increased, reducing “range 
anxiety” issues. 
Number of EVs on the road has more than tripled between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 1.12). There are 
now more than 3 million EVs on the road, two thirds being BEVs. China is the first country in term 
of stock, with almost 1 million EVs on the road at the end of 2017. However, EV sales remain limited 
in most of top-10 countries, ranging from 0 to 2%, apart from Norway where EV sales now represent 
40% of market share (Figure 1.13). 
 
Figure 1.11 Lithium-ion price developments. Source: (International Energy Agency, 2018) 
 
Figure 1.12 EV stock in major regions and in Top 10 countries. Source: (International Energy Agency, 2018) 
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The transition from the ICE vehicle road system to a coexistence of ICE vehicles and EVs is a 
lengthy and costly process, which implies the modification of an existing mature transportation 
system and the creation of a new ecosystem. It implies the creation of interfaces between the 
different actors of the system and the standardization of the communication between them to allow 
interoperability of solutions (Brown et al., 2010).  
In particular, there will be new interactions between EVs and the electricity system. We will see in 
the second section of this chapter how electricity systems have completely mutated in the last 
decades and how EVs and electricity systems might interact in the third section. 
 
Figure 1.13 Market Share and Sales in Top-Ten Countries. Source: (International Energy Agency, 2018) 
2 MUTATION OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: LIBERALIZATION 
AND DECARBONIZATION 
2.1 Liberalization of Electric Industries and Design of Electricity 
Markets 
At the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, following the expansion and the 
interconnection of electricity networks at the national level, state-owned regulated monopolies were 
in charge of the entire value chain of the electricity industry in most developed countries. This value 
chain is split in four different parts: generation of electricity, transmission (which includes 
management of High Voltage networks and System Operations), distribution (Medium and Low 
voltage networks) and retail of electricity to final consumers. This type of architecture was the results 
of different factors:  
 The need for large public investments at the end of Second World War to electrify countries 
to allow economic growth; 
 The nature of electricity, which cannot be stored and requires high level of coordination 
between the different part of the value chain, in both short term and long term;  
 Electricity sector was thought to be a natural monopoly, meaning that it would be more 
costly to have multi-firm production than to have a monopoly, due to high capital costs. 
However, in the end of the 20th century, this architecture began to be criticized (Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1988). Arrival of new and more efficient generation technologies such as CCGT 
questioned the fact that generation was a natural monopoly. Competition at the generation and 
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retail level was believed to foster innovation and efficiency and would allow reducing retail prices 
for final consumers. There was a consensus that liberalizing this sector would benefit to society in 
the long-term (Joskow, 2008). Distribution and transmission levels, due to their high investment 
costs, have always been considered as natural monopolies. However, there was also a need to 
give them better incentives to be more efficient.  
Opening of competition on the generation and retail businesses also required to unbundle legal 
monopolies by separating transmission and distribution structures from generation and retail, to 
avoid conflict of interests and allow new competitors to enter the market. Moreover, an independent 
body should be created, which will be in charge of creating the rules of new markets and supervise 
competition. This process was first put in place in UK in the 80s, followed by some US States and 
European Union.  
However, there was still a need for coordination between the different elements of the value chain, 
as the physics of electricity remained the same. The process to allow this coordination was 
internalized before reforms in the vertical-integrated companies. With liberalization, this 
coordination is done through markets, by confronting supply of electricity and demand. These 
markets must be organized, meaning that rules should be set in order to allow coordination, from 
short-term to long-term, in an efficient way, while ensuring security of supply.  
It is possible to distinguish different sequences in electricity markets. Electricity being a flow, it is 
impossible to store it in the form of electricity, (it is possible to store it in another form of energy – 
chemical, electrostatic, mechanical, thermal…). Every Watt produced at one point of the system 
should be consumed at another point. The main objective of electricity markets is to ensure a 
balance between supply and demand, at the most effective cost. Figure 1.14 gives an overview of 
these different sequences. 
Market actors are called Balance Responsible Parties (BRP) in power markets. A BRP can have 
generation assets and/or retailer, but it can also be a pure energy trader, without any generation or 
consumers. A Balance Responsible Party has the legal duty to have a balanced perimeter, meaning 
that every generated or bought energy has to be either consumed by its clients or sold in the market.  
The different markets where BRPs can trade energy are in blue in Figure 1.14. There are three 
different type of markets: future energy markets, where BRPs can trade energy for the coming 
years, months or weeks; Day Ahead Market (DAM) where BRPs can trade energy for the next day; 
and intraday market, where BRPs can trade energy for the coming hours. On these markets, the 
price of energy for a certain delivery period will be determine by confrontation of offer and demand: 
BRPs wanting to sell energy (e.g. producers) will make offer bids, based on their costs, while BRPs 
wanting to buy energy (e.g. retailer) will make demand bids based on their willingness to pay.  
The price and the amount of energy traded for this delivery period is the point where demand curve 
(demand bids sorted in decreasing order) meets offer curve (offer bids sorted in increasing order). 
BRP will trade on these different markets based on the information they have on forecast of 
generation and consumption. The closer from real-time, the better will be this information. However, 
it will also be more costly to balance near real-time, as resources might be scarce. 
In parallel, Transmission System Operator (TSO), in charge of balancing the system, procures 
reserve. Reserve is provided by flexible actors (Balancing Services Provider – BSP) able to adjust 
their consumption or generation output to rebalance the system in case of imbalance. It means 
these actors will not produce or consume at the maximum or the minimum output, in order to be 
able to change it when required.  
There are different types of reserve, depending on the reactivity of the resources to an imbalance 
and the duration of the deviation from its original output. BSPs can be paid based on the capacity 
(in MW) they offer and on the activated reserve (in MWh).  
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There are two types of reserve:  
 Upward reserve: activated when there is more consumption than generation on the 
network and correspond to an increase of generation or a decrease of consumption, 
  Downward reserve activated when there is more generation than consumption. 
Finally, BRPs can offer energy they were not able to trade in the different market sequences on the 
balancing mechanism to the TSO. It increases the amount of available balancing energy for the 
TSO, but BRPs is only remunerated for this energy if the reserve is activated. 
In real-time, based on the observed imbalance on the system, TSO will activate the different 
reserves in order to rebalance the system. Frequency deviations around its nominal value are the 
reflection of imbalance of the network. If frequency is above its nominal value, it means that there 
is more generation than consumption and vice-versa.  
TSO activates reserve based on administrative rules (e.g. pro-rata activation) or merit-order rules. 
For upward reserve, TSO remunerates the BSPs for extra-energy generated: TSO activates 
reserve in increasing order of bid prices. For downward reserve, BRPs remunerate TSOs for energy 
not produced due to reserve activation: TSO activates reserve in decreasing order of bid prices. 
After real-time, TSO calculates imbalance of each BRP. If BRP perimeter is negative (meaning 
consumption and energy sold is higher than generation and energy bought), BRP remunerates TSO 
for energy not generated or bought on markets. It will buy this energy at a high price, reflecting 
costs for TSO to rebalance the network. If perimeter is positive, TSO remunerates BRP for extra-
energy bought or generated at a low price. This imbalance settlement process gives an incentive 
to BRPs to balance their perimeter before real-time. 
 
Figure 1.14 Electricity markets general architecture 
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2.2 Towards Massive Penetration of Renewables and Distributed 
Energy Resources 
We have seen in Paragraph 1.2 that decarbonization of the electricity sector was a prerequisite to 
an efficient decarbonization of road transport through electric vehicles diffusion. More generally, 
decarbonization of electricity generation is the major goal to achieve CO2 emissions target. Table 
1.2 gives CO2 emissions per kWh of different electricity generation technology. 
Table 1.2 CO2 Intensity for different electricity generation technologies. Source: (Ademe, 2017) 
 Technology kgCO2eq/kWh 
Thermal Generation 
Coal 1.06 
Oil 0.73 
Gas 0.418 
Nuclear 6.10-3 
Renewable Generation 
Onshore Wind 0.0127 
Offshore Wind 0.0148 
Hydroelectric 6.10-3 
Photovoltaic 0.055 
Geothermic 0.045 
It appears clearly that decarbonization of the electricity sector could be achieved by replacement of 
fossil fuels generation assets by renewable energy assets and nuclear assets. However, there are 
main economic barriers to this shift: 
 At the beginning of the 21st century, renewable technologies are costly and relatively 
immature compared to thermal technologies 
 Electricity networks have been designed for centralized large generation assets, 
whereas renewable generation is decentralized and distributed technology. 
 Wind and photovoltaic technologies are non-dispatchable technologies and generation 
is not synchronized with consumption 
 There is mistrust toward nuclear energy generation in public opinion after Fukushima 
catastrophe in 2011. 
As for electric vehicles, there are negative externalities with associated with generation from fossil 
fuels that are not reflected in market prices. Policy makers designed different instruments to foster 
penetration of renewable energy in the electricity generation mix: 
 Following Kyoto conference, a market for CO2 emissions was created in European 
Union (called European Union Trading Scheme – ETS). Policy makers fix an annual 
global level of CO2 emissions at the European level and allocate quotas to companies, 
which then can trade quotas with each other.  
 Subsidies to renewable energy generation, which can take different forms (feed-in tariff, 
feed-in premium, green certificates…). 
 Tax credit for the installation of renewable energy generation assets 
These different schemes allowed for an increasing penetration of renewable energies in the two 
last decades, in particular photovoltaic and wind generation, in most European countries, with 
contrasted results in different countries (Figure 1.15 and Figure 1.16). This diffusion allowed a 
reduction of costs for solar and wind technologies, as shown in Figure 1.17. The governments in 
the coming decades will pursue this transition toward low carbon generation of electricity. In the 
middle to long term, it could mean having a 100% renewable energy mix in order to meet targets of 
the COP21. 
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Figure 1.15 Electricity Generation by Technology in European Union between 2004 and 2016. Source: 
(Eurostat, 2017) 
 
Figure 1.16 Share of Renewables in Electricity Generation in 2016. Source: (Eurostat, 2017) 
 
Figure 1.17 Learning curve of photovoltaic cells. Source: (IRENA, 2017) 
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2.3 The Challenge of Increasing Flexibility Requirements 
The massive penetration of renewables in the electricity generation mix will have major impacts on 
the operation of electricity networks Photovoltaic and wind electricity is by nature non-dispatchable. 
Generation cannot be controlled according to market needs but is a function of the availability of 
the resource (irradiation of sun or wind speed). We call residual consumption the part of 
consumption not fed by non-dispatchable resources. Thermal or hydro generation units must feed 
this residual consumption. System operators might face issues of ramp-up of the residual 
consumption, due to intermittency of renewable resources (Navid and Rosenwald, 2012) (called 
duck-effect, see Figure 1.18). This effect can also be seen in the price curve, with higher peak price 
due to ramp-up issues (Figure 1.19). 
Moreover, photovoltaic and wind assets are not synchronized to the frequency of the electricity 
network, meaning they do not participate to the global inertia of the system. Imbalances between 
consumption and generation will have bigger impacts on the frequency of the system (Ahmadyar 
et al., 2018)(Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015). 
Finally, photovoltaic and wind generation cannot be perfectly forecasted, meaning System 
Operators should be able to face increasing short-term imbalances on the network. 
In order to manage these different effects, System Operators will need more flexibility from the 
actors of the electricity system. They will require faster ramping-up assets to follow residual 
consumption and more and faster reserves in order to manage balancing between generation and 
consumption.  
 
Figure 1.18 The duck-curve in California – Residual Consumption between 2012 and 2020. Source: (US 
Department of Energy, 2017) 
 
Figure 1.19 Average Hourly Price in California 
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The flexibility of an asset can be described by different essential attributes (Eid et al., 2016)(Ulbig 
and Andersson, 2015). These attributes are illustrated in Figure 1.20:  
 The direction of power adjustment (upward or downward). 
 The availability in time 
 The power capacity of the adjustment (in MW) 
 The maximum duration of the adjustment 
 Energy 
 The delay between notification and activation 
 The location on the grid 
 
Figure 1.20 Attributes of flexibility assets. Source; (Eid et al., 2016) 
TSOs will define technical requirements (maximum delay, minimum ramping capabilities, minimum 
duration etc.) in different flexibility markets to be able to manage effectively balancing of the 
network. Depending on their characteristics, assets will bid their flexibility on the markets where 
they are able to meet technical requirements while getting the better remuneration. 
In conclusion, there is now a clear need for more flexible assets on the electricity system to cope 
with the integration of renewable systems. Price signals in the electricity markets should reflect 
these middle/long term needs for new investments. 
Moreover, every sources of flexibility should be considered to participate in the markets, including 
demand-side flexibilities. 
3 USING ELECTRIC VEHICLES AS DISTRIBUTED FLEXIBILITY 
ASSETS 
3.1 Challenges and Opportunities of Massive Diffusion of EVs for 
Electricity Systems 
In addition to the massive penetration of renewable energy generation, a massive uptake of EVs 
will represent another challenge for System Operators. This new electricity consumption could in 
the coming years impact the long-term adequacy between offer and demand, for both energy and 
power and both in term of generation asset and network (distribution and transmission). 
It is possible to calculate some order of magnitude of these impacts. For example in France, the 
annual mileage of a personal car is about 17,000 km. With a consumption of 0.20 kWh/km, the 
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annual consumption of 1 million EVs would be about 3.4 TWh, which represent an increase of the 
2017 electricity consumption (475 TWh) by 0.7 %.  
With respect to the capacity increase, if every vehicle charge at the same time with a power plug of 
3 kW, the instantaneous consumption of these vehicles would be 3 GW, which represent an 
increase of 3 % compared to the historical peak consumption in France and the generation output 
of about two nuclear units. Moreover, as people typically plug-in when they come back from home, 
the consumption from Electric Vehicles would be synchronized with peak consumption and could 
aggravate the so-called “duck-curve”. 
These order of magnitude shows that EVs will represent a major challenge in term of capacity, 
which is the major determinant of electricity networks. Indeed, System Operator will size the network 
in order to fit the maximum peak consumption. In case of a major diffusion of Electric Vehicles and 
if these vehicles charge as soon as plugged (“dumb” charging), System Operators will have to 
reinforce the entire network, which would imply massive investments. It would be particularly true 
for distribution networks, in places where EVs would diffuse rapidly, such as cities. However, it is 
possible to pilot charging pattern of the vehicle in order to reduce stress to the network and provide 
flexibility services to System Operators. 
Personal vehicles have on average very low utilization rates. According to a survey conducted by 
the French government in 2008 (Ministère de la Transition Ecologique et Solidaire, 2008), 42 % of 
vehicles are circulating less than two hours a week, which represents a utilization rate of 1.1% and 
89 % of the vehicles are circulating less than 8 hours a week (utilization rate of 4.7%). Moreover, 
75% of vehicles have a daily mileage of less than 42 km. For EVs, it means that, potentially, the car 
is plugged to the network 95 % of the time and need a daily recharge of less than 8 kWh (if we 
consider an average consumption of 0.2 kWh/km). Considering that the typical EVSE at home is 
about 3 kW, it means that it would take only 3 hours to charge completely the car for daily trips.  
We have seen in the previous paragraph that System Operators might face an issue of increasing 
peak consumption in case of “dumb charging”. Personal cars are often at home during the entire 
night, the vehicle might be plugged to the network for more than 8 hours. It might not be necessary, 
in most cases, to charge the vehicle as soon as plugged. It would be preferable to delay charging 
hour to charge the vehicle during period of low consumption. This process is called load-shifting as 
consumption is delayed from peak to off-peak period 
It is required to have a price signal to allow this delay of charging pattern. Different types of price 
signals have been studied in the literature (Gyamfi et al., 2013). From the simplest to the more 
complex price structure: 
 Time-of-Use (TOU) price: electricity is charged at predefined different prices within 
predefined time periods 
 Critical Peak Pricing (CPP): electricity is charged at a very high price for a certain 
number of days or hours during the year with extreme peak situations 
 Real-Time-Pricing (RTP): electricity is charged at a price reflecting real-time evolutions 
of electricity markets 
Simple price structure like TOU will not ensure a perfect load shifting as consumption is displaced 
to a fixed period, which might not match with volatility of consumption, and might create secondary 
peaks of consumption as vehicles will start charging at the same time. However, they are simpler 
to implement (TOU tariffs exist in France since the 50s) and do not expose client to price risks. RTP 
price could perform more effective load shifting but might be more complex to put in place and 
expose the client to significant price risks. Allowing bidirectional flows between the battery and the 
grid would increase the flexibility potential of the vehicle, as shown in Figure 1.21. This technology 
was called Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G)6.  
                                                     
6 In the following of the thesis, V2G and bidirectional capability will be used as synonyms 
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Figure 1.21 Flexibility Potential for Unidirectional and Bidirectional Capabilities 
Moreover, it is possible to use flexibility of the EV to offer services to TSO on reserve markets and 
balancing mechanisms, to increase the value of this flexibility. These services being remunerated 
by TSOs, provision of flexibility would allow reducing cost of recharge of the Vehicles. We will see 
in the next paragraph which types of flexibility could be addressed with electric vehicles. 
3.2 Which Flexibility Services for Fleet of EVs? 
First and priority service provide by an Electric Vehicle is mobility. Flexibility provision should not 
endanger the delivery of this service to the customer. We can distinguish two time-scales in the 
provision of mobility services: 
 Short time scale: flexibility provision should not endanger capability of the user to do its 
next trip at the end of the charging session, meaning that battery should have enough 
energy to run for the desired mileage. 
 Long time scale: battery capacity is affected by the number of cycles that will occur during 
its lifetime. Car manufacturer guarantee the battery for a certain mileage of the vehicle and 
for a certain capacity fading. Provision of flexibility should not reduce extensively battery 
lifetime. (Wang et al., 2016) 
It is necessary to manage smartly charging pattern of the vehicles to reduce these two constraints 
but also to find the appropriate services, which allow maximizing value while fitting with the 
characteristics of EVs. 
We will give an overview of main flexibility services in Europe and the associated technical 
requirement. Then we will analyze if these services fit with EVs characteristics (with unidirectional 
or bidirectional capabilities), and give order of magnitude on possible remuneration. These different 
services are not accessible by a single user. It will be necessary to pool a fleet of EVs to make 
offers on the markets. The party that will manage charging patterns of the vehicles and make offers 
on the markets is called aggregator.  
3.2.1 Energy Arbitrage 
The first way to use flexibility of EVs charging pattern is to do energy arbitrage: with unidirectional 
capabilities, the principle, explained in Paragraph 3.1 is to charge the battery at the least costs 
given volatility of electricity price. With bidirectional capabilities, it is also possible to feed electricity 
into the grid when electricity prices are high. Figure 1.22 shows average prices in Day Ahead Market 
for year 2017 in six different countries. The trend of price evolution during the day is the same in 
every countries: peak price around 8:00 and 18:00 and low prices during night. However, the range 
of variation is not the same in every countries and shows high seasonality, as can be seen if Figure 
1.23.  
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Figure 1.22 Average Spot Prices in 2017 
 
Figure 1.23 Daily Range of variation of Spot Price in 2017 in France 
We can assess potential savings through energy arbitrage on a simple case: a vehicle has to charge 
6 kWh of energy on 3 kW power plug every night. The vehicle is plugged at 6 pm. We look at seven 
different scenarios: 
 Unidirectional-0: Charge as soon as plugged 
 Unidirectional-1: Charge between 3am and 5am each night 
 Unidirectional-2: Charge during the two hours with lowest price each night 
 Bidirectional-1: Charge during the two hours with lowest price each night. Discharge of 1 
hour during the 10 days when it is the most economically efficient (days with high range of 
price variation). 
 Bidirectional-2: Charge during the two hours with lowest price each night. Discharge of 1 
hour during the 50 days when it is the most economically efficient  
 Bidirectional-3: Charge during the two hours with lowest price each night. Discharge of 1 
hour during the 100 days when it is the most economically efficient  
Figure 1.24 shows the cost of charging over year 2016 for different countries. It is clear that most 
of the value is captured with scenario Uni-1 and this value is higher in countries with high amplitude 
between peak and off-peak periods (France and Belgium). In these countries, bidirectional charging 
also allows decreasing substantially costs of charging.  
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However, most of the value can be captured with a limited number of discharging hours. Figure 
1.25 shows the additional savings compared to scenario Uni-2 in function of the number of hours 
of discharge. It shows that marginal value of each additional hour of discharging is decreasing 
rapidly. This is due to seasonality of volatility of electricity price. 
 
Figure 1.24 Costs of charging over year 2016 for different charging patterns 
 
Figure 1.25 Value of Bidirectionality for Energy Arbitrage (Compared to Uni-2 Scenario) 
For unidirectional capability, energy arbitrage will have no impact on battery degradation, as there 
are no additional cycles on the battery. For short-term mobility needs, the user of the vehicles would 
have to inform its next hour of departure and minimum amount of energy required to perform the 
trip, in order to manage charge pattern to meet these targets. 
For bidirectional capabilities, discharging the battery will induce more cycles, which might affect 
battery lifetime and create extra-costs for the user (Thompson, 2018). As we have seen, the 
marginal value of each hour of discharging is decreasing. The aggregator should select the hours 
where discharging will have a higher value than battery degradation. The implementation of energy 
arbitrage would be relatively simple. 
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3.2.2 Reserve Provision 
As seen in Paragraph 2.1, Transmissions System Operators are in charge of balancing the system. 
To do so, they contract with flexibility actors, able to adjust their generation or consumption in order 
to rebalance the network. 
By managing power rate of the EVSE of the fleet in their pool, aggregators could provide such 
flexibility services. However, depending on the characteristics of the product provided, impact on 
mobility needs and battery degradation might differ.  
We will focus on design of reserve in continental Europe in this section. 
 
Figure 1.26 Balancing Reserve as defined by ENTSO-e 
The ENTSO-e has created three types of reserve, harmonized across all continental Europe, which 
differs in the delay of activation and length of the adjustment: 
 Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR): it is the first activated reserve. Activation is based 
on frequency deviations, which reflects imbalances. BSPs have to measure frequency and 
to react to frequency deviations (following characteristics showed in Figure 1.27). The BSP 
should completely activate reserve within 30 seconds after a frequency deviation and be 
able to maintain reserve activation for at least 15 minutes. Remuneration is based on 
capacity offered. 
 Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR): it is activated only in the bidding zone responsible 
for the imbalance. It should have a delay of activation of 15 seconds and be fully activated 
in less than 15 minutes. It can be activated automatically (aFRR) by a signal sent by the 
TSO, with dynamic profile (meaning activation rate7 is a linear variable between 0 and 1), 
or manually activated (mFRR) and static profile (activation rate is binary). Remuneration is 
based on capacity offered and on energy delivered. 
 Replacement Reserve (RR): reserves activated in more than 15 minutes. Remuneration is 
based on capacity and on energy delivered. It is static profile reserve only.  
Aggregators should privilege services with high remuneration of capacity, low activation rate of the 
reserve and short duration of reserve activation. This type of service will have lower impact on short-
term and long-term mobility needs.  
                                                     
7 Activation rate is the percentage of offered reserve that is activated at a certain time. 
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Figure 1.27 Power-Frequency curve for FCR Provision (generator convention) 
As energy storage is limited, it will not be possible to offer the entire capacity of the EVSE if duration 
of reserve activation or activation rate is high. Moreover, if activation rate is low, there will be less 
impact on battery degradation for bidirectional vehicles. For unidirectional vehicles, availability of 
the vehicle is low as a vehicle cannot provide reserve as soon as battery is fully charged. Provision 
of reserve will have low impacts on battery degradation (as it will not affect number of cycles). 
Impacts on mobility needs will depend on the direction of reserve provision: if downward reserve is 
provided (increase of consumption), there will be no impact on mobility needs whereas upward 
reserve provision (decrease of consumption) could have impacts, as charge will be delayed.  
FCR has ideal characteristics for bidirectional EVs: remuneration is only based on capacity, 
activation rate is very low (as shown in Figure 1.28) and duration of reserve activation is only 15 
minutes. However, implementation of these types of services would be more complicated, as EVSE 
should be able to react rapidly enough to frequency deviations and store data on power 
adjustments. 
 
Figure 1.28 Histogram of Activation Rate in Continental Europe for FCR in 2016 
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Automatic FRR have activation rate and duration of reserve activation much higher than FCR, which 
could have high impacts on mobility needs. For static services (mFRR and RR), unidirectional 
strategy should be preferred: the vehicle will stop charging on request of the TSO. It will not affect 
battery degradation but will have impacts on mobility needs. It is simpler to implement, as delay to 
activate reserve is longer and provision of reserve is binary. 
 
Figure 1.29 Histogram of Activation Rate in France for aFRR in 2016 
3.2.3 Other Sources of Value 
It exists other types of sources of value for unidirectional and bidirectional vehicles: 
 Self-consumption if user possess a generation asset. The value of self-consumption will 
depend on the spread between 1) the retail price of electricity and 2) the Feed-in-Tariff for 
renewable generation The higher the spread, the higher the value of maximizing self-
consumption 
 Value on capacity markets, created in some European countries. EVs have to curtail 
consumption or reinject electricity during a certain number of peak hours. It reflects the 
value of investing in new generation assets to cope with peak consumption hours 
 Value for distribution grids. By managing charging patterns of EVs, it is possible to avoid 
local congestion on distribution grids. Electricity Distribution Companies could avoid new 
investments on transformers to cope with peak consumption situations. EVs could also 
provide voltage regulation. 
3.3 A Literature Review on Smart Charging of Electric Vehicles 
We have seen in the previous paragraph that charging patterns of Electric Vehicles can be 
managed by aggregators to offer flexibility services and reduce charging costs. However, this 
process should take into consideration mobility needs of the user to ensure that he will have 
sufficient amount of energy for his next trip, through algorithms. 
Extensive reviews of the literature was performed in (García-Villalobos et al., 2014) and (Hu et al., 
2016). According to these two reviews, algorithms can be categorized according to four main 
parameters: Characteristics of vehicles studied, control strategy of the operator, objective of the 
algorithm and optimization method. 
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3.3.1 Characteristics of Vehicles 
When assessing possible value of smart charging, it is necessary to decide on the characteristics 
of the vehicles in the fleet: 
 Battery capacity and limitations on the State-of-Charge 
 Maximum power of the EVSE 
 Unidirectional or Bidirectional capabilities 
 Trip patterns 
 Efficiency of the charger 
It is possible to include heterogeneity in the vehicles of the fleet. Moreover, the aggregator can have 
or not perfect foresight on the parameters of the vehicles. 
3.3.2 Control Strategy of the Operator 
We can distinguish between centralized and decentralized control.  
 In centralized control, EVs will send data on their status (State of Charge of the battery, 
hour of departure etc.) to a central controller. Based on data, central controller will decide 
on a charging pattern, which will be sent to every vehicle of the fleet (Han et al., 2010) 
(Sortomme et al., 2011) (Kang et al., 2013) 
 In decentralized control, the aggregator will send a price signal to each EV, which will 
decide on their charging patterns according to this price signal. Optimization is performed 
at the local level (Vaya and Andersson, 2012).  
 In (Hu et al., 2016), authors also identified transactive control, where EVs will send back 
their charging patterns to the aggregator, which will adapt its price signal until an equilibrium 
is reached. 
Centralized control will be more costly to implement and computation requirements for aggregator 
will be high, as he should get all information necessary to decide its strategy.  
Decentralized control will be less expensive to implement and ensure a good level of privacy for the 
users regarding data they send to the aggregator. However, it is necessary for the aggregator to 
forecast the reaction of aggregated units to the price signal. 
3.3.3 Objective of the Algorithm 
There is a variety of objectives of the aggregator in the literature. According to the classification 
used in (Hu et al., 2016), we can distinguish four types of objectives:  
 Providing ancillary services to Transmission System Operators, typically provision of 
reserve services (Kempton and Tomić, 2005)(Codani et al., 2016)(Sortomme and El-
Sharkawi, 2011)(Jargstorf and Wickert, 2013) 
 Providing ancillary services to Distribution System Operators, which can include limitation 
of congestion, power losses, imbalance between phases in three-phased systems, voltage 
regulation (Deilami et al., 2011)(García-Villalobos et al., 2016) 
 Providing storage services to renewable energy source supplier (e.g. self-consumption) 
(van der Kam and van Sark, 2015) (Soares M.C. Borba et al., 2012) 
 Minimizing charging cost for electric vehicle owner (Sundström and Binding, 2012) 
These different objectives can be cumulated by the aggregator and might conflict against one 
another. Associated with these different objectives, the algorithm will minimize a cost function, 
which can be an economic cost (if it is possible to monetize the service) or a technical cost. 
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3.3.4 Optimization Method 
Finally, the aggregator will have to define a method of optimization. We will not go in the detail of 
the different algorithms. 
 There is a trade-off for the aggregators between computation time and accuracy of the optimization. 
3.4 Toward the Elaboration of Business Models for Aggregator 
If the above-mentioned literature is extensive and explored a wide diversity of algorithms and control 
strategies, there is however a lack of understanding of the value of this technology and how it could 
come to market. Business model can be defined as “the rationale of how an organization creates, 
delivers, and captures value in economic, social, cultural or other contexts” 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_model). Elaboration of business model should therefore 
take into account: 
 Possible revenues of the solution under realistic hypothesis of market rules 
 Costs of implementation of the solution 
 Risks associated with the development of the solution 
 Willingness of users to adopt the solution 
 Cooperation with other actors of the value chain and interfaces to develop 
We identified different level of gaps in the literature to go from smart charging algorithm definition 
to realistic business models.  
First, it is needed to transcribe technical results in possible monetary value, either for the system or 
for the users. Moreover, if there is no market to monetized this value, there is no possible viable 
business-value for the solution.  
Second, evaluation of revenues should be done in realistic conditions in term of market-design. 
Indeed, market-design could hinder participation of the fleet.  
Then, costs of the implementation of the solution should be thoroughly assessed. The different risks 
that could affect the value of the solution should also be taken into consideration, by performing 
sensitivity analysis.  
Finally, designing a viable business model means assessing how the value should be shared 
between the different actors of the value chain and the client.  
These different gaps identified in the relevant literature are presented in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3 Gaps in the relevant literature 
Gap in the literature 
Papers where the gap was 
identified 
Papers trying to bridge this 
gap 
Revenues of the smart charging solution 
is not evaluated, only technical results 
are given 
(Han et al., 2010) 
(Sortomme et al., 2011) 
(Kang et al., 2013) 
(Vaya and Andersson, 2012) 
(Deilami et al., 2011) 
(García-Villalobos et al., 2016) 
(van der Kam and van Sark, 2015) 
(Soares M.C. Borba et al., 2012) 
(Sundström and Binding, 2012) 
(Kempton and Tomić, 2005) 
(Codani et al., 2016) 
(Sortomme and El-Sharkawi, 2011) 
(Jargstorf and Wickert, 2013) 
(Dang et al., 2015) 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
Smart charging solution cannot be 
monetized due to inexistent market 
(Dang et al., 2015)  
Smart charging solution revenues are 
assessed in unrealistic conditions, not 
taking into account market-design and its 
possible evolutions 
(Sortomme and El-Sharkawi, 2011) (Codani et al., 2016) 
(Jargstorf and Wickert, 2013) 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
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Cost of implementing the solution are not 
considered 
(Codani et al., 2016) 
(Sortomme and El-Sharkawi, 2011) 
(Jargstorf and Wickert, 2013) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
(Kempton and Tomić, 2005) 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
No sensitivity analysis is performed on 
the value of the solution 
(Kempton and Tomić, 2005) 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
User willingness to adopt the solution is 
not taken into account 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
(Parsons et al., 2014) 
(Geske and Schumann, 2018) 
Value sharing between different actors of 
the value chain is not taken into account 
(Codani et al., 2016) 
(Sortomme and El-Sharkawi, 2011) 
(Jargstorf and Wickert, 2013) 
(Dang et al., 2015) 
(Tomić and Kempton, 2007) 
(Noori et al., 2016) 
(Gough et al., 2017) 
(DeForest et al., 2018) 
 
4 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
These gaps are complex to bridge but crucial to assess the viability of a smart charging solution. 
We will try to do so in this thesis, adopting the point of view of an investor. We take the following 
hypothesis and restrictions in our studies. We will focus on European markets, which offers the 
opportunity to study diversified and evolving markets, with an increasing development of Electric 
Vehicles. We will restrict our study to EVs equipped with bidirectional chargers and on markets 
offering high value services, i.e. reserve market. Finally, we will use rather simple algorithms, which 
will allow us to simulate large fleets in reasonable computation times, in order to have realistic order 
of magnitude on the value of the technology. 
We will proceed in three steps, corresponding to the following three chapters:  
Chapter 2: we perform in this chapter a qualitative evaluation of market rules, to identify barriers to 
entry an aggregator might face when investing in a market. We build a framework to perform this 
analysis and apply it on two case studies: 1) a comparison of four different market zones in 2016 
2) evolution of rules in France in 2017. 
Chapter 3: we evaluate revenues of a fleet of EVs participating in reserve services, with different 
set of rules identified in Chapter 1. We evaluate these revenues for small fleets to understand how 
these rules will influence the entry of actors. Then we evaluate profitability of participation on 
reserve markets, taking into account costs of provision. We perform this analysis with larger size of 
fleets as we try to identify the long-term profitability of the solution. 
Chapter 4: we analyze value sharing between different actors and with the final user, based on 
results on profitability obtained in chapter 3. We try to evaluate the value of a cooperation between 
the actors and to identify which forms this cooperation could take.
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1 BARRIERS TO ENTRY FOR NEW ENTRANTS IN FLEXIBILITY 
MARKETS 
In this chapter, we will perform a qualitative analysis of the existence of barriers to entry in reserve 
markets for new entrants with innovative technologies, in particular aggregator of Distributed 
Energy Resources (Demand Side Response – DSR, distributed generation assets or distributed 
storage).  
In (Bain, 1956), barriers to entry were defined as “an advantage of established sellers in an industry 
over potential entrant sellers, which is reflected in the extent to which established sellers can  
persistently raise their prices above competitive levels without attracting new firms to enter the 
industry.”  
Electricity markets, including reserve markets, were designed in the last decades with the idea that 
large and centralized generation units were the only assets able to deliver flexibility products such 
as reserve at an affordable cost. This idea was true at the beginning of the liberalization of the 
electricity industry, as technology did not allow controlling consumption units and there was no 
decentralized generation. 
The technical and economic feasibility of power reserve provision by different types of DERs has 
been studied in the literature. In (Singarao and Rao, 2016) and (Díaz-González et al., 2014), the 
authors analyzed the provision of electricity by wind farms, respectively in United States and in the 
United Kingdom. Participation of domestic loads has been analyzed in (Samarakoon et al., 2012) 
and (Trovato et al., 2017). In (García-Villalobos et al., 2014), the authors presented a review of the 
current EV charging algorithms, including for participation in frequency regulation reserves.  
Reserve provision processes were designed with the involvement of System Operators and 
generation companies. It led to a variety of set of rules in different countries, with however a 
common point: they had not be thought to be open to other technologies and actors such as 
aggregator. Often, rules were referring explicitly to generation units connected to High-Voltage 
network as only provider of reserve, excluding de facto any other type of resources. Advantage of 
established seller is then clearly established by the fact that the appearance of new actors was not 
anticipated in the design of rules. 
Other rules might limit participation of DERs in an indirect manner, as we will see in Paragraph 2. 
Rules were designed to fit with operations of large centralized units, which have completely different 
characteristics than DERs, in term of size of the units, availability and predictability. It might not be 
possible for aggregators to enter the market because of these rules, even if it is possible for them 
to provide the same product with equivalent technical characteristics. The aggregator might also 
enter the market at the expense of partnership with other actors, which would represent a 
transaction costs for aggregators and a loss of value.  
Established sellers also have an advantage in the sense that they are stakeholder in the design 
process of the rules and might lobby to prevent an opening of the market to new actors, which might 
affect price of the service by increasing offer volume. 
In our view, however, there is still a lack of a general framework enabling us to analyze the 
participation of DERs in different markets. It is thus necessary to perform a detailed analysis of 1) 
which rules are possible barriers to entry for DERs, 2) the importance of these barriers, 3) the way 
to redesign rules in order to remove these barriers. 
In Section 2 of this chapter, we will present a modular framework that could be used as a tool for 
investors and policy makers to assess the existence of barriers to entry in the different markets. In 
Section 3, we will see that opening markets is a costly process for TSOs and it might be the result 
of a trade-off. Finally, in Section 4, we will apply the framework to two different cases: first, an 
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analysis of four different European market zones (France, Germany, Denmark and Great-Britain) 
performed in 2016; then, an analysis of the evolution of French rules in 2017. 
2 MODULAR ANALYSIS OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
In this section, we will present a framework to analyze the presence of barriers to entry in reserve 
markets. We decided to use a modular framework for description of rules, which allows a clear 
understanding of the different levels of barriers for aggregators. Three modules are used in this 
framework: 
 Module A: Administrative rules regarding aggregation of Distributed Energy Resources 
 Module B: Definition of products 
 Module C: Remuneration scheme 
We will first describe different rules in each of these modules and the way they can act as barriers 
to entry for aggregators. Then we will look at how this framework could be used by policy makers 
to redesign rules or by aggregators to assess in which markets to invest. 
2.1 Module A: Administrative Rules Regarding Aggregation of 
Distributed Energy Resources 
2.1.1 Technical Discrimination against Aggregated Resources (A1) 
Some rules may discriminate against some players regarding their participation in reserve markets. 
TSO can discriminate resources based on their voltage level (for example resources should be 
connected to TSO’s network) or their type (consumption units, non-dispatchable resources, 
storage). TSO can explicitly forbid participation of DERs in the rules or implicitly, by not defining 
storage and consumption units as potential providers. In this case, there is no possible participation 
of DERs to reserve services. 
TSO can also fix a maximum volume of reserve provided by DERs, give priority to some type of 
actors in the provision or reserve or define specific technical requirement for DERs. TSO might also 
not allow the aggregation of different type of units (e.g. consumption and generation units), which 
limits the possibility of aggregation. In these cases, participation of DERs is not forbid but limited in 
volume. 
2.1.2 Interoperability among DSOs and TSOs (A2) 
There is a large diversity of DSOs in European countries, depending on the history of the electricity 
system, its construction, and market reforms in the last 20 years. For example, there is only one 
major Distribution System Operator in France (Enedis – representing a 97% market share) and few 
others (115) delivering electricity to a limited number of customers (3%), whereas there are 65 
EDCs in Denmark and 869 in Germany. There are also countries with multiple TSOs such as 
Germany (four TSOs). 
To ensure that aggregation is possible, new entrants should be able to aggregate units among 
multiple DSOs and TSOs. If it is not the case, aggregators will be limited to a geographical zone, 
which will limit the volume of reserve they can offer. 
2.1.3 Aggregation Level (A3) 
Two methods of aggregation are identified in (Codani et al., 2016): telemetry and financial 
aggregation. Telemetry allows the aggregator to combine bids and power flows. The aggregators 
handle dispatching by using algorithms to optimize the dispatching of energy, based on 
characteristics of each unit. 
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On the contrary, financial aggregation only allows for the aggregation of bids while the dispatch of 
energy is controlled by the TSO. This solution does not allow the aggregators to use their own 
dispatching algorithm to take account of different availability and flexibility characteristics of the 
different units pooled. 
2.2 Module B: Definition of Products 
2.2.1 Minimum Bid Size and Bid Increment (B1) 
The minimum bid size of an offer will define the minimum level of aggregation necessary to deliver 
reserve and is a key parameter for the participation of DERs. If the minimum bid is set too high, it 
will be difficult for aggregators to participate, as it would require managing an overly cumbersome 
number of small generation resources. Aggregators can decide to engage in partnership with 
incumbents or other aggregator to reach this volume, which implies transaction costs and a loss of 
value. 
Bid increment also plays an important role. If bid increment is similar to minimum bid, it will be as 
difficult for aggregator to reach the level of bid (twice the minimum bid) as to reach the minimum 
bid. Having a high bid increment will induce threshold effects, as revenues of the aggregator will 
not increase proportionally to the number of units pooled. 
However, market designers may want to set bid size at a high level to minimize the number of 
market players and the related transaction costs on the market. 
2.2.2 Time Definition of Products (B2) 
The time definition is the period of time during which providers must have their power available. 
This parameter is essential for new participants who aggregate consumption units or EVs since the 
availability of reserves is highly dependent on consumers’ habits or industrial process. The amount 
of reserves they are able to provide is highly variable in function of hour of the day, day of the week 
(working or non-working day). 
If time-definition is long, compared to the periodicity of availability of reserve, aggregators will bid 
on the market based on the period where availability is the lowest, which will affect their revenues. 
Figure 2.1 shows a simplified representation of the impact of minimum size, bid increment and time 
definition of products. 
 
Figure 2.1 Impact of Bid Increment and Duration of Product on Reserve bid on market 
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2.2.3 Distance to Real-Time Reservation (B3) 
This parameter defines how long the procurement of reserves is made ahead of delivery. This may 
have an impact on new participants such as aggregators due to the uncertainty it may induce in the 
decision-making process. Indeed, if the procurement is made long before delivery, aggregators 
must make assumptions that have an impact on the amount of reserve they can provide (behavior 
of consumers, number of aggregated units, etc.). To limit risks of not being able to deliver the 
amount of reserve they bid, aggregators will tend to make bids that are more conservative.  
2.2.4 Symmetry of Products (B4) 
Two types of products can be sold in a reserve market: upward products – increase in generation 
or decrease in consumption – or downward products – decrease in generation or increase in 
consumption. Some markets allow for differentiated bids between upward and downward provision 
while other markets only allow for symmetrical bids, meaning the provider must deliver the same 
amount of downward and upward reserve simultaneously. 
Depending on the type of unit providing flexibility, it might be better to have symmetric or asymmetric 
products. For example, in the case of unidirectional EVs, asymmetric products are better as the EV 
can only provide downward reserve when it is not charging (when the battery is not full). However, 
for bidirectional EVs, symmetric products are better because it allows having zero-net energy 
delivery (meaning the amount of upward energy delivered is the same than the amount of downward 
energy). With asymmetric bids, the aggregator would face the risks of having only one of its bid 
accepted, meaning the battery would only either charge or discharge.  
In order to fit with these two profiles, it is possible to have linked bids, meaning upward bid will be 
accepted only if downward bid is accepted and vice-versa.  
2.3 Module C: Remuneration Scheme 
2.3.1 Nature of Payment (C1) 
Different schemes exist to remunerate reserves: regulated tariffs, pay-as-bid, and uniform pricing. 
These schemes are not equivalent regarding the provision of reserve, in particular concerning the 
entry of new actors. Indeed, the level of remuneration and bid strategies will be impacted by the 
remuneration scheme.  
The use of a regulated tariff is associated with mandatory provision by a few participants (often 
large producers) since there is no information to select providers based on their costs. Even if the 
rules allow for new entrants such as aggregators to propose reserves, the selection of the reserve 
will be made by an administrative rule preventing new participants from competing effectively with 
incumbent players. Moreover, regulated tariffs do not take account of the market value of electricity 
generation. In the European EPEX power spot market, real-time prices vary considerably. With a 
fixed and guaranteed yearly remuneration, a generator receives cross-subsidies. 
The two market solutions – pay-as-bid and uniform pricing – allow for aggregators to compete with 
large producers and to enter the market effectively. In a pure and perfect market setting (including 
perfect competition), the allocation of reserves should be optimal for both arrangements (Kahn et 
al., 2001).  
However, under real-world conditions the bidding strategies will not be the same. With uniform 
pricing, market players have an incentive to bid at the marginal cost of service provision, whereas 
with pay-as-bid, participants will bid at what they expect to be the highest accepted bid to maximize 
their revenues. It is difficult for new entrants to perform well in guessing the maximum bid, as they 
enter a new market and have less information about the market. They would not capture the entire 
benefit as they might under a uniform pricing scheme. 
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2.3.2 Extra-Bonus for Flexibility (C2) 
Technical requirements for frequency regulation have been defined based on capabilities of large 
generators since historically this was the only available or economic option. As these producers 
have time responses intrinsic to their generation assets and cannot adapt their output 
instantaneously when the TSO requires it, an acceptable time delay for the delivery of reserves has 
been defined. New DERs capable of participating in reserve provision are able to adapt their 
production or consumption faster than large producers. Increased flexibility can allow for more 
renewable sources of energy to be integrated, which can lower carbon emissions and air pollution. 
Value for the electricity system of faster reserve depends largely on the size of the system and 
penetration of renewables. If system is relatively small, increased penetration of renewables will 
decrease the inertia of the system. Faster reserve might have a high value for the system, allowing 
reducing impact of imbalances on the frequency deviations (Greve et al., 2017). However, if 
remuneration scheme is the same for both slow and fast acting sources, there is no incentive to 
invest in faster technologies.  
2.4 A Tool for Investors and Policy Makers 
The framework developed in this section allows having a clear view on the different rules that might 
constitute barriers to entry for new entrants in reserve markets. Moreover, it is possible to see this 
framework as a decision tree, as shown in Figure 2.2. Indeed, different modules will not have the 
same consequences for aggregators and shall be treated as consecutive barriers. 
Module A rules (administrative rules regarding aggregation of DERs) constitute first-order barriers 
as they could hinder partly or completely participation of aggregator to market, with no way to skirt 
them by having partnership with incumbents or aggregators.  
Rules in Module B (Definition of Products) are second-order barriers to entry. They do not hinder 
directly possibility of aggregation of distributed units. However, their design might not fit with 
operations of aggregators, who will bid only part of their available reserve on the market. If Module 
A allows for aggregation of resources, aggregators could skirt the rules of Module B by having 
partnership, which will affect their revenues.  
Finally, rules in Module C (Remuneration Scheme) constitute third-order barriers. They will 
influence value of the reserve bid on the market but not the possibility of offering reserve. 
When a TSO wants to open reserve market, it is essential to redesign first Module A, then Module 
B and finally Module C. If Module B or C is redesigned without reducing all possible barriers in 
Module A, impact on entry of aggregators will be very limited. 
 
Figure 2.2 Decision Tree for provision of Flexibility Services with DERs 
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Investors willing to invest in DERs able to provide reserve could also use this framework and, to 
evaluate in which zone in which market the investment would be the more profitable. Markets with 
high barriers in Module A will be more difficult to penetrate than markets with barriers in Module B 
or Module C. 
3 COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE OPENING OF MARKETS 
Opening the provision of frequency-regulation reserves to DERs is necessarily associated with 
costs for TSOs. The impacts of such costs should be assessed in order to be sure that opening this 
market is beneficial.  
We have seen in the previous section that opening and redesigning the market could be made in 
three steps: 
- Removal of administrative barriers to aggregation for DERs 
- Redefinition of products in order to allow greater flexibility in their provision 
- Granting appropriate remuneration to DERs 
First, TSOs will have to learn how to manage the provision of frequency-regulation reserves by 
DERs, and how to define their prequalification tests. The prequalification tests for centralized 
resources are well known by TSOs and are relatively easy to implement: producers must be able 
to correctly respond to a predefined pattern of frequency deviations. However, prequalification of 
distributed resources, such as the aggregation of consumers or EVs, will be more complicated and 
probably more expensive. TSOs will need to build new prequalification processes to adequately 
certify that new players are reliable. Then, TSOs will need to verify ex-post if providers have really 
delivered the power reserve they have been called on to provide. This supervision will also be more 
costly with new actors as the amount of units providing reserves will increase. Thus TSOs and 
DSOs must build new processes to share information effectively and to redefine the roles and duties 
of each of the players. 
The redefinition of reserve products will be associated with increased transaction costs. Indeed, 
with reduced minimum bids and time-steps in addition to asymmetrical products, the number of 
transactions in the market will increase as along with the associated costs (management of data, 
communications with the providers, and transfers of money).  
Given a hypothetical example where the provision of reserves is made through week-long products 
with a minimum bid of 10 MW symmetrical products where the TSO requires 500 MW of reserve, 
the maximum number of transactions the TSO will have to manage is 2,600 in one year. If this TSO 
were to shift to half-day asymmetrical products with a minimum bid of 1 MW, it would be necessary 
to manage a maximum of 730,000 transactions.  
It is clear that security and stability of supply should not be jeopardized by opening the markets. 
Opening the provision of reserves to DERs will increase volume risks for TSOs: the number of 
participants will increase, they will be less identifiable, and the number of time-slots will increase. 
Therefore, as TSOs are responsible for balancing generation and demand, a risk management 
strategy should accompany the opening of markets.  
For example, TSOs could hedge some reserves through long-term contracts with large producers 
when markets are opened to reduce system risks through a strike price option contract (Rebours, 
2009). This hedging would not be a permanent solution but would allow for a transition period. The 
decision maker could also impose a minimum participation in the market for large producers or let 
the aggregators hedge their positions in the market by implementing secondary markets where 
different players could buy and sell their reserves. 
TSOs could also reduce their risks by mutualizing reserves across Europe. This, however, requires 
a harmonization of rules, which is the aim of the Network Codes, which will also lead to increased 
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learning costs and transaction costs. Another way is to mutualize imbalances in order to limit 
secondary reserves requirements. This strategy has been implemented among several European 
countries through International Grid Control Cooperation (IGCC). 
It is beyond the scope of this work to evaluate these risks and costs. However, as the 
decarbonization of the electricity mix is in progress and should intensify in the next 10 years, it will 
become unavoidable at some point to shift from the previous model (provision of reserves by 
centralized generators) to a new one (provision of reserves open to new participants).  
Costs and risks could be better managed if this process is anticipated and well managed. We think 
it is necessary for TSOs to initiate this shift long before they are forced to do so owing to a serious 
lack of available flexibility. It would be beneficial to open service provision gradually in order to 
accompany the roll-out of new technologies (distributed generation, demand response, EVs, etc.). 
4 TWO CASE STUDIES: GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISON AND 
EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Comparison of Four Market Zones in 2016 
We will now describe four market designs for Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) and 
automatic Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR) reserves in France, Germany, Denmark, and 
the United Kingdom. These countries were chosen owing to their diversity in terms of generation 
mix and market design.  
Table 2.1 provides some key characteristics regarding penetration of intermittent RES, flexibility 
needs, and future objectives for wind penetration.  
According to the European Wind Energy Association’s central scenario, the share of intermittent 
RES should increase significantly in every country of our study, which implies there will be an 
increasing need for the efficient management of reserves.  
This case study was performed in 2016. There are some on-going modifications in rules and 
conclusions of this part are only valid in this context. 
Table 2.1 RES Capacity and Reserve Requirements 
 France Germany Denmark UK 
Wind farm capacity (MW)3 12,518 51,173 4,845 15,621 
Solar capacity (MW)3 7,170 40,849 601 8,566 
Share of intermittent RES capacity 11% 39% 37% 22% 
Primary reserve1 (MW) 570 590 47 500-900 
Secondary reserve (MW) 700 2,000 200 1,100-1,400 
Central scenario 2030 EWEA Wind 
capacity (MW)4 
43,360 85,000 9,300 37,500 
Annual load (TWh) 482 538.7 34.1 324.8 
Reserve requirements by 20302 (MW) 2,800 (+89%) 4,281 (+83%) 470 (+62%) 
2,700-3,400 
(+74%) 
1 Primary reserve need for France, Germany and Denmark is decided by ENTSO-E based on consumption 
of the country 
2 Assuming there is a 5% increase of reserve for each MW of new installed wind capacity - mean value 
based on the literature (Hirth and Ziegenhagen, 2015) 
3 http://transparency.entsoe.eu 
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4 (Wind Europe, 2017) 
4.1.1 France 
Rules are issued by Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (RTE) and are described in (RTE, 2016a). 
Historically the procurement process is based on mandatory provision by large producers and pro-
rated to their generation. Each day RTE informs each producer the reserve he must provide to the 
system for the next day with a 30-minute time-step based on individual generation schedules and 
technical capabilities of the unit. The minimum capacity that an aggregation of production units must 
be able to deliver is 1 MW with symmetrical capacities. The system of allocation of reserve is the 
same for FCR and aFRR.  
The regulator sets remuneration with a fixed and annually regulated tariff. There is remuneration 
for capacity (18.2 €/MW/h) and for energy (10.47 €/MWh, payment to the provider if regulation is 
upward, payment to the TSO if regulation is downward).  
However, rules have evolved in the last two years to allow new participants (consumers connected 
to the distribution network and storage units) to deliver reserve. These units are not subject to 
mandatory provision and they can provide asymmetrical products. The minimum amount of reserve 
they can prequalify is 1 MW. They have to sell reserve through bilateral negotiation to large 
producers, through a process called “Notification d’Echange de Réserve”. 
The total amount that can be prequalified was limited to 40 MW for 2016 and the maximum amount 
for one individual aggregator to 20 MW. The selection of this volume is made based on a “First 
Come, First Served” rule. This rule is inefficient, since providers are not selected on the basis of 
their operating costs, contrary to a market solution where providers have an incentive to reveal their 
costs. 
It should be noted that most of these rules are transitory and could/should evolve in the coming 
years, creating uncertainty about the possible evolution of the market design.  
As a conclusion, Table 2.2 provides an assessment of these different rules regarding provision of 
frequency-regulation reserves by DERs. The opening of the market is still limited by administrative 
rules and is in a testing phase. There is currently no information available about the level of reserves 
actually provided by RES. The results of this testing phase and the orientation that will follow will 
allow us to improve our assessment of this market opening.  
Remuneration is the main issue in France as a regulated tariff is still used. We cannot assess what 
is the impact of this tariff (is it at a low or high level compared with the costs of provision by DERs?). 
There is high uncertainty about the viability of this tariff as the French regulator has regularly called 
for the implementation of a market-based procurement approach (Commission de Régulation de 
l’Energie, 2014)(Commission de Régulation de l’Energie, 2015). 
Table 2.2 Assessment of the Parameters of the Survey in France 
 FCR aFRR 
A1 -/+ -/+ 
A2 + + 
A3 + + 
B1 + + 
B2 + + 
B3 + + 
B4 + + 
C1 - - 
C2 - - 
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4.1.2 Germany 
Auctions in Germany are held on a common platform (www.regelleistung.net) for the four TSOs 
(Consentec GmbH, 2014). Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium have joined this 
platform, called FCR Cooperation. Auction rules were revised in 2011 by the Federal Network 
Agency, to allow an increased participation of small electricity producers such as RES in addition 
to demand-side management aggregators and storage systems (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011)(Koliou 
et al., 2014). To further facilitate market entry by DERs, another revision of rules for secondary and 
tertiary reserve is currently underway as of 2015/2016 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015)(Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy, 2015). 
There is no technical discrimination for either FCR or aFRR.  
For FCR, a call for tenders is organized on a weekly basis. The minimum bid is 1 MW and the 
products are symmetrical. However, it is possible to aggregate plants that can only contribute 
positive or negative reserves in a pooled bid (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011). The bidder must provide 
reserves for an entire week. In order to allow small reserve providers to comply more fully with the 
time requirement, it is possible to contract prequalified third parties to provide collateralization.  
Remuneration is based on pay-as-bid and offered for capacity provision alone, without separate 
remuneration for energy. In 2011, more far-reaching adjustments in favor of DERs were discussed 
(i.e. daily tenders, shorter product duration, asymmetrical bids), but they were rejected owing to 
trade-offs with system stability and transaction costs. Accordingly, rules for FCR provision remain 
unaffected by the current revision.  
For aFRR, products are asymmetrical. A call for tenders is currently organized on a weekly basis. 
A change to daily auctions, however, is being considered to facilitate bids by distributed flexibility 
resources including intermittent RES (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). Also, a shortening of product 
duration is being discussed. Currently, bidders can propose reserves for peak periods (working 
days, 8:00 am to 8:00 pm) or off-peak periods (the rest of the time).  
Under the new regime, they would bid for six timeslots of four hours each on the day following the 
auction. The minimum bid of 5 MW will remain but the revised rules propose to allow bids of 1 MW, 
2 MW, 3 MW, and 4 MW so long as bidders only make one bid per secondary reserve product 
within the balancing zone. This is to give small generators or aggregators of small-scale flexibility 
resources another participation option besides pooling (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015). 
Secondary reserve remuneration is pay-as-bid. Bids are selected on the basis of capacity prices, 
but remuneration is offered both for capacity and energy if a reserve is activated. A change to 
uniform pricing (with bids based on energy prices) is being discussed but viewed critically by the 
Federal Network Agency.  
Under the current system, successful bids with low capacity prices and high energy prices are 
common. Since reserve scheduling follows a merit order based on reserves’ energy prices, the 
consequences for total reserve provision costs are limited. With a uniform pricing rule, all utilized 
reserves would be remunerated at the energy price of the last successful bid in the market, which 
could lead to significant cost increases (Bundesnetzagentur, 2015).  
Table 2.3 shows average remuneration for the provision of secondary reserves.  
The German market design does not have any administrative barriers to entry but still has major 
issues concerning technical optimization, especially with the provision of FCR, as can be seen in 
Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.3 Average capacity remuneration for FCR and aFRR in Germany in 2015 (€/MW/h) 
 Off-Peak Peak 
aFRR upward 5.67 6.12 
aFRR downward 2.97 2.21 
FCR 21.9 
1Data: www.regelleistung.net  
Table 2.4 Assessment of the Parameters of the Survey for Germany 
 FCR aFRR 
A1 + + 
A2 + + 
A3 + + 
B1 + -/+ 
B2 - + 
B3 -/+ + 
B4 - + 
C1 -/+ -/+ 
C2 - - 
4.1.3 Denmark 
In Denmark, rules are issued by the Danish TSO Energinet.dk (Energinet.dk, 2012). There are two 
control areas in Denmark (Western Denmark, DK1, and Eastern Denmark, DK2) and the 
procurement of reserves is differentiated between these two zones. We will focus for our study on 
the DK1 zone as the DK2 zone is connected to the Nordic Synchronous Area where the 
procurement system is different.  
In DK1, FCR and aFRR can be provided by both production and consumption units. For FCR, the 
provision of reserves is made through a daily auction. Bids can be submitted for the next day for a 
period of 4 hours. The minimum bid is 300kW and the bids can be made for upward or downward 
regulation. Remuneration is based on uniform pricing: each accepted bidder is remunerated at the 
price of the highest bid (one price for upward and one price for downward reserves). Energinet.dk 
procures on average 25 MW where 10 MW is provided by long-term contracts.  
Average payments for upward and downward reserves are presented in Table 2.5. 
Secondary reserves are procured on a monthly basis. The products are symmetrical and 
remuneration is based on pay-as-bid scheme. However, Energinet.dk has a long-term contract until 
2020 with the Swedish interconnection for the provision of secondary reserves, so the procurement 
system will only be used if the interconnection is out of service or insufficient. 
Denmark is paving the way in Europe for the opening of frequency-regulation reserve markets to 
aggregators, especially for FCR. The return on experience of this process could be useful for other 
countries as it should now be extended to aFRR as well. 
Table 2.5 Average Remuneration of FCR in Denmark DK1 in 2015 (€/MW/h) 
 Upward reserve Downward reserve 
00:00 – 04:00 8.92 2.35 
04:00 – 08:00 11.94 2.09 
08:00 – 12:00 16.90 1.12 
12:00 – 16:00 15.64 1.05 
16:00 – 20:00 15.94 1.15 
20:00 – 24:00 13.04 1.17 
Data: http://energinet.dk/EN/El/Engrosmarked/Udtraek-af-markedsdata/Sider/default.aspx 
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Table 2.6 Assessment of the Parameters of the Survey for Denmark-DK1 
 FCR aFRR 
A1 + - 
A2 + N/A 
A3 + N/A 
B1 + N/A 
B2 + N/A 
B3 + N/A 
B4 + N/A 
C1 + N/A 
C2 - N/A 
4.1.4 Great-Britain 
The main procurement system used by National Grid for reserves is mandatory provision by large 
producers (National Grid, 2016a). However, a complementary scheme, Firm Frequency Regulation 
(FFR) has been implemented to allow other participants to enter the market (National Grid, 2017). 
The participants can, each month, make a bid to provide different services (based on response lag 
and duration of utilization). 
There are three different products and product taxonomy is different from CWE area: 
 Primary response: provision of upward reserve, maximum lag of 10 seconds and provision 
has to be sustained for 30 seconds 
 Secondary response: provision of upward reserve, maximum lag of 30 seconds and 
provision has to be sustained for 30 minutes 
 High Frequency response: provision of downward reserve, maximum lag of 10 seconds 
and provision has to be sustained for 30 minutes 
The bid can be made for one or several months at a time and can schedule reserve provision for 
only part of the day (only one window is authorized), which can be different for weekdays, 
Saturdays, and Sundays. However, it is not possible to change the amount of reserve provided 
during the day or during the month.  
All products are asymmetrical with a minimum bid of 10 MW. The selection criterion for reserves on 
this complementary scheme is based on the total cost of provision for the National Grid. To be 
selected, the provision of reserves with FFR must be cheaper than mandatory provision. However, 
given the number of parameters included in a bid (number of months and period of the day during 
which the reserve is provided, price and volume for differentiated services), the selection criterion 
is not transparent. (Rebours, 2009) and (Chao and Wilson, 2002) have shown that even two-part 
multi-dimensional procurement is complicated and the current bid process includes more than 20 
parameters. 
In order to allow aggregators with lower volumes than 10 MW to participate, NG has implemented 
the FFR bridging contract. This contract lasts one or two years, and remuneration is regulated and 
increases as more MWs are aggregated. The payment rates have not been made public. 
Besides this complementary scheme, NG is now implementing a new scheme to procure ultra-fast 
reserves, which would be ideal for DERs such as EVs (National Grid, 2016b). Provider should be 
able to respond to frequency deviations in 1 second, minimum bid is 1 MW. The provider should be 
available at every hours for 4 years. In the first organized tender, 8 different projects were selected, 
all being large stationary storages.  
The conclusions of this case are presented in Table 2.7. NG is implementing new schemes but the 
products that can be sold in these schemes do not correspond to what DERs could provide (e.g., 
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full provision during one or two years for the FFR Bridging Contract). This gives mixed signals about 
the willingness to open the market to DERs. We think NG should work on a unified market design 
for all players8. However, the implementation of a scheme to remunerate very fast reserves is 
positive. The return on experience that NG will receive with this implementation could be useful for 
other countries. The UK synchronous area is rather small compared to the Continental Europe 
synchronous area and is therefore more exposed to flexibility issues. 
Table 2.7 Assessment of the Parameters of the Survey in Great Britain 
 FCR aFRR 
A1 -/+ -/+ 
A2 + + 
A3 + + 
B1 - - 
B2 - - 
B3 - - 
B4 + + 
C1 -/+ -/+ 
C2 + + 
4.2 Evolution of Regulation in France: Towards the Creation of a 
Single Market Zone in Central Western Europe 
4.2.1 Modification of Rules in France 
In October 2016, France decided to change completely its market design for the provision of 
Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) (Commission de Régulation de l’Energie, 2016), which 
gives the opportunity to test this analytical framework on a real case. Before the change came into 
force, the French TSO (Réseau de Transport d’Electricité, RTE) procured reserves through 
mandatory provision by centralized large units, with an annual fixed regulated tariff. Other players 
could sell reserves to large units, after a pre-qualification agreement with RTE, with a negotiated 
price. The French regulator had asked RTE to change its rules to implement a call for tender, to 
comply with the requirements of the ENTSO-e Network Code (Commission de Régulation de 
l’Energie, 2015). 
Several choices were possible; one of them was to create a national call for tender, based on 
original French rules. The second option was to join an existing reserve market. RTE decided to 
join the FCR Cooperation. The French regulator pointed out the limits of this option: the duration of 
the reservation product (an entire week from Monday 0 a.m. to Sunday 12 p.m.) was judged too 
long by the regulator and some of the French players (RTE, 2016b). However, the regulator 
considered that it could be in a better position to change the rules from within the Cooperation and 
that market integration was a priority to procure reserves at the lowest cost.  
In the FCR Cooperation, National TSOs are still in charge of prequalification tests and contracts 
with reserve providers (post assessment, penalties for non-delivery), which are not harmonized 
among countries. France keeps its limit of 40 MW of DERs that can be prequalified by RTE. TSOs 
give their reserve requirements to the platform. BSPs can make offers on the platform until market 
clearing. Offers are selected based on their Merit-Order. Exports are limited to 30% of the size of 
the national reserve.  
                                                     
8 NG launched a project in 2018 to “improve the information we share, simplify our balancing services and 
remove barriers for new entrants” (National Grid, 2018) 
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The exchange of reserves between BSPs from different countries is not allowed. However, France 
retains its notification mechanism, which still allows French BSPs to exchange reserves through 
bilateral negotiation or secondary market. BSPs are remunerated using the “pay as bid” rule. Costs 
are allocated to the TSOs pro-rata their reserve requirements at the average cost of reserve for the 
overall Cooperation. We will now analyze the implications of the French decision for aggregators. 
Organization of procurement of Reserve in France before 2017 and in the FCR Cooperation is given 
in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. The framework developed in Section 2 gives an opportunity to 
understand the impact of changes in the rules of the FCR procurement on aggregators.  
 
Figure 2.3 Organization of FCR Procurement in France before January 2017 
 
Figure 2.4 Organization of FCR procurement in the FCR Cooperation 
France keeps its volume limit for aggregators, so no improvement is made in the first module. By 
joining FCR cooperation, France is adopting a week-long, symmetric product. It will be 
disadvantageous for aggregators who have uncertainties about their resource availability.  
Even if it will still be possible to transfer reserves from one BSP to another, with shorter products 
and closer to real time, this secondary market may not be liquid enough, and cross-border 
exchanges are forbidden. In the third module, improvement is made by adopting a market solution, 
even if pay-as-bid is not the most efficient one (Kahn et al., 2001). 
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By applying the above-mentioned framework, it seems that France will impose new technical 
barriers to entry (Module B) for aggregators. There is no change in Module A and an improvement 
in Module C. 
Table 2.8 Changes in the rules when joining the FCR Cooperation 
 Former French Market-
Design 
FCR Cooperation 
Module A Status quo 
Module B 
Status quo: 1MW 
30 minutes 168 hours 
Day Ahead Week Ahead 
Asymmetric Symmetric 
Module C 
Administrative Tariff Pay-as-Bid 
Status quo 
 
Table 2.9 Assessment of the rules in France (before 2017) and in the FCR cooperation 
 Former French 
Market-design 
FCR Cooperation 
- France 
A1 +/- +/- 
A2 + + 
A3 + + 
B1 + + 
B2 + - 
B3 + +/- 
B4 + - 
C1 - +/- 
C2 - - 
However, changes in Module B and Module C will not be balanced. Indeed, the framework is a 
decision tree (Figure 2.2). Improvements in Module C will have less impact for aggregators while 
Module B is disadvantageous for them. 
By analyzing the decision through this framework, we have shown that this new market design is 
not to the advantage of aggregators. However, this is not the only parameter to consider when 
assessing the implications of this decision: by joining the FCR Cooperation, it is now possible for 
French producers to export reserves or for RTE to import them when economically efficient. 
Additionally, it could allow provision of reserves at a lower cost for the TSO, as will be seen in the 
next section. 
There therefore existed for France a trade-off between time granularity, which allows new innovative 
technologies to enter the market, and market integration, which allows higher liquidity in the market 
and the import/export of reserves. 
4.2.2 Rationale of Market Integration 
In its deliberation, the French regulator argues that joining a cross-border market would make it 
possible to reduce the cost of procuring ancillary services while ensuring security of supply and 
allowing better integration of RES (Commission de Régulation de l’Energie, 2016). This is in line 
with the European Commission’s goal of creating integrated markets for electricity, reiterated once 
again in the Winter Package (European Commission, 2016). 
Efforts had first been concentrated on wholesale electricity markets, by coupling different markets 
(France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in 2006, joined by Germany in 2010), to allocate implicitly 
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cross-border capacities, and minimize price differences between different countries (Newbery et 
al., 2016)(Meeus et al., 2009). This process is still ongoing in Europe. The European Commission 
is now pushing for the implementation of common markets for ancillary and balancing services such 
as FCR, which is still lagging behind. In (Mott MacDonald, 2013), the authors estimated the potential 
welfare gains for Great-Britain and France from joining the balancing services at 50 M€/year. 
(Flinkerbusch and Heuterkes, 2010) calculated the potential cost reduction achieved by joint 
procurement of balancing reserves of four TSOs in Germany to be 17%. In (Drees and Moser, 
2016), the potential savings of market integration of balancing services in Central Europe, with the 
introduction of core portions (portion of the balancing service which must be supplied by the national 
market), was estimated at 87 M€/y. Market integration would also foster competition between 
players and reduce the market power of dominant players. However, these studies concentrate on 
automatic and manual FRR and there is no study assessing the potential cost reduction of joint 
auctions for FCR. 
The rationale behind market integration is the maximization of the sum of social welfare across all 
countries. Let us take a simple example of two countries and compare the situations with and 
without cooperation (Figure 2.5): 
 Country A wants to procure 500 MW of primary reserves. There are three producers: the 
first one can supply 300 MW of reserves at a price of 5 €/MW, the second one is able to 
provide 300 MW at 10 €/MW, the third is able to provide 300 MW at 15 €/MW 
 Country B wants to procure 600 MW of primary reserves. There are two producers: the first 
one is able to supply 200 MW of reserves at a price of 12 €/MW, the second one is able to 
provide 500 MW at 20 €/MW 
 
Figure 2.5 Merging procurement of reserves in two countries 
When TSO are in autarky (reference case), there is no exchange of reserves between the two 
countries: 
 If the remuneration scheme is pay-as-bid (Reference 1), the cost of procurement for 
TSO A will be 3.5k€, and 10.4 k€ for TSO B. There is no surplus for producers, assuming 
they bid at their marginal cost. 
 If the remuneration scheme is marginal pricing (Reference 2), the cost of procurement 
for TSO A will be 5 k€, and 12 k€ for TSO B. The producers’ surplus will be 1.5 k€ for 
producers in A and 1.6 k€ for producers in B. 
When merging, Country A will export 400 MW of reserves to country B (Figure 2.5). 
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If TSOs implement a pay-as-bid scheme when merging (solution 1), the total cost of reserves is 
11.4 k€, and the revenues for the producers A & B are respectively 9 k€ and 2.4 k€. There is a 
decrease of 2.5 k€ in the cost to procure reserves, as the producer in country B is partially replaced 
by the producer in country A, which is cheaper.  
Costs can be allocated to the TSO in two different ways: 
 Solution 1.1: Costs are allocated on the basis of the average price (here 10.36 €/MW) 
and the reserve requirement of TSO (500 MW for TSO A and 600 MW for TSO B). In 
this case, TSO A would pay 5.18 k€ and TSO B 6.22 k€. 
 Solution 1.2: each TSO is paying for the less expensive offers in their zones; the 
importing TSO paying for the reserve it is importing from other countries. In this case, 
TSO A would pay 3.5 k€ and TSO B would pay 7.9 k€. 
If marginal pricing were used (solution 2), the price is 15 €/MW and the total cost for both TSOs is 
16.5 k€. Costs are allocated among TSO based on the marginal price and the reserve requirement 
of each TSO. TSO A will pay 7.5 k€ and TSO B will pay 9 k€. The producers in country A will sell 
900 MW of reserve (total value = 13.5 k€), and the producers in country B will sell 200 MW (total 
value = 3 k€). With a comparison with the solution 1, the surplus for the producer in country A will 
be 4.5 k€ and 0.6 k€ in country B. 
The results of these different schemes are summarized in Table 2.10. Whatever the chosen 
scheme, there will be an increase of 2.5 k€ in the total surplus of {TSO A + TSO B + Producer A + 
Producer B}. 
Table 2.10 Cost for TSOs and producers surplus with different remuneration schemes 
 
Cost for TSO A Cost for TSO B 
Surplus of 
producer A 
Surplus of 
producer B 
Total 
surplus 
Ref 1 3.5 k€ 10.4 k€ 0 0 - 13.9 k€ 
Ref 2 5 k€ 12 k€ 1.5 k€ 1.6 k€ -13.9 k€ 
Sol. 1.1 5.18 k€ 6.22 k€ 0 0 -11.4 k€ 
Sol. 1.2 3.5 k€ 7.9 k€ 0 0 -11.4 k€ 
Sol. 2 7.5 k€ 9 k€ 4.5 k€ 0.6 k€ -11.4 k€ 
Depending on the chosen solution for cost allocation and remuneration, the increase in the total 
surplus will not be allocated to the players the same way. With Solution 1.1, there is a welfare 
transfer from the country with the lower average cost to the country with the higher average cost. 
This is the solution chosen in the FCR Cooperation. With solution 1.2, the surplus increase is 
entirely allocated to country B. With solution 2, the surplus increase is divided between country A 
and country B. 
Table 2.11 Increase of social welfare in country A and country B when merging 
 {TSO A +Producer A} {TSO B + Producer B} 
Sol 1.1-Ref 1 -€1.68k€ +€4.18k€ 
Sol 1.2 – Ref 1 €0k€ +€2.5k€ 
Sol. 2 – Ref 1 +€0.5k€ +€2k€ 
To generalize this example, with Solution 1.1, there would be a transfer of social surplus from 
reserve-exporting countries having a low average price – as TSOs would pay a high average price 
compared to autarky and there would be no extra-rent for generators due to pay-as-bid rules – to 
reserve-importing countries with a high average price. 
However, it should be noted that players would not bid at their marginal cost with a pay-as-bid 
solution. They would rather bid what they guess would be the price of the last selected offer, to 
maximize their revenue. This would result in lower transfers of social surplus among countries. 
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As solution 1.1 was chosen in the Cooperation, if France is exporting its reserve and has a low 
average price, it could negatively impact its total surplus, while allowing other countries to increase 
their surplus. On the contrary, if France imports reserves and has a high price compared to the 
market, other countries will see a decrease in their social surplus. 
4.2.3 On-going Process of Modification of Rules 
On January 9, 2017, the TSOs involved in the FCR Cooperation launched a consultation to every 
stakeholder on the potential changes in market design in the FCR Cooperation (50 Hertz et al., 
2017a). Various aspects were covered in the consultation, including auction frequency, product 
duration minimum bid, bid resolution and TSO-BSP Settlement. 
Results of the consultation and positions of the TSOs on these subjects were published on May 31, 
2017 (50 Hertz et al., 2017b). Twenty-nine BSPs prequalified for more than 20 MW and 28 BSPs 
prequalified for less than 20 MW responded to the consultation. 
Big BSPs were more in favor of keeping a weekly auction, with week-long products, whereas small 
BSPs asked for daily auctions with 1-hour products. 
When looking at the minimum bid, most of the stakeholders (78%) did not ask to reduce it. However, 
as most of the stakeholders were already prequalified, they had no interest in reducing the minimum 
bid. It should also be noted that results vary considerably depending on the type of technology 
used: 4 out of 7 storage units and 4 out of 8 aggregators of consumption units asked for a lower 
minimum bid whereas 29 out of 31 generation units asked for keeping this minimum bid. The 
proposal to keep a minimum bid of 1 MW and to lower bid increment was not in the consultation. 
For TSO-BSP settlement, 53% of the stakeholders asked for marginal pricing. Surprisingly, none 
of the aggregators of consumption units asked for marginal pricing, whereas most of storage units 
asked for it. 
Based on this consultation, the TSOs proposed a target-market design: 
 Within 9 months after approval from all National Regulatory Agencies (NRA), go for 
marginal pricing 
 Within 18 months after approval from all NRAs, implement daily auctions with 4 hours’ 
product, while keeping 1 MW minimum bid. 
The reason adduced by stakeholders and the TSOs for keeping a 1 MW minimum bid is that “there 
is hardly a business case below 1 MW” and that pooling resources would make it possible to easily 
reach this 1 MW threshold. This argument is questionable, since it is not the role of TSOs to decide 
where possible business is and that the pooling of resources can be limited for some new innovative 
players who do not own any generation assets. When considering lowering minimum bid, the 
analysis of the regulators should be driven by evaluating the costs and benefits for the system of 
this change and not by prejudging the possibility for BSPs to have a profitable business model. 
Moreover, a large majority asked for a harmonization of different market rules, such as 
prequalification criteria, penalty schemes and monitoring, to create a level playing field for all 
stakeholders among all countries. This should be implemented in a third step. 
In April 2018, this schedule was detailed by TSOs (50hertz et al., 2018): 
 In November 2018, daily auctions will be implemented, with daylong products9. 
 In July 2020, product duration will be 4 hours 
 In July 2019, marginal pricing will be implemented 
                                                     
9 This change was since postponed to July 2019. 
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5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, we presented a qualitative framework to identify barriers to entry for new entrants 
in reserve markets. These barriers to entry results from market-design that do not take into account 
the potential entrance of new actors in these services and fit the operational requirements of large 
centralized assets. We identified three different types of barriers to entry. First barriers are 
administrative rules that can exclude some types of resources from participation to market. Second 
types of barriers are rules regarding designs of products. Third types of barriers are those regarding 
remuneration on these markets. 
Investors and policy makers could use this framework to assess if it is possible for new actors to 
enter these different markets. We gave two different case studies to illustrate this. First, we provided 
a geographical benchmark of four different market zones, with two different products (Frequency 
Containment Reserve and automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve). This assessment was done 
in 2016. Second, we explored the modification of rules in France in 2017 in a context of 
harmonization of rules in Continental Europe, to understand its implications on provision of reserve 
by aggregators.
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In the previous chapter, we presented a qualitative framework to evaluate the impact of rules on 
flexibility provision by Distributed Energy Resources. We used this framework to compare rules in 
four different market-zones and to understand implications for aggregator of modification of rules in 
France. 
In this chapter, we will make a quantitative study of these rules on an aggregator of Electric Vehicles 
with bidirectional capabilities. We will focus more specifically on rules defining products (Module B) 
and on provision of Frequency Containment Reserve.In the first section, we will present our model 
to simulate participation of the fleet in flexibility services. In the second section, we will analyze 
revenues of fleets. It will allows us to understand quantitatively the impact of these rules on small 
to medium size fleets. Then, we will look at the profitability of an investment in bidirectional chargers 
on large fleets, through Net-Present-Value analysis. 
1 SIMULATION OF FLEETS PARTICIPATING TO FREQUENCY-
CONTAINMENT-RESERVE 
1.1 Description of the Model 
In this section, we will present the different modules to simulate participation of fleets of electric 
vehicles.  
The methodology used to build the model is described in the Figure 3.1. First, based on statistical 
characteristics of a fleet, the module 1 assigns trip patterns and corresponding mobility needs to 
each individual user. Then, with the module 2, we calculate reserve available over a definite horizon 
of time, based on a frequency deviations dataset. To compute the total reserve available for the 
entire fleet, we run Module 1 and Module 2, as many times as there are EVs in the fleet (𝑁𝑒𝑣). To 
take into account diversity of frequency deviation patterns and trip patterns, we run 𝑁 times this 
simulation. Based on these simulations and on product definition, we compute reserve offered on 
the market by the aggregator in Module 3.  
1.1.1 Individual Mobility Needs 
In this first module, we assign to each vehicles of the fleet its daily mobility needs. We use statistical 
distribution of daily trip patterns to do so.  
Each individual user is doing two daily commuting trip between home and work. We do not take 
into account non-working days, meaning trip patterns are the same for working days and non-
working days. These two daily commuting trips are characterized by (i) a distance, (ii) a hour of 
departure (in the morning for trip from home to work and in the afternoon for return trip) and (iii) an 
average speed. In the following of the thesis, whenever it is not explicitly stated, we will use 
statistical distributions presented in Table 3.2 for distance and hour of departure. These statistical 
distributions are derived from a survey conducted by the French government in 2008 (Ministère de 
la Transition Ecologique et Solidaire, 2008). Figure 3.2 shows the histogram of trip distances from 
this study and the fitted lognormal distribution adopted. Figure 3.3 shows average speed in function 
of commuting trip distance. We chose to assign an average speed based on a uniform distribution 
between a lower and an upper bound depending on the distance as shown the figure. Equation 3.1 
gives the calculation of the minimum required State of Charge of the battery at each time step, 
represented in Figure 3.4. 
 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚(𝑡) = max (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 , 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 
(𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 − 𝑡)
𝐸
∗ 𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔) 3.1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Methodology for Simulation of Participation of an EV Fleet to FCR 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the Vehicles 
Energy Capacity of the Battery 𝑬 50 kWh 
Minimum SOC 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 20% 
Maximum SOC 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 90% 
Power of the EVSE 𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔 Variable 
Consumption 𝑐 0.18 kWh/km 
 
Table 3.2 Statistical Distribution of Trip Patterns for Commuting Fleet 
Parameter Type µ σ 
Trip Distance (km) LogNormal 2.75 0.736 
Departure From Home (h) Normal 8 2 
Departure From Work (h) Normal 17.5 2 
 
Figure 3.2 Histogram of Distance Data and Fitted Lognormal Distribution 
 
Figure 3.3 Average Speed in function of Distance (Observations and Boundaries) 
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1.1.2 Calculation of Individual Reserve Available 
Based on energy needs for mobility calculated in Module 1, we want now to compute for each 
vehicles the Frequency Containment Reserve available during each charging session. Available 
reserve is limited by 1° minimum required energy at each time-step as calculated before, 2° 
maximum State of Charge of the Battery (𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥), 3° rated power of the EVSE (𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔) and 4° 
minimum duration of reserve activation. As explained in Chapter 1, Frequency Containment 
Reserve is activated based on measured frequency deviations from its nominal value. In continental 
Europe, the entire reserve is activated for a deviation of ± 200 mHz and full activation should be 
sustained for at least 30 minutes.  
To take this minimum duration of activation into account, we calculate reserve activated with a time-
step of t = 30 minutes. Each 30 minutes, vehicles calculate their Preferred Operating Point (𝑃𝑂𝑃) 
and available reserve (𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) based on their State-of Charge at the beginning of the time-step 
and limitations given before. We first calculate maximum power that can be injected into and 
withdrawn from the battery (respectively 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡) and  during the 30 minutes time-step 
(Equations 3.2 and 3.3). As we take a load convention, a positive sign correspond to an injection 
into the battery. Then, we compute maximum power that can be injected or withdrawn by the supply 
equipment, taking into account efficiency of the charger (𝑃ℎ,𝑆𝐸, and 𝑃𝑏,𝑆𝐸) and Equations 3.4 and 
3.5). Finally, as provision of reserve should be symmetric, we set the 𝑃𝑂𝑃 as the average of 𝑃𝑏,𝑆𝐸 
and 𝑃ℎ,𝑆𝐸 and 𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 as the remaining power available (Equations 3.6 and 3.7). During the time-
step, we compute the power injected by the EVSE and State of Charge of the battery for each 
second (s = 1 second) based on the Preferred Operating Point and Reserve calculated before and 
the measured frequency deviation (Equations 3.8 and 3.9). Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show 
graphical representations of computation of POP and Available reserve in different situations. 
Module 1 and Module 2 gives us reserve available for one EV. By running it multiple times and 
adding individual contributions to reserve, we can have reserve available for an entire fleet over a 
definite horizon of times for a certain pattern of frequency deviation. 
 𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 = −min (
𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔
𝜂
, 𝐸 ∗
𝑆𝑂𝐶 − 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝑡
) 3.2 
   
 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 = min (𝜂 ∗ 𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔 , 𝐸 ∗
𝑆𝑂𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑆𝑂𝐶
𝛿𝑡
) 3.3 
   
 𝑃𝑏,𝑆𝐸 = {
𝜂 ∗ 𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 , 𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 < 0
𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡
𝜂⁄ , 𝑃𝑏,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0
 3.4 
   
 𝑃ℎ,𝑆𝐸 = {
𝜂 ∗ 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 , 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 < 0
𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡
𝜂⁄ , 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0
 3.5 
   
 𝑃𝑂𝑃 =
𝑃ℎ,𝑆𝐸 + 𝑃𝑏,𝑆𝐸
2
 3.6 
   
 𝑅𝐸𝑉 = 𝑃𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑔 − 𝑃ℎ,𝑆𝐸  3.7 
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 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝]      𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑂𝑃 +
𝑓(𝑡) − 50𝐻𝑧
0.2𝐻𝑧
∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉 3.8 
   
 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟, 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝]      𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡) =
{
 
 𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡 − 𝛿𝑠) + 𝛿𝑠 ∗
𝜂 ∗ 𝑃
𝑆𝐸
(𝑡)
𝐸
, 𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑡) > 0
𝑆𝑂𝐶(𝑡 − 𝛿𝑠) + 𝛿𝑠 ∗
𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑡)
𝜂 ∗ 𝐸
, 𝑃𝑆𝐸(𝑡) < 0
 3.9 
   
 
Figure 3.4 Graphical Representation of Different Situations of Battery State of Charge  
 
Figure 3.5 Graphical Representation of Computation of POP and Reserve for one time-step. 
1.1.3 Reserve Bid on the Market 
In Module 3, we compute the reserve the aggregator could bid on the market. The aggregator 
should take into account – when making its offer – both uncertainties on trip patterns and frequency 
deviations patterns. To do so, we compute Module 1 and Module 2 for the entire fleet 𝑁 times with 
different trip patterns and with a different dataset of frequency deviations each time. We consider 
that available reserve for the fleet is the minimum available reserve over the 𝑁 simulations for each 
time step of an entire day (Equation3.10). Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show minimum and maximum 
reserve available for two fleets (first with 100 EVs and second with 2,000 EVs) over 500. Figure 3.8 
shows average proportion of reserve not offered over these 500 simulations for each time step. . 
The aggregator can then apply a security margin 𝛽 between 0 and 1 to be able to tackle unexpected 
situations (unexpected trips, vehicles not plugged, forecast errors in trip patterns). 
 𝑅𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡 = (1 − 𝛽) ∗ min
𝑠𝜖[1,𝑁]
∑𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒,𝐸𝑉
𝑛,𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑣
𝑛=1
  3.10 
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We now have available reserve of the fleet for each time-step of 30 minutes over an entire day, 
taking into account diversity of trip patterns and frequency deviations patterns. However, the 
aggregator must make a bid complying with market rules: minimum size of the bid, bid increment 
and duration of products. To do so, he will make its bid based on the minimum reserve available 
over each market period while respecting minimum bid and bid increment. Figure 3.9 shows bid 
made by the aggregator for different duration of products and bid increments. 
 
Figure 3.6 Minimum and Maximum Available Reserve for 100 EVs over 500 simulations 
 
Figure 3.7 Minimum and Maximum Available Reserve for 2000 EVs over 500 simulations 
 
Figure 3.8 Average Available Reserve not bid 
 
 
   
(a) Product of one week 
Bid Increment: 1MW 
(b) Product of one hour 
Bid increment: 1 MW 
(c) Product of one hour 
Bid increment: 0.1 MW 
Figure 3.9 Reserve available and Reserve offered for a fleet of 500 EVs with a 3 kW EVSE at home and a 7 kW EVSE at work 
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1.2 Validation of the Model 
We now want to validate that the aggregator would really be able to deliver reserve he offered on 
the market with the model described above, considering new frequency deviation patterns and trip 
patterns. The idea is to demonstrate the reliability of the bid, which could impact the size of the 
margin and the risk of penalties. 
To do so, we run Module 1 and Module 2, but instead of computing individual reserve available for 
each time-step, we affect to each vehicle part of the reserve offered on the market. We run 100 
simulations on two consecutive days. If it is possible to deliver reserve bid with the fleet for every 
simulations, the model is validated. Otherwise, we will look at the maximum number of 30 minutes 
time-steps where reserve cannot be provided by the fleet over the 100 simulations and the 
maximum amount of reserve that cannot be provided over the 100 simulations.  
We use two different validation tests. First, we set individual trip patterns based on statistical 
distribution presented in Table 3.2, considering the aggregator has perfect knowledge of these 
distributions. Second, we introduce forecast errors on statistical distributions as shown in Table 3.3: 
each parameters is affected according to a normal distribution. Mean of the distribution is the 
reference value and standard deviation is 10% of the reference value (except for mean hour of 
departure, where standard deviation is half an hour).  
We will perform this validation for two different set of product design: first, products of one week 
and bid increment of 1 MW; second, products of 1 hour and bid increment of 0.1 MW. We look at 
five sizes of fleet: 30, 100, 300, 1000 and 3000 EVs.  
Figure 3.10 shows results of the validation procedure without forecast errors on statistical 
distribution for different sizes of fleet. For this simulations, we take a coefficient 𝛽 equals to zero, 
meaning there is no security margin. There is no error for {1 week; 1 MW} over the 100 simulations. 
For {1 hour; 0.1 MW} market-design, there is limited number of time-steps with error (maximum 3 
errors over the 100 simulations for 3000 EVs) and a maximum non-delivered reserve of 360 kW for 
a fleet of 3000 EVs. This error could easily be reduced using algorithms that are more sophisticated. 
Figure 3.11 shows results when we introduce forecast errors, keeping 𝛽 equals to zero. Non-
delivered reserve is much higher in this case (maximum above 3 MW) and number of time-steps 
with errors can reach 50 with {1 hour; 0.1 MW} products, meaning the aggregator does not have 
enough reserve more than half the time. This could be problematic considering penalties in case of 
failure to deliver reserve. 
Increasing coefficient 𝛽 to 20 % helps to reduce this issue, as shown in Figure 3.12. Maximum 
forecast error is reduced to a maximum of 500 kW with {1 hour; 0.1 MW} products and there is no 
error for {1 week; 1 MW} products. We see here the importance of keeping a security margin when 
there is uncertainty on the statistical parameters of the fleet, especially when size of the fleet is 
important and granularity of products is important. We consider that this security margin of 20 % 
allows keeping insufficient delivery of reserve within an acceptable range. 
Table 3.3 Statistical Distributions with Forecast Errors 
Parameter Type µ σ 
Trip Distance (km) Lognormal 𝒩(2.75,0.27) 𝒩(0.736,0.07) 
Departure From Home (h) Normal 𝒩(8,0.5) 𝒩(2,0.2) 
Departure From Work (h) Normal 𝒩(17.5,0.5) 𝒩(2,0.2) 
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Figure 3.10 Validation test without forecast error and 𝛽 = 0 
 
Figure 3.11 Validation test with forecast error and 𝛽 = 0  
 
Figure 3.12 Validation test with forecast error and 𝛽 = 20 % 
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2 REVENUE ANALYSIS OF A FLEET OF BIDIRECTIONAL EV 
CHARGERS PROVIDING FREQUENCY CONTAINMENT 
RESERVE 
In the previous section of this chapter, we described the model used to simulate participation of a 
fleet of EVs to FCR. In this section, we will use this model to analyze revenues of participation to 
FCR. We will analyze the influence of market-design, size of the fleet and rated power of the EVSE 
on the revenues of the fleet. In the first section, we will present different market-designs studied 
and rated power of the EVSEs. In the second section, results of this analysis are presented. 
2.1 Market-Designs and Rated Power Scenarios 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that there is a diversity of market design in Europe 
concerning flexibility products. Moreover, there is an ongoing process of harmonizing markets while 
redesigning rules in order to facilitate participation of new actors. It is important, in this analysis to 
understand in detail the influence of market-design on the revenues of the fleet. We have seen in 
previous section (Figure 3.9) that temporal granularity (duration of products) and volume granularity 
(minimum bid and bid increment) will have a high influence on the possibility to bid the available 
reserve, which will affect directly the revenues of the fleet. 
Moreover, it is important to study revenues in different hypothesis of EVSE rated power as it will be 
the main determinant of amount of reserve that can be provided. Different set of rated power at 
home and at work are presented in Table 3.4. In the first scenario (EVSE-1), we consider EV can 
charge only at home, with a 3 kW power plug. This represents a business-as-usual scenario, as we 
consider here standard rated power for residential EVSE and that it is not possible with a single EV 
to provide reserve at different locations (meaning EVSE are aggregated rather than EVs). 
 In a second scenario, we consider it is possible to provide reserve with a single EV at different 
locations and we take a rated power of 7 kW for the EVSE at work. Finally, the third scenario 
represents a more disruptive scenario, where we consider each user has a 7 kW EVSE at home 
and a 22 kW EVSE at work. 
We will study three different temporal granularities, three different volume granularities and three 
different hypothesis on rated power of EVSE, as shown in Table 3.4. Scenario Temp-1 (one-week 
products) and Vol-1 (Minimum bid and bid increment of 1 MW) represent actual rules in the FCR 
Cooperation. Temp-2 (4-hours product) represents the target temporal granularity for FCR 
Cooperation (see Chapter 2). 
Table 3.4 Different Scenarios of Market-Design and EVSE 
Temporal Granularity 
Temp-1 One-week 
Temp-2 4 hours 
Temp-3 1 hour 
Volume Granularity 
Vol-1 Minimum bid 1 MW, Bid Increment 1 MW 
Vol-2 Minimum bid 1 MW, Bid Increment 0.1 MW 
Vol-3 Minimum bid 0.1 MW, Bid Increment 0.1 MW 
EVSE10 
EVSE-1 Home: 3 kW, Work: 0 kW 
EVSE-2 Home: 3 kW, Work: 7 kW 
EVSE-3 Home: 7 kW, Work: 22 kW 
                                                     
10 If AC bidirectional charging is used, maximum charging power can be limited by the rated power of the on-board charger 
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For this part of the study, as we want to evaluate maximum revenue the aggregator could make by 
participating to these markets, we consider he does not take any security margin, meaning 
coefficient 𝛽 is set to zero. Parameters of the EV and of trip patterns are described in Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2. 
2.2 Results 
Figure 3.14 shows the results for different scenarios of temporal granularity, volume granularity and 
EVSE rated power. On each figure, different temporal granularities are represented for a defined 
volume granularity and EVSE scenario. On left-side of the graphics is given the average reserve 
provided by one EV in kW and on right-side the corresponding revenue per EV per year.  
To convert average reserve provided in revenue, we need to know the price of reserve. Figure 3.13 
shows the evolution of the weekly weighted average price of reserve in FCR Cooperation and the 
2-years average price. We assume that the aggregator would always provide reserve whatever the 
price of reserve (short-term marginal cost of provision being null) and would be price taker on the 
market. We can thus compute directly revenues by multiplying average reserve provided by the 
average price of reserve. The two-year average price of reserve is 13.5 €/MW/hour. To be 
conservative, we consider that the average future price of reserve is 12 €/MW/hour. Equation 3.11 
gives the computation of revenue. 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 [€ 𝑦𝑟⁄ ] = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 [𝑘𝑊] ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 [€ 𝑀𝑊⁄ ℎ𝑟] ∗
8760
1000
⁄  3.11 
 
Figure 3.13 Evolution of FCR Cooperation price between January 2017 and November 2018 
Figure 3.14 gives the results for all different scenarios. We can first observe that entering market 
with one-week product is not possible when only EVSE at home are aggregated, because EVs are 
not available during daytime. This is the only case where entering is not possible for size of fleet 
lower than 5,000 EVs.  
We can then observe the effect of volume granularity. When volume granularity is low (Scenario 
Vol-1), revenue per EV is not monotonously increasing with the number of EVs. We can see for 
certain sizes of fleet peaks of remuneration. This effect is particularly present for low EVSE power 
(EVSE-1 and EVSE-2), low temporal granularity (Temp-1) and small fleets. For example, for 
scenario {Temp-1 ; Vol-1 ; EVSE-2} we can see revenue per EV decreases from 263 € for 400 EVs 
to 134 € for 776 EVs. This effect is explained by the size of the bid increment: before reaching the 
size of fleet which would allow increasing the bid (for example from 1 MW to 2 MW), the total 
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revenue of the aggregator stays constant when adding new vehicles, which means the revenue per 
EV decreases. We can observe decreasing the bid increment to 0.1 MW completely suppress this 
effect for every scenario and increasing temporal granularity reduces it partly. This will have a huge 
importance for the business-model of the aggregator: it will be easier to forecast properly the 
revenues per EV when temporal granularity is higher and to design an appropriate offer for 
customer. We can also observe reducing minimum bid to 0.1 MW allows entering the market with 
smaller fleets, particularly for low rated power of EVSE and for low temporal granularities. 
Finally, we can see higher temporal granularities allow reaching higher revenues per EV. For EVSE-
1 scenario, it is not possible to enter with one-week products. For fleet of 5,000 EVs, going from 4-
hours to 1-hour products increases revenues per EV by 34 % (37.5 €). For EVSE-3 scenario, going 
for weeklong to 4-hours long products increases revenues by 34 %, and from 4-hours to 1-hour by 
18%. 
   
(a) Vol-1, EVSE-1 (b) Vol-2, EVSE-1 (c) Vol-3, EVSE-1 
   
(d) Vol-1, EVSE-2 (e) Vol-2, EVSE-2 (f) Vol-3, EVSE-2 
   
(g) Vol-1, EVSE-3 (h) Vol-2, EVSE-3 (i) Vol-3, EVSE-3 
Figure 3.14 Revenues in Function of the Size of the Fleet for Different Scenarios (see Table 3.4 for 
definitions of different scenarios) 
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These different results allows us to captur the importance of market-design when trying to assess 
the viability of a business-model for provision of flexibility by EVs. Not only increasing volume and 
temporal granularity will increase revenues of the aggregator, but it will also guaranty that each EV 
added to the fleet will indeed participate to reserve provision and increase revenues. To show this, 
it is possible to take the problem in reverse: which size of fleet will allow the aggregator reaching a 
certain target revenue necessary to have a viable business model?  
This is represented in Figure 3.16: we compute the minimum size of the fleet that should be 
aggregated to reach a certain level of revenue per EV. Above this size of fleet, revenue per EV will 
always stay above target revenue, as shown in Figure 3.15 in the {Temp-1, Vol-1,EVSE-2} scenario 
for a target revenue of 250 €/EV. We show results for EVSE-2 scenario and three different set of 
market-design: {Temp-1, Vol-1} (actual rules in FCR Cooperation), {Temp-2, Vol-1} (target rules) 
and {Temp-3, Vol-3} (highest granularity studied here). For example, to reach a revenue of 100 €, 
at least 414 EVs should be aggregated with {Temp-1, Vol-1}, 360 EVs for {Temp-2, Vol-1} and 28 
for {Temp-3, Vol-3}. It is not possible to reach a revenue of 300 € per EV with {Temp-1, Vol-1}, while 
respectively 1426 and 80 EVs should be aggregated for {Temp-2; Vol-1} and {Temp-3; Vol-3}. 
 
Figure 3.15 Computation of Minimum Size of Fleet for a given Target Revenue 
 
Figure 3.16 Minimum Size of the Fleet in function of Target Revenue. EVSE-2 scenario. 
Target Revenue 
Minimum Size of Fleet 
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We have seen in this section how market-design could influence revenues of an EV fleet providing 
FCR. Based on our simulations, we were able to identify the minimum size of a fleet the aggregator 
should constitute in function of its targeted revenue. 
The aggregator will set its target revenue first in function of the cost caused by the provision of 
reserve. Indeed, revenues should at least balance costs to make it possible to have a profitable 
business-model. In the next section of this chapter, we will look at this issue, by studying the Net-
Present-Value of an investment in EVs equipped with bidirectional EV chargers. 
3 NET-PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS OF AN INVESTMENT IN 
BIDIRECTIONAL EV CHARGERS 
In the first part of this section, we will identify the different sources of costs associated with provision 
of FCR with bidirectional EV fleets and present the model for evaluation of Net-Present-Value of 
the investment in bidirectional EV fleets, parameters of our base-case scenario and results of this 
scenario, based on framework analysis used in (Roques et al., 2006). Finally, we will present 
different sensitivity analysis to study the different risks the aggregator could face. 
3.1 Model and Base-Case Scenario 
3.1.1 Costs Associated with Bidirectionality and Aggregation 
Implementation of bidirectional functions on the vehicles and operations associated with 
aggregation will be associated with additional costs on the vehicle. It is important to identify these 
different sources of costs carefully before making an investment in bidirectional chargers. 
We can identify two different types of costs. First, investment costs (CAPEX), and operating costs 
(OPEX).  
 Investments Costs are every costs incurred at the installation of the charger (on-board or 
off-board) and specifically dedicated to the provision of FCR. It includes searching for 
clients, installing bidirectional capabilities on the vehicle (as we make the hypothesis that 
bidirectional capabilities is only used for provision of reserve), developing Human Machine 
Interface, upgrading the telecommunication and metering equipment in order to comply 
with requirements of provision, going through prequalification process. Investment costs 
will occur once before starting to operate the fleet.  
 Recurrent Costs is including costs such as management of data, management of contracts 
with users and TSO, extra Operation and Maintenance costs on chargers due to reserve 
provision, market operations. These costs will occur every year of operation. 
These costs could differ in function of the technological options (e.g. AC on-board or DC off-board 
bidirectional charger), the different requirement on metering and telecommunication (e.g. is it 
necessary to install a new certified metering device for power? is it required to measure frequency 
at every points of connection? how fast should the measurement be send to the TSO?). They might 
also differ from one actor to another, considering its competencies and infrastructure already in 
place. 
Moreover, costs might evolve in function of the number of aggregated units. Investors might benefit 
from economies of scale if aggregating a large number of units: infrastructure could be shared 
between a large number of units, which will reduce the cost per unit (Burger et al., 2016). Investor 
could also benefit from leaning effect if having a large fleet: first bidirectional charger installations, 
prequalification process, contractual design might be costly because different processes have to 
be established. The investor will benefit from the experience acquired before for each new vehicle 
added to the fleet. 
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However, investors might face diseconomies of scale above a certain number of units. This might 
be due to cost of managing a large structure, non-scalability of the operational solution to aggregate 
data. Investors will also target first clients for which costs of implementation are low (for example 
company fleets or clients in a certain geographical scope); when these clients are already in the 
pool of units, investor will have to reach clients for which the implementation of the solution will be 
more costly. 
3.1.2 Base-Case Scenario 
We want first to build a base-case to calculate Net-Present-Value under different market-designs 
scenario in function of the size of the fleet. Net-Present-Value is the sum of the Discounted Cash 
Flow during the lifetime of an asset as shown in Equation 3.12. The discount rate represents the 
cost of capital for the company. The higher the discount rate, the lower will be future cash-flows.  
Net-Present-Value provides an evaluation of the profitability of the asset. If the Net-Present-Value 
is positive, investors should pursue the investment, since future cash-flows exceed the amount of 
the initial investment. Moreover, it allows comparing mutually exclusive projects, meaning it is not 
possible to invest in both project at the same time (in our case, the different mutually exclusive 
projects will be the different sizes of fleets). Parameters of the base-case are presented in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3.5 Parameters of Base-Case Scenario Calculation 
Investment Costs 𝐼0 500 €/EV 
Scale Factor 𝛼 10 % every 10,000 EVs 
Recurrent Cost 𝐶0 200 €/EV 
Minimum Recurrent Cost 𝑐𝑛 75 % of Recurrent Costs 
Size where 𝑪 = 𝑪𝒏 𝑁𝑛 25,000 EVs 
Margin Security 𝛽 20 % 
Lifetime 𝑇 10 years 
Inflation 𝜏 1 %/yr 
Average Price of Reserve 𝑝 12 €/MW/hr 
Discount Rate 𝑟 8 %/yr 
 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  −𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +∑
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝑡) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑡)
(1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 3.12 
For investment costs, the price of the first bidirectional charger added to the fleet is 500€. Then, we 
take into account economies of scale through the parameter α. The investment cost is a function of 
the size of the fleet 𝑁𝑒𝑣 and is calculated using Equation 3.13. When 10,000 vehicles are added to 
the fleet, investment costs per EV is reduced by 10%. Figure 3.17 shows the evolution of the 
investment cost with the number of vehicles in the fleet. 
 𝐼(𝑁𝑒𝑣) = 𝐼0 ∗ (1 − 𝛼)
(
𝑁𝑒𝑣
10000
)
 3.13 
Recurrent costs occur at each period of the Net-Present-Value analysis. The recurrent cost for the 
first EV is 200€/EV/year11. They are decreasing with the fleet size for 𝑁𝑒𝑣 < 𝑁𝑛 (polynomial function 
with coefficient 𝑎 and 𝑏, as shown in Equation 3.15) and constant for Nev ≥ Nn (Equation 3.14). We 
take Nn equals to 25,000 EVs. To calculate a and b, we use Equations 3.17 and 3.18. Figure 3.18 
                                                     
11 In (E-Cube, 2013) and (Rious et al., 2015), recurrent costs was evaluated to 50 €/year/client for basic load 
shifting. We take a higher value to consider complexity of FCR provision (10-seconds measurement of every 
site should be available in real-time to the TSO). 
REVENUES AND PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS OF A FLEET OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES PROVIDING FLEXIBILITY 
SERVICES 
63 
 
shows the evolution of recurrent costs with the number of vehicle. Finally, we take into account 
inflation with the parameter τ as shown in Equation 3.19. 
 𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑣) = max(𝑐𝑛 ∗ 𝐶0, 𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑣
2 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑣 + 𝐶0) 3.14 
   
 𝐶(𝑁𝑛) = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑛
2 + 𝑏𝑁𝑛 + 𝐶0 = 𝑐𝑛 ∗ 𝐶0 3.15 
   
 𝐶′(𝑁𝑛) = 2 ∗ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑛 + 𝑏 = 0 3.16 
   
 𝑎 =  
(1 − 𝑐𝑛)
𝑁𝑛
2
∗ 𝐶0 3.17 
   
 𝑏 = −2 ∗  
(1 − 𝑐𝑛)
𝑁𝑛
∗ 𝐶0 3.18 
   
 𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑣 , 𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑣) ∗ (1 + 𝜏)
𝑡 3.19 
 
Figure 3.17 Evolution of Investment Costs with Size of the Fleet 
 
Figure 3.18 Evolution of Recurrent Costs with Size of the Fleet 
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We introduce a security margin 𝛽 for the aggregator in order to cope with situations where some 
EVs would not be available or there would be an error of forecast in the statistical distributions (see 
first section). The aggregator will apply this security margin on the available reserve before bidding 
on the market. We then calculate the annual revenue based on a function 𝑀, which gives the offered 
reserve in function of available reserve and market-design (Equation 3.20, see first section). We 
can then calculate Net-Present-Value of the investment (Equation 3.21). 
 𝑅 = 𝑝 ∗∑𝑀((1 − 𝛽) ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) 3.20 
   
 𝑁𝑃𝑉 = −𝐼(𝑁𝑒𝑣) +∑
𝑅 − 𝐶(𝑁𝑒𝑣 , 𝑡)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 3.21 
To take into account diversity of deviations patterns of the frequency and of trip patterns, we run 
500 simulations with 2,000 EVs on two consecutive days taken randomly for each simulation during 
year 2017, with frequency data published by RTE (RTE, 2018). We compute available reserve for 
fleets going from 10 to 50,000 EVs. For size of fleets under 2,000 EVs, we sum reserve patterns of 
EVs taken randomly over the 2,000 EVs simulated. To compute reserve available for fleets with 
more than 2,000 EVs, we duplicate the profile of some EVs in order to reach the appropriate size 
of fleet. Available reserve is then computed as the minimum reserve for each time-step over the 
500 simulations. 
3.1.3 Results 
Figure 3.20 is presenting the evolution of the Net-Present-Value per EV in function of the size of 
the fleet with base-case parameters, for EVSE-2 scenario (3 kW at home and 7 kW at work) and 
for four different market designs: 
 Scenario 1: Temporal Granularity of 1 week and volume granularity of 1 MW. 
 Scenario 2: Temporal Granularity of 4 hours and volume granularity of 1 MW 
 Scenario 3: Temporal Granularity of 4 hours and volume granularity of 0.1 MW 
 Scenario 4: Temporal Granularity of 1 hour and volume granularity of 0.1 MW 
We take into account a maximum prequalified volume of 150 MW that can be delivered by a single 
Balance Service Provider. This limitation is imposed by ENTSO-e to ensure that the failure of one 
reserve provider would not affect the security of the system. This represents 5% of the total volume 
of FCR that should be delivered in Continental Europe12. It causes a decrease of the Net-Present-
Value per EV in the three last market-design scenarios, as revenues stops increasing with the size 
of the fleet when this volume is reached. From these curves, we can calculate two results: 
 The maximum Net-Present-Value per EV, which reflects the level of profitability of installing 
bidirectional chargers. It will influence the offers the aggregators would make to users. 
Indeed, in order to enroll clients, aggregators will reverse part of their benefits to user of 
EVs. If value of bidirectional chargers is high, aggregators will be able to propose a 
significant remuneration to clients, which will make their offer more attractive. Moreover, a 
high level of profitability ensures  
 The minimum number of EVs to reach a positive Net-Present-Value. It will be an essential 
feature for the aggregator, as it can represent a high risk for the investor to start aggregating 
a fleet without being certain to reach a sufficient size. 
Figure 3.19 shows how these two indicators might allow aggregator to reach a profitable business 
model. 
                                                     
12 In some country, the size of reserve can be lower than 150 MW, which reduces the maximum reserve that can be provided 
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Figure 3.19 Influence of Maximum NPV per EV and Minimum Size of the Fleet on Business Model 
Results are presented in Figure 3.21 and Figure 3.22. It is possible to reach a positive Net-Present-
Value in every scenario. However, increasing temporal granularity allows increasing significantly 
NPV. Maximum Net-Present-Value per Electric Vehicle is multiplied by four when going from week-
long products to hour-long products.  
Volume granularity has no significant effect on the maximum Net-Present-Value per EV. The 
minimum size of the fleet to reach positive NPV is highly influenced by granularity of products. With 
week-long products, the minimum size is more than 19,000 EVs whereas it is only 240 EVs with 
hour-long products. We can also see the effect of volume granularity: with four-hours products, 
going from 1 MW to 0.1 MW allows to divide by more than two the minimum size of the fleet. 
 
Figure 3.20 Evolution of NPV per EV with Size of the Fleet for Different Market-Designs 
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Figure 3.21 Maximum NPV per EV for Base-Case Scenario 
 
Figure 3.22 Minimum Size of the Fleet for Base-Case Scenario 
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The precedent analysis allowed identifying the level of profitability of a fleet of bidirectional vehicles 
providing Frequency Containment Reserve, as well as the minimum size of the fleet to reach a 
profitable business model, with different possible market-design. This study was performed with 
fixed parameters. These parameters are considered as realistic, based on the experience of experts 
interviewed. 
However, it is necessary to perform some sensitivity analysis, in order to capture the impact of a 
variation of these parameters. Indeed, the investor might face different uncertainties when 
assessing the profitability of the investment: 
 Investment costs and recurrent costs might be difficult to assess ex-ante, as the business 
model of aggregators is new. For example, recruiting client to participate to flexibility 
services might be a costly task if users are reluctant to let a third party control the charging 
process of their vehicle. Moreover, depending on the already existing activities of the 
aggregator and on its experience, some tasks might be less costly (e.g., it might be easier 
to build the appropriate IT architecture for a player already involve in electricity markets). 
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 The security margin could be refined when the aggregator has more knowledge on the 
habits of the users and the type of fleets aggregated. 
 The average price of reserve might decrease in the future, due to the arrival of new 
technology able to provide reserve: large stationary batteries, other distributed assets… 
Figure 3.23 shows the evolution of the price in the FCR Cooperation from January 2015 to 
July 2018 (lowest bid and highest accepted bid). This trend is clearly visible, even if FCR 
prices is highly volatile (due to correlation with energy prices). 
 Fleets with different trip patterns might affect the Net-Present-Value due to different 
availability of the cars and power of the EVSE (for example a company fleet). 
We will perform in this section three different types of sensitivity analysis to capture these different 
uncertainties.  
First, we want to see the effect on maximum NPV and minimum size of the fleet of a small variation 
(±20%) of each of the parameter of the NPV calculation around the base-case scenario value, all 
things being equals. It will allow us to identify the most sensitive parameters for the investor. It 
represents a situation where the investor has already a precise view on its costs structure and on 
the price of the service and want to assess the risk associated with the variation of each of these 
parameters. 
 
Figure 3.23 Evolution of FCR Cooperation Price between 2015 and 2018 
Second, we will calculate the value of the two indicators on different fleets, in term of availability of 
EV Supply Equipment and trip patterns. It allows the investor to target its offer to specific type of 
clients in order to maximize its profitability. 
Finally, we will look at profitability boundaries in function of investment cost, recurrent cost and price 
of reserve.  
3.2.1 Parameters of the Net-Present-Value Analysis 
As parameters in the base-case are uncertain for the aggregator, we will now perform a sensitivity 
analysis. In order to capture the impact of a variation of one of the parameter on the two values 
analyzed here (maximum Net-Present-Value and minimum size of the fleet), we calculate again 
NPV in function of the size of the fleet with one of the parameter in Table 3.5 set at ± 20 % of its 
original value, all things being equal. 
Figure 3.24 gives the results of this sensitivity analysis. Each figure represents, for four different 
market-designs, the impact of the variation of one parameter on the maximum NPV (left-hand side) 
and the minimum size of the fleet (right-hand side). 
 
 
  
(a) Maximum NPV and Minimum Size for Scenario 1 
  
(b) Maximum NPV and Minimum Size for Scenario 2 
  
(c) Maximum NPV and Minimum Size for Scenario 3 
  
(d) Maximum NPV and Minimum Size for Scenario 4 
Figure 3.24 Sensitivity Analysis on Base-Case Scenario Parameters 
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A decrease of 20 % of the price or an increase of 20 % of recurrent costs makes the investment 
unprofitable for low granularity products (scenario 1). Revenues of the investment do not balance 
costs associated. This sensitivity to price of reserve should be considered carefully by investor as 
a decrease of price of reserve is likely to happen. For other market-designs, even if there is no case 
where the investment is unprofitable, we can see that average price has still a high influence on the 
maximum NPV (± 400 € of the maximum NPV for price variation of ± 20%). The other parameters 
that have an influence are, by order of magnitude, recurrent costs, lifetime of the asset, margin 
security, investment costs and discount rate. 
Every parameters have a large influence on the minimum size of the fleet for scenario 1. An 
increase of 20% of the price reduces by about 10,000 EVs the number of EVs to be aggregated. 
When granularity is increasing, the minimum size becomes less sensitive to a variation of the 
parameters. For high granularity (scenario 4), recurrent costs and average price become the only 
influencing parameters. A decrease of 20% of the average price correspond to an increase of more 
than 14,000 EVs for a temporal granularity of 4 hours, and more than 5,000 EVs for a temporal 
granularity of 1 hour. 
This sensitivity analysis demonstrates the risks associated with the investment in a fleet of EVs 
equipped with bidirectional chargers. Aggregators should assess these different risks before 
starting to invest, as this could affect viability of their business models. 
3.2.2 Parameters of the Fleet 
In order to catch the influence of the parameters of the fleet, we perform analysis with three other 
fleets. In this sensitivity analysis, we take all parameters as in base-case and make a sensitivity 
analysis on the average price of reserve, which is the most sensitive parameters to assess 
profitability of the fleet. 
First fleet studied (Fleet 1) has the same parameters as base-case fleet but no plug available at 
work. Results can be seen in Figure 3.25 for maximum Net-Present-Value per EV. There is no 
scenario in that case where reaching a positive NPV is possible, even with an increase of reserve 
price of 20 %. It shows that availability rate of EVs is a crucial parameter to reach profitability. 
 
Figure 3.25 Maximum NPV per EV for Fleet 1 
The second and third fleets studied are company fleets. Cars are leaving in the morning and are 
coming back at lunchtime, then leave in the afternoon and come back in the evening. They are 
plugged in for the entire night. EVs of Fleet 2a have a 7 kW power plug and EVs of fleet 2b have a 
22 kW power plug. Parameters of the stochastic distributions for these fleets are given in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6 Statistical Distribution of Trip Patterns for Company Fleet 
Parameter Type µ σ 
Trip Distance (km) Normal 40 5 
Departure From Home (h) Normal 8 1 
Departure From Work (h) Normal 14 1 
Average Speed (km/h) Normal 15 5 
Figure 3.26 and Figure 3.28 show results for maximum NPV and Figure 3.27 and Figure 3.29 for 
minimum size of the fleet. With 7 kW plug, NPV is negative in scenario 1 (week-long products), due 
to periods of very low availability of the vehicles during working hours. Maximum NPV is lower in 
scenario 2 and 3 (4-hour products) than for base-case fleet, and profitability is not ensured in case 
of a decrease of the price. However, NPV is higher in scenario 4 (hour-long product) than for base-
case fleet.  
 
Figure 3.26 Maximum NPV per EV for Fleet 2a 
 
Figure 3.27 Minimum Size of Fleet for Fleet 2a 
With 22 kW plug, NPV is similar than for base-case fleet in scenario 1. Even if availability of EVs is 
very low during working hours, high rated power of EVSE allows making relatively high bids with 
few vehicles. For scenario 2, 3 and 4, maximum NPV is more than 5 times higher than for base 
case, due to high maximum power of the EVSE. 
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Figure 3.28 Maximum NPV per EV for Fleet 2b 
 
Figure 3.29 Minimum Size of Fleet for Fleet 2b 
This sensitivity analysis is demonstrating that revenues of the fleet will be highly dependent on the 
trip patterns of EVs and rated power of the EVSE. With low availability and low rated power, it will 
be difficult to ensure profitability of the investment even if there is an increase of the price of the 
reserve. Company fleets, due to low availability during daytime would be less appropriate in case 
of low granularity of the products. However, for high granularity products and high rated power, 
level of profitability could surpass base-case scenario fleet. 
3.2.3 Profitability Boundary 
This sensitivity analysis has shown the great impact of a diminution of price on profitability of the 
investment. Recurrent costs and investments costs can also be sensitive for the profitability of the 
investment. However, we only analyzed the variations on the different parameters on a small range 
(± 20%) and with only one factor varying, all things being equal. The investor might have a higher 
level of uncertainty on the different parameters (scale factor, minimum recurrent costs) and might 
not be able to evaluate them properly before pursuing the investment. 
Therefore, it is important to anticipate in which zone of investment costs and recurrent costs the 
investment should be pursued at different level of price and size of the fleet. In order to capture this, 
we calculate a profitability boundary. It represents the parametric curve where NPV changes of sign 
for a determined level of price of reserve and size of the fleet, in function of the investment costs 
(x-axis) and the recurrent costs (y-axis). These curves do not show the level of profitability.  
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(a) 𝑝 = 9.6 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 250 
(d) 𝑝 = 14.4 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 250 
  
(b) 𝑝 = 9.6 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 2,500 
(e) 𝑝 = 14.4 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 2,500 
  
(c) 𝑝 = 9.6 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 25,000 
(f) 𝑝 = 14.4 €/𝑀𝑊/ℎ 
   𝑁𝑣𝑒 = 25,000 
 
Figure 3.30 Profitability Boundaries 
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Figure 3.30 provides some example of profitability frontiers for the different scenarios of market-
designs. If the point is below the curve for a determined level of investment cost and recurrent cost, 
the NPV is positive and the investment should be pursued. For example, with an investment costs 
of 400 €/EV and a recurrent cost of 50 €/EV, with a price of 9.6 €/MW/h and a size of 250 EVs, the 
investment will not be profitable in scenarios 1 and 2 but would be profitable in scenario 3 and 4. 
We can see the effect of volume granularity for small fleet (250 EVs) on the profitability frontier. The 
gap between two curves is very large and increases with the price. There is no gap with larger fleets 
(25,000 EVs). The gap between different temporal granularities also increases when price 
increases. 
The slop of the frontier does not depend on the granularity of the product, the size of the fleet or 
the average price. In every situation, an increase of the recurrent costs of 100€ corresponds to a 
diminution of the maximum possible investment costs of about 700 €. This might influence the 
choices of infrastructure of the aggregator: it might be beneficial to have larger investment costs if 
it allows to reduce recurrent costs, e.g. choose between owning servers of using cloud solutions for 
data management. 
4 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 
In the first section of this chapter, we have described a model to simulate participation of EV fleets 
in reserve provision. This model can be described with three different modules: first module is 
allocating to each vehicle of the fleet trip patterns according to statistical distributions, which are 
used to identify mobility needs of each individual user. Then we simulate reserve available over a 
definite time horizon for each vehicle and each time-step based on a frequency deviation dataset. 
Then, we use these simulations to identify bid the aggregator would be able to make on each market 
period. We then run validation tests to assess if it would be possible to deliver offered reserve. 
In the second section, we assessed revenues of the aggregator under different scenarios of market-
design. We showed the importance of volume and temporal granularities of product: while temporal 
granularity will affect the revenues of the fleet, whatever the size of the fleet, low volume granularity 
will create threshold effect, which could affect early development of the fleet. 
Finally, in the third section, we looked at profitability of the investment in bidirectional chargers, to 
see if revenues could balance costs of the technology. We did it first on a base-case scenario, 
looking at the maximum Net-Present-Value per EV the aggregator could reach and the minimum 
size of the fleet to reach a positive NPV. Then, we did three different sensitivity analysis on these 
results: first by looking at low-range variations of each parameter of the calculation; then by looking 
at fleets with different availability rates and trip patterns; third, looking at the profitability boundary 
of the investment.
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1 ROLES OF THE AGGREGATOR AND VALUE CHAIN OF SMART 
CHARGING 
In the previous chapter, we analyzed revenues and Net-Present-Value of reserve provision by EV 
fleets. We understood the importance of market-design, availability of the fleet and power of the 
EVSE in the profitability of the technology. 
This analysis was a first step toward a business model. It gives necessary conditions for profitability 
but leaves some open questions: what share of value for the users of EVs and for each actors of 
the value chain? 
Indeed, the hypothesis was that only one actor would be in charge of all the roles of the aggregator 
and therefore bear all the costs and take all the revenues. However, there are many different tasks 
lying behind the term of aggregator.  
The first task would be to enroll clients to constitute the fleet. Then, all the equipment required to 
provide flexibility services should be implemented on the vehicle or the external charger, including 
bidirectional chargers, metering and telecommunication infrastructure It can also include capital 
provision on possible accelerated degradation of the battery due to provision of flexibility services. 
Finally, the fleet should be operated during its entire lifetime. Operating the fleet includes transfer 
from the vehicles to a central controller, management of data, making offer on the reserve markets, 
dispatching the reserve between the vehicles. It also includes customer service and maintenance 
of the different equipment. 
Different types of actors might get involved in these different tasks. First, car manufacturers will be 
directly involved, as they should design the vehicles to allow provision of flexibility services. They 
can implement AC bidirectional charger and other equipment directly in the vehicle. Otherwise, 
these equipment can be included in a DC external charger; manufacturers should still upgrade the 
vehicle in order to allow communication between the off-board charger and the Battery 
Management System. Manufacturers have also a role to play in the enrollment of client, as sellers 
of V2G equipped vehicles.  
Energy providers, electricity producers as well as independent aggregators will also be involved in 
the different tasks of management of the fleet. Energy providers and electricity producers have 
existing competencies in electricity markets, which could be beneficial in an efficient management 
of the assets. However, EVs require some specific knowledge, which could be brought by 
independent aggregators or EVSE operators. 
Each actor will have to decide on the tasks he wants to get involved in, depending on its existing 
competencies already in place. Actors will have different options for tasks where there is no or few 
competencies internally: either leaving consumers to decide which actors they turn to, either 
building cooperation with a specific actor to have common offer, or internalize this competency 
either by acquiring another company or by developing this competency internally. 
The different choices of the actors will define new value chains and ecosystem. The aim of this 
chapter will be to analyze a simplified ecosystem: a car manufacturer selling EVs with bidirectional 
chargers and an energy provider, offering FCR with these vehicles. This model will allow 
understanding the interactions and interdependencies between these two actors, how their 
decisions can influence demand for V2G function on vehicles and which type of cooperation they 
could build. 
In the second section of the chapter, we will describe the model to study these interactions: the 
actors, their decisions and the different case studies, which will reflect the different levels of 
cooperation between actors. In the third part, we will present the results of these case studies, 
based on the model presented in previous chapter. Finally, in the fourth section, we will present a 
simplified analytical framework to perform sensitivity analysis. 
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2 PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL: ACTORS AND CASE STUDIES 
2.1 Actors 
2.1.1 Car Manufacturer 
In this model, car manufacturer will be in charge of installing bidirectional function on the vehicles, 
which includes bidirectional charger and all metering and telecommunication equipment. It means 
he will bear the majority of investment costs. To simplify the analysis, we make the hypothesis he 
will bear the entire investment costs 𝐼 and does not benefit from economies of scale. However, as 
he does not take part to the management of the fleet, he does not bear any of the recurrent costs.  
He can be remunerated via a margin on the sale of V2G function: he will fix a sale price of the V2G 
function  𝑃 and users will have the option to integrate it on the vehicle or not. 
2.1.2 Aggregator 
The aggregator will be in charge of managing the fleet and making offers in reserve markets based 
on the availability of the fleet of EVs equipped with V2G function sold by car manufacturer.  
He will get the revenues from flexibility services and decide on a fixed annual fee 𝐹 paid to users 
of the cars. He will bear all recurrent costs 𝑐 but no investment cost. 
2.1.3 Users 
Users will take the decision to have a V2G function integrated on their vehicle based on the selling 
price decided by the car manufacturer and the annual fee decided by the aggregator. There is 
heterogeneity among users, which means for a certain selling price and fee, some of them will 
adopt the technology while others will not. This heterogeneity will be modeled through a demand 
function, which represents the amount of users who will buy the V2G option in function of the selling 
price and the annual fee. This demand function is exogenous for the manufacturer and the 
aggregator, meaning they have no other option to change the selling price or the fee to change the 
number of users adopting V2G. 
Buying V2G option and contracting with the aggregator are perfectly complementary: no user buy 
the V2G option without joining the aggregator’s fleet and it is not possible to join the fleet without 
having bought the V2G option. 
Users choose to buy V2G option depending on the Net Present Value of the option (Equation 4.1-
4.3). We consider NPV cannot be negative, as no user will buy V2G function in such a case. Users 
are expecting a reward for the delegation of the charging process of the battery and the engagement 
to plug the vehicle when possible. Some users expect a higher reward than others for this 
engagement. The Net-Present-Value will represent this reward. The higher the reward, the more 
clients will buy V2G option.  
We consider users have a discount rate 𝑟𝑢 different from the discount rate of aggregator and 
manufacturer (as in previous Chapter, we consider a discount rate of 8% for them, which is in a 
usual range in finance literature, see for instance (Roques et al., 2006)).  
There is a large literature on the estimation of individual discount rates (Hausman, 1979), (Coller 
and Williams, 1999), (Harrison et al., 2002), (Harrison et al., 2010) through experimental economy. 
This literature tends to find discount rates higher than market interest rates, with a large range. In 
the smart-charging literature, there have been two attempts to identify discount rate of individuals: 
(Parsons et al., 2014) found discount rates ranging from 41% to 56% and (Geske and Schumann, 
2018) from 11% to 21%, both using discrete choices experiments. Given novelty of electric vehicles 
and even more of V2G technology, these high discount rates are not surprising and in line with 
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other references in the domain of electric vehicles (Axsen et al., 2009; Horne et al., 2005; Mau et 
al., 2008). 
We will take in the following of the chapter 𝑟𝑢 equals to 12%, which is in the lower range of results 
found in the literature but larger than discount rate of manufacturer and aggregator. It means that 
present-value for users of being paid annual fees will be lower than present-value for aggregator to 
pay these annual fees. 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 = max  (0, 𝑠𝑢 ∗ 𝐹 − 𝑃) 4.1 
 𝑠𝑢 =∑
1
(1 + 𝑟𝑢)
𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 4.2 
 𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) = (𝑎 ∗𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑃,𝐹))
2
 4.3 
The parameter 𝑎 in Equation 4.3 reflects the intensity of demand. The higher this parameter, the 
more users will buy V2G function for a certain NPV. As we do not have any information on this 
intensity of demand, we will look at the different results in function of this parameter. Figure 4.1 
shows evolution of demand for V2G technology in function of user NPV for different levels of 
demand intensity. For a NPV of 300€, there would be only 900 users implementing the function for 
𝑎 = 0.1 while there would be 90,000 for 𝑎 = 1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Demand for V2G in function of User’s NPV 
It is possible to calculate elasticity of demand to Net-Present-Value, as in Equation 4.4. This 
elasticity is equals to 2, whatever the user’s NPV. It means if user’s NPV increases by 10%, the 
demand for V2G function will increase by 20%.  
 =
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢
∗
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢
𝐷
= 2 4.4 
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Figure 4.2Model for calculation of manufacturer and aggregator NPVs 
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2.2 Calculation of Net Present Value of Car Manufacturer and 
Aggregator 
With the behavior of the different actors we described above, we can now calculate NPV of the 
manufacturer and the aggregator. 
The selling price of the option P fixed by the manufacturer and the annual fee F fixed by the 
aggregator will determine the number of vehicles equipped with V2G function, as explained before. 
As the manufacturer does not have any recurrent costs to bear, its Net Present Value is simply the 
margin on the sale of the option multiplied by the number of vehicles equipped with V2G. NPV 
calculation for the manufacturer is described in Equation 4.5. 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) = max  (𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ (𝑃 − 𝐼), 0) 4.5 
As manufacturer shall have a positive margin, he should fix his selling price higher than investment 
costs. NPV can be expressed as in Equation 4.6. 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) = {
0, 𝑃 < 𝐼
(𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑃, 𝐹))
2
∗ (𝑃 − 𝐼), 𝑃 ≥ 𝐼
 4.6 
Moreover, as there is no demand if user’s NPV is null, manufacturer should not set selling price at 
a level which would not ensure profitability for users. We can then adapt formula as in Equation 4.7. 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) = {
0, 𝑃 < 𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃 > 𝑠𝑢 ∗ 𝐹
(𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑃, 𝐹))
2
∗ (𝑃 − 𝐼), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 4.7 
Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of NPV of the manufacturer in function of 𝑃 for different values of 𝐹 
(we take 𝑎 = 0.5, 𝐼 = 300 €/𝐸𝑉) and Figure 4.4 for different values of 𝑎 (with 𝐹 equal to 
100 €/EV/year). Manufacturer NPV increases when the annual fee or the intensity of demand 
increases as demand for V2G increases in both cases. Moreover, we can see manufacturer can 
increase his margin on the sell of the V2G option when 𝐹 increases. 
 
Figure 4.3 Manufacturer NPV in function of selling price P for different value of annual fee F 
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Figure 4.4 Manufacturer NPV in function of selling price P for different value of demand intensity a 
We can now find the Net Present Value of the aggregator. NPV of the aggregator can be expressed 
as in Equation 4.8-4.10, where 𝑠 is calculated as in Equation 4.11 and 𝑟𝐸𝑉 represents the annual 
revenue per EV, which can be calculated based on model presented in previous chapter. We have 
seen this annual revenue would depend on market-design, price of reserve, availability of EVs and 
number of EVs in the fleet. It is not a monotonic function of the number of EVs, due to threshold of 
volumes and maximum amount of reserve that can be provided (150 MW).  
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of aggregator NPV with the annual fee for different values of selling 
price, Figure 4.6 for different values of demand intensity and Figure 4.7 for different market-design. 
We take annual recurrent costs 𝑐 of 150 €/EV and the EVSE-2 scenario (3 kW plug at home and 7 
kW plug at work).  
Maximum aggregator NPV increases when price decreases, when demand intensity increases and 
when temporal granularity increases. When selling price increases, the aggregator should increase 
his annual fee in order to maintain demand. He will however loose margin and its revenues will 
decrease. When demand intensity increases, the aggregator can decrease his margin to increase 
demand, which will allow increasing his NPV.  
 𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹)) = 𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃, 𝐹) 4.8 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) = max [𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ [𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝑐 − 𝐹), 0]] 4.9 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) = {
0, 𝑠𝑢𝐹 < 𝑃 𝑜𝑟 𝐹 > 𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝐷) − 𝑐 
𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ [𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝑐 − 𝐹)], 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 4.10 
 𝑠 =∑
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 4.11 
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Figure 4.5 Aggregator NPV in function of annual fee for different value of selling price P 
 
Figure 4.6 Aggregator NPV in function of annual fee for different value of demand intensity a 
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Figure 4.7 Aggregator NPV in function of annual fee for different market designs 
Finally, if for a certain couple {𝑃, 𝐹}, one of the actor has a null Net-Present-Value, he will not invest 
in the technology, meaning the other actor will also have a null NPV (Equation 4.12-4.13) 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) = {
0, 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 0
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 4.12 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) = {
0, 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔 = 0
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹), 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 4.13 
We can see interdependences that can exist between choices of the aggregator and those of the 
manufacturer. If the manufacturer changes the selling price of the V2G options, it will affect the 
number of EVs equipped, which will change the revenue per EV of the aggregator, which might 
react by changing its offer and vice-versa. Figure 4.2 shows a graphical representation of the 
calculation of NPVs. 
2.3 Presentation of Case-Studies 
Based on the equations presented before, we want now to study value of a cooperation between 
manufacturer and aggregator using game theory. Game theory has been widely studied to 
understand interaction between different actors in a system and how they will share value (Wolters 
and Schuller, 1997)(Jia and Yokoyama, 2003)(Dabbagh and Sheikh-El-Eslami, 2015). 
The behavior of the car manufacturer and the aggregator can be modeled in game theory as a 
strategic, non-zero-sum game (Muthoo et al., 1996). The players are the manufacturer and the 
aggregator. The set of actions are defined by the vector of possible selling price ?̅? and annual fee 
?̅? 13. The payoff matrix is the matrix of NPV of car manufacturer and aggregator considering every 
possible strategies, computed as explained in the previous section. Moreover, we make the 
                                                     
13 We consider car manufacturer and aggregator can fix value of 𝑃 and 𝐹 with a granularity of 0.01 €. As ?̅? 
and ?̅? are bounded, the game can also be described as finite. 
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hypothesis players know payoff matrix of the other, meaning aggregator knows investment costs, 
car manufacturer knows recurrent costs and both actors know demand function. 
We will derive three case studies to study this cooperation. Case study 1 (CS1) is a non-cooperative 
situation. In this situation, we will find the Nash equilibrium of the game. Case study 2 (CS2) is a 
cooperative situation without financial exchanges. Finally, Case study 3 (CS3) is a cooperative 
situation with financial exchanges. 
We will compare these cases with two baseline reference cases: in the first reference, only one 
actor cumulates both function of manufacturer (R1), which will try to maximize his gains; in second 
reference, there are two actors, who only require having a positive NPV (R2) and try to maximize 
the sum of their gains. 
2.3.1 Reference 1 
In this first Reference, we study how an integrated actor, cumulating role of manufacturer and 
aggregator, would fix selling price and annual fee. This is done by solving optimization problem 
described in Equation 4.14 and 4.15. 
 max
𝑃,𝐹
𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ [𝑃 − 𝐼 + 𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝐹 − 𝑐)] 4.14 
 subject to {
𝑃 ≥ 0
𝐹 ≥ 0
 4.15 
2.3.2 Reference 2 
In this second Reference, we study how two actors would fix selling price and annual fee, under 
the constraint that they have a positive NPV. The optimization problem is described in Equation 
4.16 and 4.17. 
 max
𝑃,𝐹
      𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) + 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) 4.16 
  subject to  {
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) >  0
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) >  0
         4.17 
2.3.3 Case Study 1: Non-Cooperative Situation 
We want first to evaluate gains of both actors in a non-cooperative game. We will find Nash-
equilibrium considering each actor have perfect information on the intensity of demand. In the Nash 
equilibrium, no player can increase his payoff by changing its strategy (Muthoo et al., 1996): 
increasing or decreasing the selling price for the manufacturer or the annual fee for the aggregator. 
It is therefore a steady-state situation where players have no interest in changing their strategy 
unilaterally.  
We can see in Figure 4.3 that there is a value of 𝑃 optimizing manufacturer NPV. We will call this 
value 𝑃∗. We can obtain optimal price by finding where derivative of Equation 4.7 is null between 𝐼 
and 𝑠 ∗ 𝐹. This value will depend on 𝐹 but not on 𝑎. 
 
𝜕𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝜕𝑃
= 𝑎2 ∗ (𝑠𝑢𝐹 − 𝑃) ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ 𝐹 + 𝐼 − 3 ∗ 𝑃) 4.18 
 𝜕𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝜕𝑃
(𝑃∗) = 0 4.19 
 
𝑃∗(𝐹) =
𝑠𝑢 ∗ 𝐹 + 2 ∗ 𝐼
3
 4.20 
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This strategy is valid only if couple {𝑃∗, 𝐹} allows the aggregator to have a positive Net-Present-
Value, meaning that annual revenues per EV 𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃
∗, 𝐹) should be strictly greater than  (𝑐 + 𝐹).  
Otherwise, manufacturer will fix the selling price 𝑃∗(𝐹) to maximize his Net-Present-Value with the 
constraint that the aggregator should have positive Net-Present-Value (Equations 4.21 and 4.22) 
 max
𝑃
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) 4.21 
 subject to    𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝑐 − 𝐹 > 0  4.22 
We make the hypothesis in this case-study that the aggregator knows the behavior of the 
manufacturer and can thus anticipate which will be the price he will set for a certain annual fee. We 
can thus adapt Equation 4.23 in Equation 4.24.  
The aggregator will then fix the annual fee 𝐹∗ in order to maximize its NPV. Revenue per EV being 
the results of simulations, it is not possible to find an analytical form of 𝐹∗. 
 {
𝐷∗(𝐹) = 𝐷[ 𝑃∗(𝐹), 𝐹]
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
∗ (𝐹) = max  [𝐷∗(𝐹) ∗ [𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝑃
∗, 𝐹) − 𝑐 − 𝐹)], 0]
 4.23 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
∗ (𝐹∗) = max
𝐹
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝐹) 4.24 
We can solve the problem of non-cooperative situation by solving Equation 4.24, which will give us 
the optimal annual fee for the aggregator, and then by solving Equation 4.20 with 𝐹 = 𝐹∗, which will 
give us the optimal selling price of the V2G option for the manufacturer (Equation 4.25). Net Present 
Value of both actors are given in Equation 4.26 and 4.27. 
In this situation, manufacturer cannot increase his gains by changing selling price nor the 
aggregator by changing annual fee. Increasing gains, if possible, would necessitate a coordinated 
action from both manufacturer and aggregator, which would require a certain level of cooperation. 
This position is an equilibrium action as no actor can act unilaterally to increase his gains.  
Moreover, the gains find in this non-cooperative situation are the minimum gains the actors will 
accept in a cooperative situation. Indeed, they would not accept to cooperate if it comes with a loss 
of gains. These values are the reservation gains for both actor in a cooperative game. 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑆1 = 𝐹∗ 
𝑃𝐶𝑆1 = 𝑃∗ 
4.25 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆1=𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
∗ (𝐹∗) 4.26 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆1 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃
∗, 𝐹∗) 4.27 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Relations between actors in Case-Study 1 
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2.3.4 Case-study 2: Cooperative Situation without Financial Exchange 
In a cooperative situation, aggregator and manufacturer will try to set selling price and annual fee 
together, in order to maximize the total value of the V2G function. It means clients would buy at the 
same time the V2G function and the energy services with the aggregator. 
As explained earlier, it is possible to create this cooperation only if both actors are beneficiary. The 
objective is to find the optimal sum of NPVs given the constraints that individual NPVs should be 
higher than non-cooperative NPVs. This problem is presented in Equations 4.28 to 4.29 
 max
𝑃,𝐹
      𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) + 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) 4.28 
 
 subject to  {
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆1  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆1          4.29 
Net-Present-Values of the manufacturer and the aggregator are noted 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆2  and 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆2. This 
position is not an equilibrium position, contrary to Case-Study 1. It means that if one of the actor 
decides to change unilaterally either selling price (for the manufacturer) or annual fee (for the 
aggregator) he could increase his gains to the detriment of the other. This would bring back naturally 
to the situation of equilibrium found in Case-Study 1. Cooperation should therefore be framed by a 
contractual arrangement, even if there is no financial exchanges between both actors, to avoid 
unilateral changes of behavior. 
 
Figure 4.9 Relations between actors in Case-Study 2 
2.3.5 Case-Study 3: Cooperative Situation with Financial Exchanges 
In this Case-Study, the frame is the same than for Case-Study 2: manufacturer and aggregator will 
cooperate to elaborate a common offer that can maximize value of V2G for both actors. However, 
this cooperation includes the possibility for manufacturer to be remunerated by reserve market 
participation, through the aggregator.  
This remuneration will take the form of a fixed annual fee 𝐹𝑚 paid by the aggregator to the 
manufacturer, which will depend on the number of EVs equipped with V2G sold by the aggregator. 
In this situation, NPVs of aggregator and manufacturer are calculated as in Equations 4.30 and 
4.31. This will allow the manufacturer to reduce his selling price and to increase demand. 
Optimization problem is given with Equations 4.32 and 4.33. NPVs of aggregator and manufacturer 
in this situation should be higher than in Case-Study 2. Otherwise, stakeholders will not accept 
cooperation. 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) = max  [𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ (𝑃 − 𝐼 + 𝑠𝐹𝑚), 0] 4.30 
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𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) = max  [𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) ∗ [𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉(𝐷) − 𝑐 − 𝐹 − 𝐹𝑚), 0]] 4.31 
 max
𝑃,𝐹,𝐹𝑚
      𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) + 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) 4.32 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 {
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆2  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆2  4.33 
 
Figure 4.10 Relations between actors in Case-Study 3 
3 RESULTS 
We will now look at the different results for each Case Study presented in previous section. As 
explained before, the intensity of demand, characterized by parameter 𝑎 is exogenous for the 
aggregator and the manufacturer. We will look at the different results in function of this parameter.  
For other input parameters of the model, we take values shown in Table 4.1. We consider target 
market-design in FCR Cooperation for temporal and volume granularities. In order to maintain 
reasonable complexity, we do not include economies of scale in this model. 
Table 4.1 Parameters used in the framework 
Investment Costs 300 €/EV 
Recurrent Costs 150 €/EV/year 
Power at Home 3 kW 
Power at Work 7 kW 
Duration of Products 4 hours 
Minimum Bid 1 MW 
Bid Increment 1 MW 
Price of Reserve 12 €/MW/h 
3.1 Smoothing of Revenues Function 
We have seen in previous chapter that, due to high bid increments, the function of revenue per EV 
𝑟𝐸𝑉  is not monotonously increasing with size of the fleet. This creates threshold effect, which will 
have a repercussion in the calculation of Net-Present-Values in the different Case Studies.  
However, to have robust results, we should try to remove these thresholds effects. Indeed, the 
exact location of the threshold might be dependent on availability of the fleet, trip patterns etc. We 
will try to smooth the revenue function, taking a lower envelop of the function to be conservative in 
our results.  
User 
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Manage the Fleet and 
Pay Annual Fee 𝐹 
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Figure 4.11 shows the initial revenue per EV function and the smoothed function for market-design 
considered in Table 4.1 for size of fleet below 14,000 EVs and Figure 4.12 shows the smoothed 
function for size of fleet up to 100,000 EVs . 
 
Figure 4.11 Initial Revenue function and Smoothed Function 
 
Figure 4.12 Smoothed Revenue function 
3.2 Case-Study 1 
We will now study results for Case-Study 1. Figure 4.13 shows the evolution of NPV of both 
aggregator and manufacturer with Parameter 𝑎, as well as NPVs for Reference 1 and Reference 2.  
We can first observe that it is not possible to reach NPV of Reference 2 for this Case, whatever the 
intensity of demand. We can also see that above a certain level of intensity of demand (𝑎 ≈ 0.88), 
manufacturer NPV are decreasing, which is counterintuitive.  
The gains are not evenly distributed and the distribution depends on the intensity of demand. For 
high intensity of demand, the aggregator captures most of the value. His share decreases when 
intensity decreases. Figure 4.14 shows the share of value captured by each actor. 
Below a certain value of intensity (𝑎 ≈ 0.27), the total value decreases suddenly and becomes 
almost null. Moreover, the NPV for Reference 1 becomes null below 𝑎 ≈ 0.19.  
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Figure 4.13 Sum of NPVs in Case-Study 1 
 
Figure 4.14 Share of Total Value for Aggregator and Manufacturer 
We will now look at the corresponding selling price and annual fee fixed by the aggregator and the 
manufacturer. They are shown in Figure 4.15.  
We can identify regimes in function of the intensity of demand, which are corresponding to the 
different regimes identified for Net Present Values. Above 𝑎 ≈ 0.27, selling price is the reflection of 
annual fee, which corresponds to Equation 4.20. For 𝑎 ≤ 0.88, annual fee and selling price of the 
option are roughly constant. Little variations can be seen. They are consequences of little variations 
observed in the smoothed function. Above this level, annual fee and selling price decrease.  
For low intensity of demand, selling price is not anymore set by the manufacturer according to 
Equation 4.20, as this would not allow aggregator to have a positive NPV. The manufacturer 
reduces his margin in order to attract more clients, which allows the manufacturer to enter the 
market. The lower the intensity below this threshold, the higher the fee to attract more clients. This 
explains the sudden fall of sum of NPVs below this threshold. 
Finally, we can look at the number of V2G options sold, which is shown in Figure 4.16. We find 
again the different regimes presented before. The number of V2G options is decreasing between 
𝑎 ≈ 0.19 and 𝑎 ≈ 0.27, increases rapidly until reaching 𝑎 ≈ 0.88 and increases slowly after. As 
manufacturer’s margin decreases in this regime, this explains the decrease of his Net-Present 
Value after this value. Demand stays below 35,000 EVs, which is the size of fleet where revenue 
per EV starts decreasing. 
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Figure 4.15 Annual Fee and Selling Price of the V2G function in Case-Study 1 
 
Figure 4.16 Demand for V2G function in Case-Study 1 
3.3 Case-Study 2 
Let us now look at the results of the model for Case-Study 2, where manufacturer and aggregator 
will cooperate to have a common offer, which will maximize the sum of NPVs for both actors.  
Figure 4.17 shows the sum of NPVs in function of demand intensity (red dashed curve) with the 
different results of Case-Study 1. We observe cooperation allows increasing sum of NPVs for the 
first two regime identified before (𝑎 ≤ 0.88) but has no impact for higher intensity of demand. For 
𝑎 ≤ 0.6, it is even possible to reach Theoretical Maximum NPV with cooperation. 
In Figure 4.18, we can see how this value is shared between both actors. We can clearly see that 
the aggregator captures most of the value of cooperation.  
Figure 4.19 presents the selling price and annual fee for this case and Figure 4.20 demand for V2G 
function. We can see the different regimes found before: for 𝑎 ≤ 0.6, selling price and annual fee 
are constant. Selling price is reduced by about 50 € compare to Case 1 and annual fee is increased 
by about 10 €, which allows increasing demand for V2G option. For 𝑎 ≥ 0.6, selling price increases 
and buy price decreases with demand intensity. Demand is constant, at 35,000 users, the maximum 
level of demand found before.  
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Figure 4.17 Sum of NPVs in Case-Study 2 
 
Figure 4.18 Individual NPVs in Case-Study 2 
 
Figure 4.19 Annual Fee and Selling Price in Case-Study 2 
CHAPTER 4 
92 
 
 
Figure 4.20 Demand for V2G function in Case-Study 2 
3.4 Case-Study 2bis: Introduction of bargaining power of the 
Manufacturer 
We can question the viability of this cooperation, as the manufacturer does not benefit from it. He 
might indeed negotiate with the aggregator in order to fix a selling price and a fee that would allow 
him getting part of the value of the cooperation. We have to adapt Equation 4.28 to model this 
negotiation.  
The new optimization problem is described in Equation 4.34 and 4.35 (Binmore et al., 1986). The 
parameter 𝜋 represents the bargaining power of the manufacturer. The higher the bargaining 
power, the more weight will be attributed to the benefits of the manufacturer from the cooperation. 
For 𝜋 = 0, the manufacturer has no bargaining power and the solution of the optimization will be to 
maximize benefits of the aggregator under the constraint that the manufacturer does not loss 
benefit, and vice-versa for 𝜋 = 1. For 𝜋 = 0.5, value of cooperation will be shared equally between 
both actors. 
Figure 4.21 is showing NPVs of both actors for a bargaining power of 0.5 and Figure 4.22 the 
corresponding selling price and annual fee. We can observe that bargaining power of the 
manufacturer will indeed allow him to increase his benefits from cooperation. This is possible by 
increasing margin of the manufacturer and increasing annual fee. This has no consequence on the 
demand for V2G option as shown in Figure 4.23. 
However, it should be noted that this bargain is done at the expense of a loss of the total benefits 
of the cooperation, which is shown in Figure 4.24. The higher the bargaining power of the 
manufacturer, the higher the loss of total NPV. 
 max
𝑃,𝐹
 [𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆1 ]𝜋 ∗  [𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆1]
(1−𝜋)
 4.34 
 
 subject to  {
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆1  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆1          4.35 
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Figure 4.21 Individual Net-Present-Value in Case-Study 2bis 
 
Figure 4.22 Annual Fee and Selling Price in Case-Study 2bis 
 
Figure 4.23 Demand for V2G function in Case-Study 2bis 
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Figure 4.24 Loss of Gain in Case-Study 2bis compared to Case-Study 2 for different values of 𝜋 
3.5 Case-Study 3 
Finally, we can analyze results of Case-Study 3. To be coherent with Case 2bis presented before, 
we adapt Equation 4.32 to take into account bargaining power of the manufacturer. New 
optimization problem is presented in Equations 4.36 and 4.37 and sum of NPVs of both actors is 
presented in Figure 4.25, with 𝜋 = 0.5.  
This cooperation allows actors to reach NPV in Reference 1 (integration of different roles in one 
actors). It represents a large increase of NPV compared to “simple” cooperation without financial 
exchanges (up to 2,600 k€ on the ten years of life of the asset). With 𝜋 = 0.5, benefits of cooperation 
are equally distributed between the manufacturer and the aggregator.  
Figure 4.27 shows annual fee for users, selling price of V2G option and annual fee for manufacturer. 
The increase of value of the cooperation is obtained by lowering selling price, which becomes 
almost null. Manufacturer gets remuneration only from the aggregator, who can reduce the annual 
fee to users. This allows increasing demand for V2G technology. 
Figure 4.29 is showing NPVs of each actor for different bargaining power of the manufacturer and 
the corresponding annual fee for user, selling price of the V2G option and annual fee for 
manufacturer. The higher the bargaining power, the higher the annual fee for manufacturer and his 
NPV. However, annual fee for user and price of the V2G function stay constant with the bargaining 
power. Bargaining power will just affect the share of value each actor will get, but not the total value 
of the cooperation. 
 max
𝑃,𝐹,𝐹𝑚
 [𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆1 ]𝜋 ∗  [𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹, 𝐹𝑚) − 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆1]
(1−𝜋)
 
4.36 
  subject to  {
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛
𝐶𝑆2  
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔(𝑃, 𝐹) ≥  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔𝑔
𝐶𝑆2          4.37 
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Figure 4.25 Sum of NPVs in Case Study 3 
 
Figure 4.26 Individual NPVs in Case Study 3 
 
Figure 4.27 Annual Fee, Selling Price and Manufacturer Fee in Case-Study 3 
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Figure 4.28 Demand for V2G function in Case-Study 3 
 
Figure 4.29 Individual NPVs for different Bargaining Power 
 
Figure 4.30 Annual Fee, Selling Price and Manufacturer Fee for different Bargaining Powers 
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Figure 4.31, Figure 4.32 and Figure 4.33 give a summary of results for three different level of 
intensity of demand and bargaining power of 0.5: 
 For low level, benefits are almost evenly distributed between actors and relative benefits of 
cooperation are high, for simple cooperation (CS2) as well as reinforced cooperation (CS3). 
Cooperation allows increasing the number of equipped vehicles. For reinforced 
cooperation, about 28,400 vehicles are equipped and total NPV is 5.3 M€. 
 For medium level, manufacturer gets about one-third of the benefits. Simple cooperation 
does not increase significantly benefits while reinforced cooperation does. Cooperation 
does not results in a significant increase of equipped vehicles. About 35,000 vehicles are 
equipped. For CS3, total NPV is 12.7 M€ 
 For high level of demand, manufacturer gets only one-tenth of the benefits. Simple 
cooperation does not increase significantly benefits while reinforced cooperation does. 
Cooperation does not results in a significant increase of equipped vehicles. About 35,000 
vehicles are equipped. For CS3, total NPV is 16.7 M€. 
 
Figure 4.31 NPVs and Demand for Low Demand Intensity (a=0.5) 
 
Figure 4.32 NPVs and Demand for Medium Demand Intensity (a=1) 
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Figure 4.33 NPVs and Demand for Medium Demand Intensity (a=2) 
4 ANALYTIC MODEL 
In the previous section of this chapter, we used simulations of EV fleets to determine the revenues 
from FCR participation. If results presented allow determining the benefits of each actor in a realistic 
case and the price and fee they would fix, they do not allow us to capture the effect each parameter 
could have on these benefits. In order to express them analytically, we have to define a simplified 
revenue function.  
The total revenue function of the fleet is presented in Figure 4.34. This shape is obtained by 
linearization of the total revenue obtained from simulation (Figure 4.12). Before reaching a size of 
fleet 𝑁𝑀, each EV added to the fleet brings an additional revenue 𝑟𝐸𝑉. After this threshold, total 
revenue do not increase when an EV is added to the fleet.  
 
Figure 4.34 Analytic Total Revenue Function  
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To have a more general model, we also adapt demand function given in Equation 4.3. We introduce 
demand elasticity 𝑏, which gives us a new demand function (Equation 4.38) 
 𝐷(𝑃, 𝐹) = (𝑎 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑢(𝑃, 𝐹))
𝑏
 4.38 
We will first present different equations of selling price, annual fee and NPVs resulting from this 
simplified revenue function for the two References and the three Case Studies using model for 
calculation of NPVs presented in the second Section of this Chapter14. Then, we validate these 
Equations, comparing them with results obtained from simulation. Finally, we present a sensitivity 
analysis on the different parameters of the calculation. 
Table 4.2 gives a reminder of the different notations used in this Section and Equations 4.39 and 
4.42 the calculation of 𝑠 and 𝑠𝑢 from discount rate 𝑟 and 𝑟𝑢. 
Table 4.2 Parameters used in Equations 
Selling Price 𝑃 
Annual Fee 𝐹 
Manufacturer NPV 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 
Aggregator NPV 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 
Demand Intensity 𝑎 
Demand Elasticity 𝑏 
Maximum Size 𝑁𝑀 
Revenue per EV 𝑟𝐸𝑉 
Players’ Discount Rate 𝑟 
Users’ Discount Rate 𝑟𝑢 
Recurrent Costs 𝑐 
Investment Costs 𝐼 
Bargaining Power of the Manufacturer 𝜋 
 
 𝑠 =∑
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 4.39 
 𝑠𝑢 =∑
1
(1 + 𝑟𝑢)
𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 4.40 
4.1 Reference 1 
In this Case, we fix selling price and annual fee in order to maximize the total NPV of an integrated 
actor, playing both role of car manufacturer and aggregator. 
There are two regimes in this Reference, depending on the value of demand intensity 𝑎. For 𝑎 
below 𝑎1 given in Equation 4.41, maximum size 𝑁𝑀 is not reached at optimal couple {𝑃, 𝐹}. Above 
this threshold, maximum size is reached and size stays constant with 𝑎 at optimal couple.  
In this case, selling price 𝑃 will always be set to zero. If 𝑏 is higher than 1, meaning demand is 
highly elastic with user’s NPV, there is an inflexion point at 𝑎1, meaning the marginal benefit of 
increasing a will be decreasing. 
                                                     
14 For commodity of reading, we do not provide demonstration of these results. Different comments on the 
results are deduced from the analysis of these equations. 
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The higher the maximum size of the fleet 𝑁𝑀 and the ratio between 𝑠 and 𝑠𝑢, the higher 𝑎1. However, 
𝑎1 is decreasing with 𝑏. Selling price will be set to zero whatever the value of a, and annual fee will 
be constant for a lower than 𝑎1 and decreasing after. 
For a given value of intensity of demand 𝑎, NPV is increasing with demand elasticity 𝑏, with 
maximum size 𝑁𝑀 and with revenue 𝑟𝐸𝑉, and decreasing with discount rates 𝑟 and 𝑟𝑢 and with 
investment and recurrent costs 𝐼 and 𝑐.  
 𝑎1 =
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼
 4.41 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎1  
{
  
 
  
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗
1
𝑠
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑎𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗ (
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
)
𝑏
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
 
4.42 
   
 
∀𝑎 ≥ 𝑎1 
{
  
 
  
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.43 
4.2 Reference 2 
In this Case, we fix selling price and annual fee to maximize sum of NPVs of both actors, with an 
additional to constraint to have positive NPV for both actors. 
The shapes of the evolution of 𝐹 and NPV in this case present similar characteristics than in 
Reference 1. However, the maximum revenue is reached for a value of 𝑎 given in Equation 4.44 
which is higher than in Reference 1, while NPV is always lower, given that interest rate of users is 
higher than interest rates of aggregator and manufacturer.  
Selling price is fixed to compensate investment costs 𝐼, meaning benefits of manufacturer are null. 
It cannot be fixed at a lower level; otherwise, manufacturer NPV would be strictly negative. To 
compensate for higher selling price, annual fee must be higher than in Reference 1. 
 𝑎2 =
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
(𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼) 
 4.44 
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 ∀𝑎 < 𝑎2 
{
  
 
  
 
𝑃 = 𝐼
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑎𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
 
4.45 
   
 
∀𝑎 ≥ 𝑎2 
 
{
  
 
  
 
𝑃 = 𝐼
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.46 
4.3 Case-Study 1 
In this Case-Study, actors adopt a non-cooperative strategy. Two different regimes of evolution are 
found, depending on the value of 𝑎. Size of the fleet is increasing for 𝑎 below 𝑎3 given in Equation 
4.47. Value of 𝑎3 is higher than 𝑎2. For 𝑎 above 𝑎3, size of the fleet is constant, equals to 𝑁𝑀. 
For a below 𝑎3, benefits of manufacturer and aggregator are increasing with 𝑎. Selling price 𝑃 and 
annual fee 𝐹 are constant. Above this level, benefits of the manufacturer decrease with 𝑎. Indeed, 
aggregator can decrease its fee when 𝑎 is increasing, which means manufacturer should decrease 
selling price 𝑃. He will therefore decrease his margin while keeping the volume of equipped vehicles 
constant and his benefits will decrease. This is coherent with results found in Section 3 of this 
Chapter. If demand elasticity 𝑏 is higher than one, 𝑎3 is an inflexion point for Aggregator NPV. 
As manufacturer fix a selling price higher than recurrent costs, to have a positive margin on the 
installation of the V2G option, the sum of NPVs will be lower than in Reference 2, whatever the 
value of 𝑎. 
 𝑎3 = (
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
)
2
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
(𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
 4.47 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎3 
 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
 
4.48 
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∀𝑎 ≥ 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑚
𝑏
𝑎
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
 )
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑁𝑚 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.49 
   
4.4 Case-study 2 
In this Case-Study, actors adopt a cooperative behavior, trying to maximize the sum of NPVs under 
constraint to have higher individual NPV than in Case-Study 1. Value will be shared between both 
player according to their bargaining power 
To simplify this analysis, we only give results in case where the manufacturer (the aggregator) has 
no bargaining power. It is equivalent to maximizing the NPV of the aggregator (the manufacturer) 
given that NPV of the manufacturer (the aggregator) should be equal to Case-Study 1. 
It results in having three different regimes in function of 𝑎. For 𝑎 below 𝑎2, maximum size 𝑁𝑀 is not 
reached. For 𝑎 below 𝑎3 and above 𝑎2, maximum size is reached in Case-Study 2 but not in Case-
Study 1. Finally, for 𝑎 higher than 𝑎3, maximum size is reached for both Case-Studies. 
Equation 4.53 and 4.57 gives the relative gain from cooperation compared to Case-Study 1 for 𝜋 =
0 and 𝜋 = 1, respectively for the aggregator and the manufacturer We can see this relative gain 
only depends on demand elasticity 𝑏.  
For values considered in Section 3, the gain for the aggregator would be of 58 % if 𝜋 = 0, and the 
gain for the manufacturer would be of 87% if 𝜋 = 1. Gains of the aggregator are increasing with 
demand elasticity 𝑏 while gains of the manufacturer are decreasing. 
When demand intensity increases, gain of cooperation will de decreasing and become null when a 
is above 𝑎3. 
4.4.1 For 𝜋 = 0 
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎2 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
𝑏𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗ (1 +
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
) ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗ (1 − (
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
)
𝑏+1
) ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
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∀𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
√𝑁𝑚
𝑏
𝑎
+
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑁𝑚 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
−
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
 
4.51 
   
 
∀ 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑚
𝑏
𝑎
 
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.52 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎2 
∆𝐶𝑆2−𝐶𝑆1
𝐴𝑔
= (
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
)
𝑏
−
2𝑏 + 1
𝑏 + 1
 
4.53 
4.4.2 For 𝜋 = 1 
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎2 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
1
𝑏 + 1
∗ (1 − (
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
)
𝑏
) ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 + (1 −
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
) ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗ (1 − (
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
)
𝑏
) ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
  
4.54 
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∀𝑎2 ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 
√𝑁𝑚
𝑏
𝑎
−
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝐹 = 𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐 −
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑚 ∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 − 
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
−
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑀
∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
 
4.55 
   
 
∀ 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑃 = 𝐼 +
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
 
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 +
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.56 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎2 
∆𝐶𝑆2−𝐶𝑆1
𝑀𝑎𝑛 = (
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
)
𝑏+1
−
2𝑏 + 1
𝑏
 
4.57 
4.5 Case-Study 3 
In Case-Study 3, actors adopt a cooperative strategy, with a possibility to have financial flows 
between the aggregator and the car manufacturer. We give results for 𝜋 = 0 and 𝜋 = 1. We find 
three different regimes of evolution depending on the value of 𝑎.  
For a smaller than 𝑎1, maximum size of the fleet 𝑁𝑀 is not reached. For a between 𝑎1 and 𝑎3, 
maximum size is reached in this Case-Study but not in Case-Study 1. Finally, for a higher than 𝑎3, 
maximum size is reached for both Case-Studies.  
Whatever the value of a, it is possible to reach the total NPV found in Reference 1. Selling price 
and annual fee are fixed as in this reference: selling price is set to zero, meaning user should not 
pay to have the V2G function in their vehicle. The annual fee for car manufacturer allows 
redistributing gains from fleet participation to reserve between both actors. 
 For 𝜋 = 0, this annual fee is set in order to have manufacturer NPV equals to the one found in 
Case-Study 1, whereas for 𝜋 = 1, annual fee will be fixed to have aggregator NPV equals to the 
one found in Case-Study 2. 
Equation 4.61 and 4.65 gives relative gains between Case-Study 3 and Case-Study 1 for 𝑎 below 
𝑎3, respectively for aggregator for 𝜋 =  0 and for manufacturer for 𝜋 = 1. With values of Section 3, 
these relative gains are respectively 132 % and 236%. 
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4.5.1 For 𝜋 = 0 
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎1 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
𝑏
𝑠 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑠
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠
∗ (𝐼 + (
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
)
𝑏
∗
𝑏𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+2
∗
(𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
(𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗ ((
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
)
𝑏
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1 − (
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑏+1
)
  
4.58 
   
 
∀𝑎1 < 𝑎 < 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠
(𝐼 +
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑀
∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
−
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑀
∗
𝑏2𝑏+1
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+2
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
 
4.59 
   
 
∀ 𝑎 > 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠
∗ (𝐼 +
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 =  𝑁𝑀 ∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
−
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.60 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎1 
∆𝐶𝑆3−𝐶𝑆1
𝐴𝑔
= (
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
)
𝑏
∗ (
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
)
𝑏+1
∗ (
𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼
𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼
)
𝑏+1
−
𝑏
𝑏 + 1
∗
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
− 1 
4.61 
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4.5.2 For 𝜋 = 1 
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎1 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
𝑏
𝑠 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑠
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠
∗ (𝐼 +
1
𝑏 + 1
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼) − (
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
)
𝑏+1
∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗
(𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
(𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ ((
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
∗ (𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼))
𝑏+1
−
𝑏𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)𝑏
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
  
4.62 
   
 
∀𝑎1 < 𝑎 < 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠𝑢
(𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) −
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑚
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1 −
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ((𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼) −
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (
𝑎𝑏
𝑁𝑀
∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1 +
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
))
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 = 𝑎
𝑏 ∗
𝑏2𝑏
(𝑏 + 1)2𝑏+1
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼)
𝑏+1
 
4.63 
   
 
∀ 𝑎 > 𝑎3 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃 = 0
𝐹 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
𝐹𝑀 =
1
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝐼 +
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑎𝑛 = 𝑁𝑀 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ ((
𝑠 − 𝑠𝑢
𝑠
) ∗ 𝐼 +
1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑔 =  𝑁𝑚 ∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
∗ (𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼 −
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
√𝑁𝑀
𝑏
𝑎
)
 
4.64 
   
 
∀𝑎 < 𝑎1 
∆𝐶𝑆3−𝐶𝑆1
𝐴𝑔
= (
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
)
𝑏+1
∗ (
𝑠𝑢
𝑠
)
𝑏
∗ (
𝑠 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼
𝑠𝑢 ∗ (𝑟𝐸𝑉 − 𝑐) − 𝐼
)
𝑏+1
−
𝑏 + 1
𝑏
∗
𝑠
𝑠𝑢
− 1 
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4.6 Validation of Analytic Model 
We want to validate the analytic model developed before to evaluate if this tool can give similar 
results to those found by simulations. Figure 4.35 is giving results for aggregator NPV when 𝜋 =  0   
and Figure 4.36 for manufacturer NPV when 𝜋 =  1. 
We have good precision in the analytic model for every cases. However, there are some 
discrepancies between both model for low values of 𝑎 and around threshold values. 
 
Figure 4.35 Comparison between Simulation Model and Analytic Model for Aggregator NPV and 𝜋 =  0    
 
Figure 4.36 Comparison between Simulation Model and Analytic Model for Manufacturer NPV and 𝜋 =  1    
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4.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 4.4 to Table 4.9 provide sensitivity analysis on the benefits of the manufacturer and the 
aggregator for three different values of intensity of demand (0.5, 1 and 2), for three different Case-
Studies, using equations of the analytic model.  
As we have developed Equations only in case where one of the player has no bargaining power, 
we give results for manufacturer NPV when aggregator has no bargaining power and vice-versa. 
Therefore, these values represent upper bounds and would be lower if value of cooperation had to 
be shared among players.  
We look at the relative variation of the NPV, with a parameter increasing or decreasing of 20%, all 
things being equals. First line of the tables gives value of the NPV for base-case parameters given 
in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Parameters for Base-Case 
Demand Elasticity 𝑏 2 
Maximum Size 𝑁𝑀 35,000 EVs 
Revenue per EV 𝑟𝐸𝑉 280 €/EV/year 
Players’ Discount Rate 𝑟 8% 
Users’ Discount Rate 𝑟𝑢 12% 
Recurrent Costs 𝑐 150 €/EV/year 
Investment Costs 𝐼 300 €/EV/year 
It is possible with this analysis to validate results of Section 3 in base-case. For low value of demand 
intensity (𝑎 = 0.5), simple cooperation (CS2) allows increasing benefits for both actors as well as 
reinforced cooperation (CS3). However, when demand is medium or high (𝑎 = 1 or 𝑎 = 2), only 
reinforced cooperation allows increasing benefits. We also find that manufacturer NPV is lower for 
high level of demand intensity than for medium level. 
Some parameters will influence NPV of both actors in an intuitive manner. For example, a decrease 
of 20% of the revenue per EV will always have a negative influence, whatever actor, level of demand 
and Case-Study considered. It is also true for Maximum Size. An increase –decrease – of this 
parameter will always have a positive – negative – influence on NPV, for medium of high demand 
intensity. It is also true for player’s discount rate and recurrent costs. 
Other parameter will play an ambiguous role on benefits, especially for manufacturer. In particular, 
we can observe that the effect of a variation of demand elasticity is difficult to forecast. It is also 
true for users’ discount rate and investment costs, at a lower level. This can be explained by the 
non-monotonic nature of manufacturer NPV function with demand intensity. 
Finally, we can see that the level of a variation of each parameter will depends on the type of 
cooperation in place and the demand intensity. For example, an increase of 20 % of the revenue 
per EV have a large influence on manufacturer NPV is low, but no influence at all when demand is 
high. 
This sensitivity analysis gives a good complement to the one performed in the last Chapter, and 
shows that level of complexity is largely increased when value is shared between different actors. 
It is clear, considering this analysis that shape of demand function will play a predominant role in 
the design of a coherent business model. 
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Table 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis on Manufacturer NPV for 𝑎 = 0.5 and 𝜋 = 1 
 
Table 4.5 Sensitivity Analysis on Manufacturer NPV for 𝑎 = 1 and 𝜋 = 1 
 
Table 4.6 Sensitivity Analysis on Manufacturer NPV for 𝑎 = 2 and 𝜋 = 1 
 
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
900 k€ 1 688 k€ 4 388 k€
-20% -87% -87% -87%
+20% 153% 35% 7%
-20% 0% 0% 0%
+20% 0% 0% 0%
-20% -98% -98% -96%
+20% 416% 268% 113%
-20% 0% 0% 22%
+20% 0% 0% -18%
-20% 64% 64% 19%
+20% -39% -39% -15%
-20% 169% 162% 64%
+20% -77% -77% -72%
-20% 47% 47% 33%
+20% -36% -36% -27%
User's Discount Rate
Recurrent Costs
Investment Costs
Low Demand a = 0,5
Base-Case Manufacturer NPV
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
3 274 k€ 3 274 k€ 5 858 k€
-20% -89% -79% -71%
+20% -65% -65% -43%
-20% -28% -28% -26%
+20% 10% 30% 26%
-20% -98% -96% -87%
+20% 0% 0% 0%
-20% 0% 0% 21%
+20% 0% 0% -19%
-20% 0% 0% -27%
+20% -33% -7% 23%
-20% 0% 0% 0%
+20% -75% -53% -36%
-20% 0% 0% -7%
+20% -30% -5% 3%
Medium Demand a = 1
Base-Case Manufacturer NPV
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
User's Discount Rate
Recurrent Costs
Investment Costs
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
1 637 k€ 1 637 k€ 3 914 k€
-20% -33% 28% 33%
+20% -65% -65% -32%
-20% -28% -28% -24%
+20% 31% 31% 26%
-20% -82% -67% -37%
+20% 0% 0% 0%
-20% 0% 0% 28%
+20% 0% 0% -25%
-20% 0% 0% -35%
+20% 0% 0% 37%
-20% 0% 0% 0%
+20% 0% 0% 0%
-20% 0% 0% -10%
+20% 0% 0% 10%
Recurrent Costs
Investment Costs
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
User's Discount Rate
High Demand a = 2
Base-Case Manufacturer NPV
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Table 4.7 Sensitivity Analysis on Aggregator NPV for 𝑎 = 0.5 and 𝜋 = 0 
 
Table 4.8 Sensitivity Analysis on Aggregator NPV for 𝑎 = 1 and 𝜋 = 0 
 
Table 4.9 Sensitivity Analysis on Aggregator NPV for 𝑎 = 2 and 𝜋 = 0 
 
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
1 604 k€ 2 539 k€ 4 022 k€
-20% -86% -86% -87%
+20% 452% 248% 180%
-20% 0% 0% 0%
+20% 0% 0% 0%
-20% -98% -98% -95%
+20% 416% 299% 223%
-20% 8% 8% 25%
+20% -7% -7% -21%
-20% 48% 48% 13%
+20% -33% -33% -12%
-20% 169% 163% 126%
+20% -77% -77% -72%
-20% 47% 47% 32%
+20% -36% -36% -27%
Investment Costs
User's Discount Rate
Recurrent Costs
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
Low Demand a = 0,5
Base-Case Aggregator NPV
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
6 397 k€ 6 397 k€ 8 981 k€
-20% -89% -83% -82%
+20% 110% 110% 74%
-20% -5% -5% -10%
+20% 0% 12% 14%
-20% -98% -97% -92%
+20% 206% 206% 146%
-20% 8% 8% 19%
+20% -7% -7% -17%
-20% 36% 36% 8%
+20% -33% -15% 3%
-20% 110% 110% 78%
+20% -77% -64% -51%
-20% 39% 39% 23%
+20% -36% -21% -13%
Investment Costs
User's Discount Rate
Recurrent Costs
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
Medium Demand a = 1
Base-Case Aggregator NPV
Case-Study 1 Case-Study 2 Case-Study 3
12 229 k€ 12 229 k€ 14 506 k€
-20% -83% -73% -66%
+20% 29% 29% 23%
-20% -16% -16% -17%
+20% 15% 15% 16%
-20% -96% -93% -81%
+20% 108% 108% 91%
-20% 8% 8% 14%
+20% -7% -7% -13%
-20% 14% 14% 3%
+20% -15% -15% -3%
-20% 58% 58% 49%
+20% -58% -58% -49%
-20% 20% 20% 14%
+20% -20% -20% -14%
Investment Costs
User's Discount Rate
Recurrent Costs
Revenue per EV
Players' Discount Rate
Demand Elasticity
Maximum Size
High Demand a = 2
Base-Case Aggregator NPV
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5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, we have studied how value could be shared between a car manufacturer, who 
would be in charge of installing V2G function on the vehicles and an aggregator, who would be in 
charge of operating the fleet to provide Frequency Containment Reserve. We have looked at three 
different Case-Studies. For each Case-Studies, we developed results on a simulation model of EVs 
providing FCR, as in Chapter 3, and on an analytical model. 
In a first Case-Study, both actors adopt a non-cooperative behavior, meaning they will try to 
maximize their own Net-Present-Value, observing the behavior of the other actor. This situation 
would end in an equilibrium situation, which would be suboptimal due to double marginalization. 
Moreover, due to the limited size of the market, above a certain level of demand intensity, NPV of 
the manufacturer would decrease with demand intensity. 
In a second Case-Study, actors adopt a cooperative behavior, meaning they fix together selling 
price and annual fee for customers, to maximize the Net-Present-Value of both actors, under the 
constraints that each actor could not earn less than in the non-cooperative case. Actors would share 
the additional value given a certain bargaining power. 
Finally, we analyze a cooperation that includes the possibility of having financial flows between the 
aggregator and the manufacturer. This type of cooperation is equivalent to an integration of both 
activities as it allows redistributing value between the manufacturer and the consumer. As in Case-
Study 2, the share of value that will be affected to actors will be the result of a negotiation and will 
depend on their relative bargaining power. However, this type of cooperation could lead to a higher 
risk for the manufacturer, as he will be tied to the aggregator with a long-term contract and will 
share price risks on the FCR market with the aggregator. Therefore, he might prefer to secure part 
of the value by setting a non-zero price to the V2G function. 
To conclude, we have seen the complexity of designing a coherent offer for users that will ensure 
profitability for both manufacturer and aggregator. We used here a deterministic framework where 
the actors know all the parameters on costs, price of reserve and shape of demand. However, there 
is high uncertainty on these different values. In particular, it will be essential in the coming years to 
evaluate clearly demand for this type of service on the different market segments. Actors of the 
value chain should evaluate the types of vehicles and usage that are the most valuable in order to 
target them in their marketing. It means identify which vehicles could bring the more revenues and 
which are expecting low remuneration. 
We have also looked at a setting with only one possible offer and one type of usage. It could be 
interesting for both manufacturer and aggregator to have a menu of contracts where remuneration 
will depend on the rated power of EVSE, the minimum time of connection required during the week 
etc. However, this should not be done at the expense of the readability of the offer. 
In this framework, we have only looked at the provision of one service, Frequency Containment 
Reserve, which is the service with the higher value for V2G applications. We have looked at the 
effect of a saturation in this market. Other sources of value could be found to limit this effect of a 
saturation, such as energy arbitrage or other balancing services. Another solution, which is 
increasingly studied, is the provision of services to distribution network, to relieve congestion or 
provide voltage regulation services. However, there is currently no market-design put in place for 
these services. 
Finally, in our framework, both actors are in a monopolistic situation. However, there is already a 
competition in both car manufacturing market and energy provision. We can expect to have 
competing offers in the V2G market, with different cooperative agreement between actors. This 
would result in lower benefits compared to the monopolistic situation. Future work could consider 
this type of competition.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The concept of smart charging and Vehicle-to-Grid emerged more than two decade-ago. At that 
time, Electric Vehicles were nearly inexistent in the street. There is now a large consensus that 
Electric Vehicles will play a major role in the future of mobility. The First Chapter of this thesis 
exposed the background of this emergence. Transport industry is one of the first CO2 emitter. There 
is an urgent need to decarbonize this sector, which could be achieved by the conjunction of an 
electrification of the vehicles and a decarbonization of the electricity generation. It requires a public 
intervention, as transport system based on fossil fuel is already mature after one century of 
experience: we are facing a “lock-in” situation and without an intervention, transport system based 
on Electric Vehicles could not emerge. This public intervention took different forms in different 
areas. It led to a decrease in price of batteries, a diversification of the models proposed by car 
manufacturer, a development of charging infrastructure and finally an increase of sales, which is 
very likely to continue and accelerate in the future. 
However, the decarbonization of the electricity sector raised new challenge for System Operators, 
due to the intermittency of Renewables Energy Resources (RES). In particular, more flexibility is 
required in a system with high penetration of RES, to be able to face high ramp-up situations and 
to balance the system. In parallel with decarbonization of the system, reforms were conducted in 
different regions of the world to liberalize the sector. 
In this context, development and massive diffusion of EVs could be seen as a new source of 
constraints for System Operators: they could induce high congestions on both distribution networks 
and transmission networks when charging as well as aggravate ramp-up periods, especially if 
vehicles are charging as soon as plugged. However, considering mobility requirements, there is a 
flexibility in the charging pattern of vehicles, which could be used to charge when price of electricity 
is low, but also to offer flexibility services to System Operators, using smart-charging algorithms. 
Moreover, if it is possible to have reverse flow from the battery to the grid (Vehicle-to-Grid – V2G – 
or bidirectional capability), it would be possible to increase this flexibility. 
A large number of smart-charging algorithms were studied in the literature, to offer different services 
– balancing services to the TSO, flexibility services to the DSO, reducing energy bills of the user of 
the vehicle, allowing increased penetration of RES in the grid etc. However, the design of a technical 
solution does not make a business-model and some gaps of the literature were identified. First, 
how could this solution be monetized? Second, what is the institutional framework, in particular 
market rules, in which this solution could be implemented? Third, what are the costs associated 
with the implementation of this solution? Fourth, what is the willingness from users to adopt the 
solution? Finally, how the value would be shared among the different actors in the value chain? 
Based on this finding, the three following chapters of this thesis try to answer these different 
questions, focusing on provision of reserve by EVs equipped with bidirectional chargers, identified 
as the most valuable option already existing. We reduce the scope to European Union and use 
simple algorithms, to limit computation time when simulating large fleets. 
In the Second Chapter, we develop a framework to evaluate barriers to entry in reserve markets 
for aggregator of Distributed Energy Resources. We chose to have a generic framework, not 
focusing on Electric Vehicles. We distinguish three types of barriers. 
 First-Order Barriers: Administrative rules regarding the aggregation of DERs. We focus 
here on conditions to aggregate DERs to make an offer on these markets. For example, is 
it possible to offer reserve from different types of units, connected at different voltage 
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levels? How can the aggregator dispatch reserve between the different units? Does 
aggregated resources have to comply with specific technical requirements? 
 Second-Order Barriers: Definition of products. These are the rules defining the products 
exchanged in the market: length of products, minimum bid and bid increment, distance of 
Gate Closure Time to delivery and symmetry of products. These different rules might fit or 
not with operations of aggregators of DERs 
 Third-Order Barriers: Remuneration scheme. These rules define how the provider of 
reserve will be remunerated on the market. If no market is existing, provision will be based 
on administrative allocation and remuneration on regulated tariff. If a market is in place, 
remuneration can be based on pay-as-bid or uniform pricing. The latter will be more 
convenient for new entrants, as player just bid their marginal cost and do not have to guess 
the highest accepted bid. Moreover,  
Policy makers when designing markets could use this framework, as well as investors wanting to 
assess which markets are the most adapted.  
As an illustration, we provided first a benchmark of four different market zones with two different 
products (FCR and aFRR). This comparative assessment was performed in 2016 and results are 
only valid in this context. Denmark was considered as a frontrunner in the opening of market to new 
resources. France was characterized by an administrative mechanism of allocation of reserve, 
making it complicated for new entrants to offer reserve. In Germany, if market is open to any type 
of reserve, the definition of products was considered as non-optimal, due to high length of products. 
Finally, in Great Britain, if there is a move to open market to new types of actors, and to remunerate 
faster reserve, the number of markets and the lack of transparency was considered as a serious 
obstacle for new actors. 
Finally, we analyzed the effect of a modification of rules in France. French regulator requested this 
change, in order to create a market mechanism for provision of FCR. It was decided to join a 
common market between Germany and other neighboring countries, called FCR Cooperation. As 
explained before, this market is characterized by high length of products, which could have a 
negative impact on entrance of new actors. However, creation of a unique European wide market 
could help to reduce costs of provision of reserve. We gave some insights on the ongoing process 
of modification of rules in the FCR Cooperation. It is now planned to move to 4-hours products and 
marginal pricing, but not to change minimum bid or bid increment. 
The Third Chapter provides a quantitative evaluation of the impact on a fleet of Electric Vehicles 
providing FCR of two rules: bid increment (volume granularity of offers) and length of product 
(temporal granularity of products).  
First, we describe our model to simulate participation of fleets in FCR market. We distinguish three 
modules in this model. In the first module, we assign to each vehicle of the fleet according to 
stochastic distributions of trip patterns, which allows knowing the mobility constraint on the vehicle. 
In the second module, we evaluate for each vehicle the power available for reserve participation 
considering historic record of frequency deviation and assigned trip patterns over a definite time 
horizon. Iterating module 1 and 2 several times, with different frequency deviation patterns, we have 
a set of available reserve for each period of the day, which is used to evaluate the offer that could 
be made by the aggregator on the market in the third module. We validate this model, with and 
without uncertainty on the stochastic distributions of trip patterns. 
We then use this model to evaluate revenues of a fleet of EVs, considering different scenarios on 
volume and temporal granularities and on the rated power of EVSE at home and at work. We 
simulate size of fleets up to 5,000 EVs. We find that volume granularity and temporal granularity 
play a significant role in the revenues of the fleet. Low temporal granularity induces a loss of 
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revenue, whatever the rated power of EVSE considered. With week-long products, it is not possible 
to enter the market if vehicles are not available during daytime. Low volume granularity induces 
threshold effect: the total revenue of the fleet will not increase when new vehicles are added and 
the corresponding revenue per EV is therefore decreasing. In our best scenario (products of 1 hour, 
bid increment of 0.1 MW, 7 kW EVSE at home and 22 kW EVSE at work), the revenue per EV is 
about 1200 €/year. In a central scenario (products of 4 hours, bid increment of 1 MW, 3 kW at home 
and 7 kW at work), the revenue per EV is 350 €/year. 
In the third section of this chapter, we perform a Net-Present-Value analysis of the provision of FCR 
with EVs, considering costs associated with the provision:  
 Investment costs to enroll clients, implement bidirectional charger and other functions on 
the vehicle, Human Machine Interface and telecommunication equipment 
 Recurrent costs for management of the fleet, contractual relations with the clients and 
maintenance of the equipment 
We simulate fleets up to 50,000 EVs, considering a maximum volume of 150 MW that can be offered 
by one Balance Service Provider according to ENTSO-e rules (to diversify the number of actors 
providing FCR). We consider first a base-case scenario, with fixed parameters for NPV 
computation. We look at two different indicators for four different market-designs: the maximum 
NPV per EV that can be reached and the minimum size of the fleet to reach a positive NPV. We 
find that market-design has a large influence on both indicators. Maximum NPV ranges from 
170 €/EV for worst scenario to 760 €/EV for best one, and minimum size from 19,000 EVs for worst 
scenario to 240 EVs for best one. We perform sensitivity analysis on each of the parameter of the 
calculation on the NPV, for both indicators. We find that price of reserve has a large influence: a 
decrease of price of reserve of 20 % could decrease significantly the maximum NPV as well as the 
minimum size of the fleet for all scenario of market-design studied. This parameter is subject to high 
uncertainty, because a large increase of offer coming from storage units could lead to a depreciation 
of the value of reserve. We perform other sensitivity analysis on the parameters of the fleet studied. 
This study is not considering how the value would be shared between different actors of the value 
chain and with the user of the vehicle. The Fourth Chapter gives a framework to study this 
question. We model the interactions between a car manufacturer and an aggregator, considering 
demand for V2G technology. The car manufacturer implements the V2G technology on the vehicle 
and fix a selling price for the option. The aggregator manages the fleet and makes offers on the 
markets. He fixes an annual fee to reward users. Users will react to the selling price and annual 
fee, buying or not the V2G option, which is modeled with a demand function. 
Benefits of the car manufacturer and the aggregator are studied in three different scenario, using a 
game theory framework. In a first Case-Study, they do not cooperate when deciding their strategies. 
This situation leads to a Nash equilibrium where the players cannot increase their payoff by 
modifying their strategy unilaterally. In the second Case-Study, the players cooperate to reach a 
higher benefits for each actor. They cooperate only if the benefits is higher than in the non-
cooperative game. The share of the benefits of these cooperation will be attributed to each player 
according to their bargaining power. In the third Case-Study, players are cooperating, with the 
possibility of having a financial flow between them. This situation allows the car manufacturer to 
have a remuneration directly from the aggregator and therefore to reduce his selling price. 
We use this framework first with a revenue function resulting from simulations presented in Chapter 
3 and then with a simplified revenue function, which allows having an analytical form of the different 
results. Main outcomes of this study are:  
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 There is a significant value of designing a cooperation between a car manufacturer and an 
aggregator, especially if this cooperation includes the possibility of financial flows between 
parties and users are sensitive to high upfront payment when buying the V2G option. This 
value will be shared between actors according to their bargaining power. In our model, we 
found possible increase of 5.7 M€ to 16.7M€ on the entire lifetime of the asset (10 years), 
depending on demand intensity. 
 Manufacturer Net-Present-Value is not monotonic with demand intensity for V2G 
technology and decrease above a certain tipping point. This is due to the limitation on 
volume that can be offered by the aggregator. 
 In a cooperative framework with possibility of financial flows, the car manufacturer would 
fix a null selling price and be remunerated only by the aggregator. 
The sensitivity analysis showed the complexity in designing such a cooperation, due to the 
interdependencies between the two actors and non-linearity. In particular, demand function for V2G 
function will play a predominant role. It appears important now to have a better understanding of 
this demand (Who will buy V2G cars? What reward they expect? Which form should take this 
reward?)  
It is important to understand that this framework is rather simple compared to a real-life situation. 
Strong hypothesis were made to be able to model this cooperation: absence of competition on both 
car markets and energy provision markets, perfect knowledge of the demand function and payoff 
matrix of each player and no economies of scale in costs. 
To conclude, we have been able, in this thesis, to follow the different steps any actors willing to 
participate in smart-charging activities should study: 
 Prospecting the different solutions that smart-charging and V2G could offer 
 Assessing the institutional framework, in particular market rules, to evaluate the barriers to 
entry that he could encounter 
 Evaluate the possible revenue and the value of the asset, considering costs to implement 
the solution 
 Understand the demand for the solution 
 Identify which role he should take in the value chain depending on his competencies and 
elaborate cooperation with other actors of the value chain 
Based on this work, we can make the following recommendations: 
Recommendations for Regulators, Policy makers and System Operators:  
If relative improvement was proposed in the evolution of rules in the FCR Cooperation (going from 
1-week to 4-hours duration, even if bid increment has not be changed), which could allow entrance 
of aggregators in this market, it is also still needed to clarify the status of Electric Vehicles as 
provider of flexibility services. 
As mobile energy storage, Electric Vehicles are nothing near any other type of assets. There is a 
need to define a clear status for electric vehicles in grid connection rules, especially when equipped 
with bidirectional chargers, which would open the door to an entire set of specific rules taking into 
consideration the mobile nature of EVs, allowing to exploit completely their flexibility? Some 
clarification should be made regarding prequalification procedures, measurement of power and 
post-assessment of delivery – for example, to allow sub-metering in the EV or the external charger. 
Emergence of smart charging and V2G fosters the need for reinforced cooperation between 
Transmission System Operators and Distribution System Operators. This cooperation is required 
at local level, to anticipate the impact of diffusion of electromobility on some constrained areas and 
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at the national and European level, to create common process for the usage of flexibility from EVs 
and exchange of information. 
Indeed, as EVs might offer services for both DSOs and TSOs, there might be conflict of interest in 
the usage of these resources. For example, if a DSO takes some corrective actions in one area 
because of extreme events, it might endanger the ability of the TSO to balance the grid if EVs 
provide ancillary services in this area. This cooperation will not emerge ex nihilo and policy makers 
should create the appropriate platforms at the different levels (local, national and European).  
More globally, any initiative to foster cooperation between different actors of the value chain would 
allow better anticipation of changes to come and TSOs and DSOs should proactively involve in the 
different pilot projects on electromobility to test new regulations and share their experience and 
feedbacks at the national and European level. 
Recommendations for Actors of the Value Chain: 
Smart charging and V2G starts now to get outside of laboratories to be implemented in pilot 
projects: 50 V2G projects were identified in the world, 25 being in Europe (Everoze Partners, 2018). 
Commercial propositions are starting to emerge and different cooperation are appearing. Different 
actors should define their strategies: What will be their place in the value chain? With who can they 
cooperate? Which type of users will they target in their offers? 
We have studied mainly in this thesis provision of ancillary services with bidirectional chargers. 
However, the number of services that will emerge in the near future is still unsure and there might 
be many other opportunities for Electric Vehicles. Actors of the value chain should be versatile and 
agile. There is no “one fit all” solution: depending on the usage of the vehicle, the expected reward, 
the type of vehicle, the type of customer, different markets and services should be addressed. There 
is place for “low value” smart charging (unidirectional peak shaving for example) to “high value” 
smart charging (bidirectional provision of reserve) with many intermediary solutions. 
Recommendations for Future Research: 
There is still a large scope for research on the interaction between electromobility and electric 
systems. Following are five subjects that, in our sense, should be studied by different actors in the 
coming years. 
What will be the consequence on smart-charging of other innovations in the mobility industry, such 
as car sharing, autonomous mobility or very fast charging?  
These different innovations might radically change the usage of the vehicle and reduce the 
availability for provision of flexibility services. 
What will be the customer engagement in smart-charging? What remuneration does he expect for 
participation? Will it be possible to influence his behavior through contracts?  
This subject will be central to evaluate the profitability of smart-charging. If pilot projects can give 
some insights on this question, participants of these projects are often biased toward EVs and 
environmental issues. It will be interesting to know if V2G can reach mass market or will be limited 
to specific usages. Moreover, tools such as gamification could be useful to modify behaviors, 
beyond simple rewards. 
How local electricity markets will develop in the future, what will be the institutional framework 
around these markets and what will be the place of EVs in these markets?  
EVs could be very valuable assets to provide local flexibility. However, it is difficult to design an 
institutional framework for these markets, due to the diversity of networks (there is no “typical” 
distribution network) and the risk of high market power for potential providers. 
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What is the scalability of the smart-charging technologies? 
The issue of scalability is essential in the design of the solution. However, literature on this subject 
is nearly inexistent. Provision of high value services means being able to manage in real-time a 
large fleet, with very low delay on data transmission and very low error rate and outage probability. 
Moreover, data should be available to the TSO in real-time. Aggregator will have to choose the 
most appropriate technology in order to perform these services while having high reliability, which 
could affect costs of the solution. 
What will be the impact of Electric Buses and Electric Trucks in the future?  
Research has mainly focused on individual transportation. However, electric public transportation 
and freight transport might have a growing influence in the coming years. Possibility of smart 
charging and V2G with this type of assets could be explored. 
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SUMMARY IN FRENCH 
CHAPITRE 1 : LE VEHICULE ELECTRIQUE A LA CONVERGENCE DE 
DEUX INDUSTRIES EN MUTATION 
Les ventes de Véhicules Electriques ont été en constante augmentation ces dix dernières années, 
stimulées par l’adoption de politiques publiques favorisant la décarbonation du secteur automobile : 
imposition de normes restrictives d’émission sur les modèles vendus, soutien à la demande par la 
mise en place de primes ou d’exemptions de taxes à l’achat du véhicule, développement du réseau 
d’infrastructure de recharge. Ces différentes mesures devraient permettre de réduire les coûts liés 
à la fabrication de la batterie, d’augmenter l’autonomie des véhicules, de diversifier les modèles 
proposés par les constructeurs et d’aboutir à la mise en place d’un système de mobilité cohérent 
autour du véhicule électrique. 
Dans un contexte d’accroissement des énergies renouvelables dans le mix énergétique, entraînant 
des besoins plus important en flexibilité, la diffusion massive des véhicules électriques pourrait 
constituer une nouvelle source de contrainte si la recharge n’est pas gérée de manière intelligente. 
En particulier, la recharge non contrôlée des véhicules pourrait contribuer à l’augmentation des pics 
de consommation journaliers, et introduire des congestions sur les réseaux de distribution, 
nécessitant des investissements importants pour redimensionner les différents éléments du réseau. 
La gestion de la recharge des flottes de Véhicules Electriques peut aussi constituer une opportunité 
pour apporter cette flexibilité. La batterie des véhicules étant dimensionnée pour des trajets longue 
distance, son autonomie est largement surdimensionnée pour des trajets pendulaires quotidiens, 
ce qui laisse place à une flexibilité dans la gestion du processus de recharge. Cette flexibilité 
pourrait être renforcée par la mise en place d’un chargeur bidirectionnel, permettant la réinjection 
d’électricité sur le réseau. 
Plusieurs options sont possibles dans la mise en place d’une recharge intelligente. La première est 
l’arbitrage en énergie sur les marchés de l’électricité. Cette solution vise à diminuer les coûts de 
recharge, en déplaçant la recharge aux heures où l’électricité est peu chère, et dans le cas où le 
véhicule est équipé d’un chargeur bidirectionnel, à réinjecter de l’électricité les heures où elle est 
chère. Cette première solution est relativement simple à mettre en place car elle ne nécessite pas 
une gestion fine de la recharge. En revanche, les gains attendus sont limités et dépendent de la 
volatilité journalière du prix de gros de l’électricité.  
Pour une stratégie unidirectionnelle, des gains peuvent être réalisés en décalant la recharge sur 
une plage horaire fixe (entre 3h00 et 5h00) où les prix sont en moyenne les plus bas (entre 20€/an 
au Danemark et 60€/an en France). De faibles gains supplémentaires seront réalisés si la charge 
est optimisée de façon journalière. Dans le cas d’une recharge bidirectionnelle, les gains sont 
réalisés en effectuant une décharge les jours où la volatilité du prix est la plus importante. Des 
gains de 10€/an par rapport à une recharge unidirectionnelle optimisée peuvent être attendus en 
France pour 10 heures de décharge dans l’année (20 €/an si 100 heures de décharge sont 
autorisées). Il peut être intéressant de limiter les heures de décharge de la batterie, car cela peut 
avoir un impact sur sa durée de vie. 
Les flottes de Véhicules Electriques peuvent également proposer des services de flexibilité aux 
Gestionnaire de Réseaux de Transport : ce sont les réserves. Un acteur met à disposition une 
capacité à moduler sa production ou sa consommation afin de rétablir l’équilibre du réseau. 
Plusieurs types de réserve existent, suivant une classification établie par l’ENTSO-e. Les services 
ayant une valorisation importante sur la capacité mise à disposition et étant faiblement sollicités 
sont les plus intéressants pour des flottes de VE, car leur fourniture aura un impact moindre tant 
sur la durée de vie de la batterie que sur les contraintes liées à la mobilité de l’utilisateur. 
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La recherche s’est principalement intéressée à la conception d’algorithmes permettant cette 
recharge « intelligente », qui prennent en compte les besoins en mobilité des utilisateurs, tout en 
fournissant différents services de flexibilité. Cependant, un algorithme de recharge ne suffit pas à 
évaluer l’intérêt d’une solution. Différents aspects doivent être pris en compte : comment la solution 
pourra être valorisée dans un cadre institutionnel ? Quels sont les coûts liés à l’implémentation de 
la solution ? Quel est l’attrait des utilisateurs pour la solution, quelle rémunération attendent-ils pour 
leur participation ? Comment répartir la valeur entre les différents acteurs de la chaîne de valeur ? 
Cette thèse s’attache à aller au-delà de l’aspect algorithmique, en balayant l’ensemble des aspects 
qui permettraient d’aboutir à un modèle d’affaire viable, et en se focalisant sur la fourniture d’un 
type de service : la réserve primaire (Frequency Containment Reserve), qui constitue le service 
identifié comme ayant la plus forte valeur pour des flottes de Véhicules équipés de chargeurs 
bidirectionnels.  
CHAPITRE 2 : IMPACT DES REGLES DE MARCHE SUR LA 
FOURNITURE DE FLEXIBILITE PAR DES RESSOURCES 
DECENTRALISES 
Une première étape pour évaluer l’intérêt de rentrer sur un marché est d’évaluer les barrières à 
l’entrée qui existent sur ce marché. Ces barrières à l’entrée résultent de la construction des 
marchés en question, réalisée à une époque où seuls des moyens de production centralisés 
pouvaient fournir de la réserve. Avec l’arrivée de nouveaux moyens pour fournir ces réserves, il est 
nécessaire de redéfinir les règles de marché pour leur permettre de participer. 
Trois différents types de barrières à l’entrée ont été identifiés, qui constituent des niveaux 
successifs. 
Le premier niveau est constitué par les Règles administratives concernant l’agrégation de 
ressources décentralisées. On distingue ici des règles qui peuvent empêcher explicitement 
l’agrégation de ressources, ou exclure certains types d’unité du marché (les unités de 
consommation, les actifs connectés au réseau de distribution…). L’agrégation de ressources 
connectées à plusieurs Gestionnaires de Réseau de Distribution ou de Transport peut aussi être 
empêchée. 
Le deuxième niveau est celui constitué par les Règles définissant les caractéristiques des 
produits échangés. On distingue la durée des produits, le volume minimum et le pas de volume 
des offres, le délai entre la clôture du marché et la livraison du produit et la symétrie des offres 
entre réserve à la hausse et à la baisse. Ces règles peuvent ne pas convenir aux opérations d’un 
agrégateur. Par exemple si la durée des offres est longue et que les actifs agrégés sont disponibles 
de manière périodique (ce qui est le cas pour des véhicules électriques), l’agrégateur 
dimensionnera sa réserve offerte sur le plus bas volume de la période de livraison. Ces barrières 
peuvent être contournées par l’agrégation d’actifs aux caractéristiques différentes, quand les règles 
du premier niveau le permettent. 
Finalement le troisième niveau est constitué des Règles définissant la rémunération des offres. 
On distingue des processus de marché se basant sur des offres faites par les participants, des 
mécanismes administratifs, où la rémunération est faite sur un tarif régulé. Dans les mécanismes 
de marché, on peut distinguer deux alternatives : la rémunération au prix offert, ou la rémunération 
au prix marginal. La rémunération au prix offert est moins favorable à de nouveaux acteurs, car elle 
nécessite d’anticiper la valeur de la dernière offre acceptée afin de tirer la rémunération la plus 
haute possible, et donc une bonne connaissance du marché. 
Afin d’illustrer l’utilisation de ce cadre d’analyse, on réalise deux études de cas : une comparaison 
de quatre pays (France, Allemagne, Danemark et Grande-Bretagne), réalisée en 2016, sur les 
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réserves primaire et secondaire ; et une analyse de la modification des règles de marché sur la 
réserve primaire en 2017. 
La comparaison des quatre zones de marché révèle de grandes disparités entre les différents pays. 
La France se distingue par un mécanisme administratif d’allocation des réserves. Les unités de 
production centralisées se voient allouée une partie de la réserve au prorata de leur production, 
rémunérée à un tarif régulé décidé annuellement. Cependant, des actifs décentralisés peuvent 
obtenir une préqualification (dans la limite de 20 MW par agrégateur et 40 MW au total). Ces 
agrégateurs peuvent ensuite vendre de la réserve aux producteurs centralisés à un prix fixé par 
une négociation bilatérale, via une Notification d’Echange de Réserve. Ce mécanisme ne permet 
pas d’avoir une visibilité suffisante sur la rémunération possible de la réserve. L’Allemagne se 
distingue elle par la longueur des produits, qui est d’une semaine pour la réserve primaire comme 
pour la réserve secondaire. Cette durée rend difficile l’entrée d’actifs ayant une disponibilité sur la 
journée. Le Danemark possède des règles plus avantageuses, avec des durée d’offre de 4 heures 
avec un pas de temps de 0,1 MW. Enfin, la Grande-Bretagne est caractérisée par une diversité de 
mécanisme, avec une complexité et un manque de transparence sur chacun de ces mécanismes 
rendant complexe l’arrivée de nouveaux acteurs. 
En 2017, la France a changé les règles citées précédemment, pour adopter un mécanisme de 
marché sur la réserve primaire, en rejoignant le marché constitué par l’Allemagne et les pays 
avoisinant. Elle s’est donc calée sur une durée de produit d’une semaine, défavorable aux 
agrégateurs. Ce changement s’inscrit dans un processus d’harmonisation des règles au niveau 
européen afin de créer des zones de marché pan-européenne. Ces règles devraient être amenée 
à évoluer dans les années à venir, pour adopter des durées de produits de 4 heures, plus favorables 
à de nouveaux entrants. 
CHAPITRE 3 : ETUDE DES REVENUS ET DE LA VALEUR ACTUELLE 
NETTE D’UNE FLOTTE DE VEHICULES FOURNISSANT DE LA 
RESERVE PRIMAIRE 
Nous souhaitons maintenant connaître la valeur d’un investissement dans des véhicules équipés 
de chargeur bidirectionnel capables de fournir de la réserve primaire. 
Nous utilisons pour cela des simulations de flotte de Véhicules Electriques et procédons en deux 
étapes : une évaluation des revenus de la flotte, suivant plusieurs scénarios de règles de marché 
(durée des offres et pas de volume) et de puissance de bornes de charge. Nous considérons 
ensuite les coûts associés à l’implémentation des chargeurs et à la gestion de la flotte pour 
déterminer la Valeur Actuelle Nette de l’investissement. 
Le modèle de simulation de la flotte se découpe en trois module. Le premier module permet 
d’affecter à chaque véhicule des trajets quotidiens sur l’horizon de temps de la simulation à partir 
de distributions stochastiques sur ces trajets. On établit à partir de ces trajets les contraintes sur 
l’utilisation de la batterie, afin d’être capable de satisfaire les besoins en mobilité de l’utilisateur. 
Dans le second module, on simule la participation de la flotte à la réserve primaire, en considérant 
des relevés historiques de fréquence du réseau européen. L’algorithme utilisé permet de maximiser 
la réserve fournie tout en satisfaisant les besoins en mobilité de chaque utilisateur et les requis 
techniques de fourniture de réserve primaire. On obtient en sortie de ce module la réserve 
disponible pour la flotte considérée sur l’horizon temporel de la simulation. En répétant ces deux 
premiers modules N fois avec des affectations de trajet différentes et des données de fréquence 
différentes, on prend en compte la variabilité sur ces deux paramètres. A partir de ces différentes 
simulations, on peut déterminer dans le troisième module l’offre qui permette de satisfaire les règles 
de marché tout en s’assurant que la réserve sera effectivement disponible. 
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Nous validons ensuite ce modèle sur deux test différents : le premier avec une distribution 
stochastique des trajets connue par l’agrégateur, un deuxième avec une incertitude sur les 
caractéristiques de la distribution stochastique. Dans le deuxième cas, l’introduction d’un coefficient 
de sécurité permet de valider le modèle. 
On évalue les revenus sur trois scénarios de durée des offres (une semaine, 4 heures et 1 heure), 
trois scénarios de pas de volume (volume minimum de 1 MW et pas de volume de 1 MW, volume 
minimum de 1 MW et pas de volume de 100 kW, volume minimum de 100 kW et pas de volume de 
100 kW) et trois scénarios de puissance de prise, avec des flottes allant jusqu’à 5000 VE.  
Le pas de volume de 1 MW introduit des effets de seuils : en effet les revenus de l’agrégateur 
restent constants tant qu’un nouveau palier de puissance n’est pas atteint, diminuant le revenu par 
véhicule. Ces effets de seuils sont d’autant plus importants que la durée des offres est importante. 
Ces effets de seuils disparaissent lorsque le pas de volume est de 100 kW. Par ailleurs, la 
diminution de la durée des offres permet d’augmenter substantiellement les revenus par véhicule. 
Dans le meilleur des scénarios étudiés, on atteint un revenu de 1200 €/VE/an. Le scénario central 
aboutit à un revenu de 280 €/VE/an. 
On veut ensuite connaître la valeur d’un investissement dans une flotte de véhicules équipés de 
chargeurs bidirectionnels. Il est important de prendre en compte les différents coûts liés à la 
fourniture de réserve primaire. D’une part, les coûts d’investissement liés à l’implémentation sur le 
véhicule des fonctions nécessaires à cette fourniture. D’autre part, les coûts récurrents liés à la 
gestion de la flotte en temps réel. La rentabilité de l’investissement est évaluée par la calcul de la 
Valeur Actuelle Nette (VAN). Si elle est positive, l’investissement peut être considéré comme 
rentable. 
On simule des flottes allant jusqu’à 100 000 VE. On prend par ailleurs en considération une 
limitation sur le volume maximal pouvant être fourni par un agrégateur de 150 MW. Cette limite est 
imposée par l’ENTSO-e pour assurer une diversification des fournisseurs de réserve. Pour quatre 
scénarios de règles de marché, on identifie la Valeur Actuelle Nette par VE maximale pouvant être 
atteinte ainsi que le nombre minimum de véhicule à agréger pour atteindre une VAN positive. La 
VAN maximale varie entre 170 € et 760 €, et la taille minimale de la flotte entre 200 VE et 
19,000 VE.  
Une analyse de sensibilité est menée afin d’identifier les paramètres qui ont le plus d’influence sur 
ces deux indicateurs. Le prix de la réserve est celui qui a le plus d’impact, quel que soit le scénario 
de règle de marché. On mène également une analyse de sensibilité sur les paramètres de la flotte 
(disponibilité et puissance des bornes de charge). 
CHAPITRE 4 : VALEUR D’UNE COOPERATION ENTRE AGREGATEUR 
ET CONSTRUCTEUR AUTOMOBILE 
Dans le Chapitre précédent, nous avons exploré dans quelles conditions l’investissement dans des 
véhicules équipés de chargeurs bidirectionnels pourrait s’avérer rentable. Cela n’est cependant pas 
suffisant pour conclure à la viabilité du business model. En effet, la chaîne de valeur est complexe 
et plusieurs acteurs vont intervenir dans cette chaîne de valeur, en fonction des compétences de 
chacun. 
En particulier, deux acteurs vont être directement impliqués dans cette chaîne de valeur : le 
constructeur automobile, chargé d’intégrer la fonction bidirectionnelle sur le véhicule, et 
l’agrégateur, chargé d’opérer la flotte et de faire les offres sur les marchés. Dans ce quatrième 
chapitre, nous développons un cadre d’analyse permettant d’appréhender les interactions entre 
ces deux acteurs et d’identifier les gains qu’ils auraient à établir une coopération afin de construire 
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leurs offres. Par ailleurs, nous introduisons une courbe de demande pour la fonction 
bidirectionnelle, qui modélise l’attrait des consommateurs pour cette technologie. 
Dans ce cadre, le constructeur réalise l’intégration de la fonction et supporte donc les coûts 
d’investissement. Il est chargé de fixer un prix de vente pour l’option de chargeur bidirectionnel, qui 
doit lui permettre au moins d’amortir ses coûts d’investissement. L’agrégateur est lui en charge de 
la gestion de la flotte et supporte donc les coûts récurrents. Il doit également fixer le versement 
annuel aux utilisateurs pour leur participation. 
Les utilisateurs observent le prix de vente et la rémunération et décident de l’achat ou non de la 
fonction bidirectionnelle avec le véhicule. Nous modélisons l’hétérogénéité des utilisateurs par une 
fonction de demande, qui fait correspondre à une Valeur Actuelle Nette perçue par l’utilisateur un 
nombre de véhicules équipés de la fonction. Plus la VAN des utilisateurs est importante, plus le 
nombre de véhicule équipés est grand. 
Le modèle nous permet de calculer les gains des deux utilisateurs. Le gain du constructeur est le 
produit du nombre de véhicules équipés et de la marge qu’il réalise sur l’installation. Le gain de 
l’agrégateur est également le produit du nombre de véhicules dans la flotte et de la marge qu’il peut 
réaliser (qui dépend de la taille de sa flotte, puisque le revenu par véhicule dépend du nombre de 
véhicule, comme nous l’avons vu dans le chapitre précédent). Le nombre de fonctions installées 
dépendant des prix de vente et versement annuel, il existe une interdépendance entre les deux 
acteurs. Ainsi, le constructeur ne peut pas fixer un prix de vente trop élevé s’il constate que le 
versement est faible et vice-versa. 
On cherche à modéliser les interactions entre les deux acteurs et leurs stratégies (la fixation du prix 
de vente pour le constructeur et du versement pour l’agrégateur) dans trois cas d’étude en 
s’inspirant du cadre de la théorie des jeux :  
 Dans le premier cas d’étude, les deux acteurs ne coopèrent pas et cherchent à maximiser 
leurs gains en anticipant le comportement de l’autre acteur. On cherche à identifier le point 
d’équilibre (qui constitue un équilibre de Nash) où aucun des acteurs ne peut augmenter 
ses gains en changeant sa stratégie unilatéralement. 
 Dans le deuxième cas d’étude, les deux acteurs vont collaborer pour établir une stratégie 
qui permette d’augmenter les gains des deux acteurs par rapport au premier cas d’étude. 
Cette stratégie ne sera plus un point d’équilibre de Nash car un des acteurs pourrait 
modifier sa stratégie unilatéralement en vue d’augmenter ses gains. 
 Enfin, le troisième cas d’étude est similaire au précédant mais inclus la possibilité 
d’échange financier entre les deux acteurs. L’agrégateur verse une partie de son gain 
annuel au constructeur, qui peut donc fixer le prix de vente en dessous du coût 
d’investissement. 
Ces différents résultats sont étudiés en fonction de l’intensité de la demande pour l’option (une forte 
intensité signifiant que les utilisateurs n’attendent pas une rémunération importante). Les résultats 
de ces trois cas d’analyse démontrent l’intérêt à mettre en place une coopération entre les deux 
acteurs : les gains attendus augmentent uniquement quand l’intensité de la demande est faible 
dans le cas d’une coopération sans échange financier, et quelle que soit l’intensité de la demande 
dans le cas d’une coopération avec échange financier. Par ailleurs, on observe que le gain du 
constructeur diminue avec l’intensité de la demande au-delà d’une certaine valeur, ceci étant dû à 
la limitation sur le volume offert de 150 MW (voir chapitre précédant). Enfin, dans le cas d’une 
coopération avec échange, le constructeur adapte sa stratégie en fixant le prix de vente de la 
fonction à zéro, sa rémunération venant entièrement du versement de l’agrégateur. 
Nous introduisons ensuite une fonction de revenu de la flotte simplifiée, afin de pouvoir exprimer 
les gains des acteurs de manière analytique. Ce cadre est validé par une comparaison avec les 
résultats de simulation et une analyse de sensibilité est menée. Les résultats de cette analyse 
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montrent des effets de non-linéarité, ce qui démontre la complexité à mettre en place un business-
model optimal sur ces services. 
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Résumé : Les ventes de Véhicules Electriques 
ont été en constante augmentation ces dix 
dernières années, stimulées par l’adoption de 
politique publique favorisant la décarbonation du 
secteur automobile.  Dans un contexte 
d’accroissement des énergies renouvelables dans 
le mix énergétique, entraînant des besoins plus 
important en flexibilité, la diffusion massive des 
véhicules électriques pourrait constituer une 
nouvelle source de contrainte pour les 
gestionnaires de réseaux d'électricité si la 
recharge n’est pas gérée de manière intelligente. 
La gestion de la recharge des flottes de Véhicules 
Electriques peut aussi constituer une opportunité 
pour apporter cette flexibilité, en particulier si les 
véhicules sont équipés de chargeurs 
bidirectionnels, capables de réinjecter de 
l’électricité dans le système pour équilibrer les 
réseaux. 
La recherche s’est principalement intéressée à la 
conception d’algorithmes permettant cette 
recharge « intelligente », qui prennent en 
compte les besoins en mobilité des utilisateurs, 
tout en fournissant différents services de 
flexibilité. 
Cette thèse s’attache à aller au-delà de l’aspect 
algorithmique, en balayant l’ensemble des 
aspects qui permettraient d’aboutir à un modèle 
d’affaire viable, et en se focalisant sur la 
fourniture d’un type de service : la réserve 
primaire (Frequency Containment Reserve), qui 
constitue le service identifié comme ayant la 
plus forte valeur pour des flottes de Véhicules 
équipés de chargeurs bidirectionnels.  
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Abstract: Transport industry being one the first 
CO2 emitters, there is an urgent need to 
decarbonize this sector, which could be 
achieved by the conjunction of the 
electrification of the vehicles and 
decarbonization of the electricity generation 
mix. In conjunction with increasing flexibility 
needs to support the introduction of Renewable 
Energy Sources, the development of Electric 
Vehicles could add new constraints for System 
Operators if charging process is not managed in 
a smart way. 
However, considering mobility requirements, 
there is a flexibility in the charging pattern of the 
vehicles, which could be used to offer flexibility 
services to System Operators, using smart-
charging algorithms. Moreover, this flexibility 
could increase with the possibility to have 
reverse flow from the battery to the grid. 
Research focused mainly, during last years, on 
the design of algorithms to provide services with 
electric vehicles, taking into account mobility 
needs of users. In this thesis, we try to go beyond 
this design of algorithms, going through the 
different steps to elaborate a viable business 
model. We focus on the provision of one service 
– Frequency Containment Reserve – identified 
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